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A CRITICAL STUDY OF THE SĀṄKHYA SYSTEM

ON THE LINE OF THE SĀṄKHYA-KĀRIKĀ, SĀṄKHYA-SŪTRA AND THEIR COMMENTARIES

(being the research paper submitted to the University of Allahabad with the addition of an English and Sanskrit introduction and the texts of the Sāṅkhya-Kārikā and the Sāṅkhya-Sūtra.

BY

V. V. SOVANI, M.A., LL.B.,
Rajkumar College, Raipur.

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PREFACE

The author of a new book on the Sāṅkhya philosophy owes an explanation to his readers. Since there are already a few books in English, exclusively devoted to the Sāṅkhya and some others covering the whole field of Indian Philosophy, each containing a chapter on the Sāṅkhya, it may be demanded, why inflict another? My answer is simple. The present work is not altogether a new attempt but the reprint of my paper on the Sāṅkhya, prepared under the wise and able guidance of Paṇḍit (now Dr.) Umeśa Miśra, and published five years ago in the *Allahabad University Studies*, Arts section, Volume VII, pp. 387-432, while I was a Research Scholar in the Department of Sanskrit of the University of Allahabad. Then again, this booklet is not meant to replace the existing works but to supplement them, if the humble effort of a beginner, with very little pretensions to originality, can aspire to such a claim. This reprint has afforded me an opportunity to add introductions in English and Sanskṛt and the texts of the Sāṅkhya-Sūtra and the Sāṅkhya-Kārikā.

It is not a detailed critical study of the Sāṅkhya based on an exhaustive study of all the available original materials, but is a brief treatment of a select and compact group of facts on broad lines. I flatter myself that it will serve as a handy volume to Oriental scholars and University students; but those, who relegate the Sanskṛt texts to the back-ground and want the English exposition only, will not find much in it to meet their requirements. References to sources have been given in the foot-notes in the case of important points only.

My thanks are due to Principal T. L. H. Smith-Pearse, I.E.S., for kindly having gone through the manuscript of the English Introduction, to Dr. J. Sinha, M.A., Ph.D., P.R.S., Professor of Philosophy, Meerut College, for associating himself with this book and to some of my colleagues for some helpful suggestions.

Raipur : April 1, 1935. V. V. S.

ASSOCIATION

I feel immense pleasure in associating myself with the valuable and scholarly work of Mr. V. V. Sovani, M.A., with whom I have been intimately connected for many years by the closest ties of affection. He is a distinguished graduate of our College and the Agra University. He was inspired with genuine love for Sanskrit literature and philosophy by his father, late Prof. V. V. Sovani, M.A., of Meerut College and Allahabad University, who was well-known in Northern India for his profound scholarship in Sanskritic studies. Mr. V. V. Sovani wrote his "*A Critical Study of the Sāṅkhya System*" as a Research Scholar of the Allahabad University, which was published in the *Allahabad University Studies*, Vol. VII., in 1931. He has laid us under a deep debt of gratitude by publishing the abstract in the form of a book which will be easily accessible to all interested in the subject. His work with its historical introduction and highly suggestive, critical analysis of the Sāṅkhya Kārikā with its commentaries and a comparative estimate of their interpretations will be a valuable guide and a useful book of reference to all students of Indian philosophy. The book, fully worked out, with English translations of the Kārikās and important portions of the commentaries, will be a valuable contribution to the literature on the subject.

Meerut : Jadunath Sinha.

April 1, 1935.

INTRODUCTION

A critical treatment of the Sāṅkhya has been essayed in the body of the book. The occasion is here taken to discuss a few broad principles and to present some thought-provoking ideas, but I have attempted only to suggest, not to dilate.

Religion and philosophy will always have an important place in ennobling the life of man. Science[1] cannot replace them. It is in the nature of too many men to crave for something that the mind cannot grasp and which is beyond the powers of exact sciences to explain. The modern increasingly scientific world has not yet been able to solve much of the riddle[2], and whatever comparatively few conclusions science has reached are liable to be reversed any moment. Who could expect that many of the Newtonian theories of

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1. "The tendency to-day is not to reduce everything to manifestations of matter—since matter now has only a minor place in the physical world—but to reduce it to manifestations of the operation of natural law", and concludes "... Dismiss the idea that natural law may swallow up religion; it cannot even tackle the multiplication table single-handed."—Prof. Eddington, as quoted by Ramanand Chatterji in the *Malaviya Commemoration Volume.*

2. "...The ethers and their undulations, the waves which form the universe, are in all probability fictitious. This is not to say that they have no existence at all: they exist in our minds, or we should not be discussing them; and something must exist outside our minds to put this or any other concept into our minds. To this something we may assign the name reality, and it is this reality which it is the object of science to study."—Sir James Jeans in *Mysterious Universe.*

Mathematics and Physics would be overthrown by Einstein's theory of Relativity? "An apple is attracted by the earth when it falls" was said by Newton. In the popular language, Einstein would probably now say, "The earth moves up to receive the apple". A molecule was regarded as unbreakable. Later on atom was supposed to be an unanalysable entity but now that too is supposed to be made of electrons and protons. In simple language, energy is supposed to be evolving matter, a statement which the scientists were not ready to accept in the past. Consider also the example of the Elements. More than 96 have been found out and he who knows the Electronic theory may some day reduce the number to Unity. Surely a start has been made by transmutation of lead into gold and Hydrogen into Helium. If it is possible to get one from the other, it may be possible some day to get All from One.

The influence of the West and new scientific theories and inventions have helped to change the outward aspect of India but the inner spiritual aspect of the country has not changed much. There is no achievement in the world which can compare favourably with that of Indian speculative philosophy ranging from the half-inarticulate beginnings in the Vedas to the logical realism of Nyāya and the ethical idealism of Buddhism. An attempt has been made in the following paragraphs to show the unity and continuity of Indian thought and its close relation to life and religion from the dim dawn of history.

The Aryans of the Vedic period were an energetic race, ever ready to act and to fight, taking pleasure in life and work, ready to enjoy the good things which life offered, manfully struggling against difficulties

and dangers. They seem never to have doubted that, inspite of its ills, life is, on the whole, a good thing, and they cherished the faith that after death brave and good men go to "Elysian fields" where, through the favour of the Gods, they enjoy everlasting bliss.

But, gradually, the spirit and belief of the people underwent a profound change. The old simple joy in life and delight in action passed away, and the view began to be held that life is not a good thing at all, that its ills and sufferings are greater than its joys and pleasures. Death was no longer viewed as a gate to a happier state of existence, but as the transition into other states, all of which are full of sorrow. Great teachers arose, who taught that, strive as he may, man can secure no permanent happiness; that life indeed is nothing but pain; that death will begin only another round of painful existence. The old Aryans, in short, had held that life, with all its troubles, problems and perplexities, is a good thing to be enjoyed; the later Hindus were inclined to the view that, for the virtuous and sinful alike, all lives are pain and sorrow. With their minds less fixed on the needs and joys of the day, these thinkers found leisure also to ponder on the world and on human life. They began to think that the way to true happiness lay not in doing and enjoying, but in the bliss of inward meditation, and that such meditation could best be carried on in the solitude of forests, apart from the noisy haunts of men.

When, in that little known remote period, the theory that man was crushed with the burden of threefold pain, took shape, and when the popular religion of the period failed to solve the difficulty except by showing a way to temporary escape from the pain and sorrow of existence, the great sages and thinkers turned their

attention to the investigation of the origin of pain. In the actual process of investigation they were faced with perplexing anomalies and imperfections in the Creation and were painfully conscious of the limitations of their powers. They did not hold any divine agency responsible for this. The origin of pain, they said, was the effect of causes, of deeds done, either in this or in a past life. Then there arose a new question, whether it was possible for man to put an end to the seemingly unbroken and irresistible sequence of the effects of deeds, and whether the cycle of life and death must go on for ever.

All action in the world is brought about by desire, which is based on innate ignorance which makes a man fail to recognise the true nature of things and ultimately causes transmigration. The darkness of such ignorance is dispelled by divine knowledge, which, according to every philosophical school, consists of tattva-jñāna. Universal knowledge, when attained, destroys the effect of Karma, which would otherwise result in a future existence, and thus puts an end to transmigration, or in other words, brings salvation.

How can man know himself and attain tattva-jñāna to annihilate the effects of Karma? Here we arrive at the parting of the ways. The peculiar bent of the Hindu mind, illustrated in the principal philosophical and religious systems of India, diverse though they are, has the special feature that it tends to and aims at pacification of the mind and thus hopes to get rid of the sufferings of the worldly existence. The different systems only prescribe different methods. As our present work is a critical study of the central features of the Sāṅkhya doctrine, we shall henceforward confine our remarks mainly to the Sāṅkhya, the pioneer

amongst the systems, which adumbrated the view that this body is subject to decay and death, and with it will end all bodily sufferings. The ego behind the body is a creation of environments and circumstances and will disappear also. What remains behind the body and behind the ego is called in the Sāṅkhya 'Prakṛti'. Puruṣa is that which is perfect, independent and completely aloof from everything else. A true knowledge[3] of Puruṣa and its relation to Prakṛti will help a man to rid himself of the threefold pain once and for all and such a man will not be born again.

In their first attempts to unfold the origin of the world, the thinkers thought of a crude mass of matter alone, and were later on forced to admit, either inside or outside of it, a power to account for the order visible everywhere on closer observation. It must have been possible only after ages to reduce matter to a very subordinate place as in Śaṅkara's Vedānta or in Buddhism. So the Sāṅkhya views can safely claim

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3. " Nor is the Sāṅkhya doctrine of many selves and nature any more tenable as a theory of Creation. How can disturbances of Prakṛti take place at a first creation, when there are no potencies due to man's actions demanding fruition? Even at subsequent creations, how do latent potentialities by themselves become fruitful without any consciousness to direct them? And, if they do attain fruition, the Sāṅkhya theory of liberation by knowledge is without value, since the potencies will remain able to come again in activity. Knowledge can never give freedom from bondage, which can be attained only by the exhaustion of action, for which the Sāṅkhya metaphysics affords no adequate possibility, owing to the infinite potentialities of nature."—Keith in *Karmamimānsā*, p. 64, following Kumarila's view.

priority to others. It is possible that in the beginning the Sāṅkhya teachers postulated Prakṛti alone and gradually so perfected it as to explain the whole Universe. A man while immersed in Sāṅkhya thought, is practically led to accept that unaided Prakṛti can do everything—evolution or dissolution. Evolution seems to be in its nature. Only when the stage is reached of accounting for the subjective side of evolution—mind, sense and motor organs—and of searching out a seer to make the manifestations purposeful, does he look out for Puruṣa and its place in the scheme, and slowly he finds not only one but many of them, and is perplexed to discover that even all of them with their characteristic indifference to Prakṛti are not enough to satisfy the critics' whims about a well-reasoned system of thought.

The nature of Puruṣa and Prakṛti and their relationship—the crux of the whole doctrine of the Sāṅkhya—has been subject to much criticism. There are flaws in this dualistic system no doubt, but were the other systems of Indian Philosophy free from defects? Puruṣas are many and Prakṛti is eternal. Was the substantiality of Prakṛti not enough for the purposes of the Sāṅkhyas? Why did they strive to turn it into an ultimate reality? Having done so, why did they not proceed beyond the separate infallibility of Prakṛti to a unified infallibility with a singular Puruṣa?[4] Otherwise-

4. "It is my opinion that systems which play the game of philosophy squarely and fairly with freedom from presuppositions and religious neutrality, naturally end in absolute idealism; and if they lead to other conclusions, we may always suspect that the game has not been played according to the rules."—Radhakrishnan in preface to *The Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy*.

wise, how could Prakṛti ever hope to undertake the unparalleled philanthropic task of labouring unceasingly for the permanent release of Puruṣa, if one is the negation of everything that the other stands for? Where was the necessity of supposing the ultimate plurality of Puruṣa, when the reasons for such a supposition are entirely worldly, such as bondage and release of individuals? The Puruṣa is always absolutely unaffected by the influence of Prakṛti. Then how can we distinguish one Absolute Puruṣa from his kindred? Does not such plurality imply introducing limitations in Him?

Was the plurality of Puruṣa a concession to the vanity of man? Was the merging of his soul into one undifferentiated Puruṣa a poor consolation? Does it make the Sāṅkhya more attractive? Did Satkāryavāda stand in the way of a single Puruṣa, because one Prakṛti is three Guṇas and their varied combinations[5] could bring the whole creation into existence, whereas one Puruṣa could not boast of any such power? How could he account for the numberless individuals in the animate world? Were countless Puruṣas supplied to fill the whole universe, so that, later on, no difficulty be felt to start and keep the world evolving?

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5. A concrete illustration of the enormous possibility of combinations from a very simple mechanism, lock and key:– " Each tumbler step of a large Chubb key can be given one of thirty different heights, the bolt step one of twenty. By merely transposing the order of the steps in a six step key it is possible to get 720 combinations. By diminishing or increasing the heights, the possible combinations may be raised to the enormous total of 7,776,000 ".—A. Williams in *How It Works*, pp 435–6.

Many are the objections raised. To mention a few: How are Puruṣas many and Prakṛti eternal? How can they come together? How can the evolutes combine in themselves the cosmic and the psychological? How can the original harmonious balance of Guṇas be disturbed? Are the tangible things of the world no more than Guṇas in conflict? Probably Prakṛti alone, in the opinion of these critics, would have been more successful in explaining the scheme than Prakṛti with an addition of innumerable Puruṣas. The absolute unattachment of Puruṣas is considered a definite hindrance rather than a solution.

If the problem of problems—the Puruṣas' evolution starting propinquity to Prakṛti—is solved, much of the criticism can be silenced, they say.

But where is the problem to necessitate a remedy? Why is it thought necessary that they are to be brought together and then a way of its accomplishment searched? Are Puruṣa and Prakṛti not all-pervading and are they not, then, blended everywhere with each other like warp and woof? Evolution under such circumstances will be unending. Whatever the texts may say, the released Puruṣa remains where he was and what he was, with the difference that Prakṛti ceases to affect him. The release brings no change in prakṛti also, because, though it affects the released no more, it unceasingly continues its attractions for the unreleased, who will always be in a vast majority. In short, everything continues to be what it was and where it was. Prakṛti ceases its attraction for the released—this statement lays emphasis only on the discriminating knowledge which makes the Puruṣa's standing aloof possible, and not on the cessation of activity in Prakṛti with regard even to the released.

Throughout the different periods the leaders of Indian thought never lost sight of the psychological basis of metaphysics. Rejecting phenomenalism, the Vedānta reaches the greatest heights the Indian mind has ever attained, when evolving a formula to explain the phenomenon of consciousness. The Sāṅkhya blundered. In attempting to solve one difficulty, it created another. It tried to reconcile the philosophical and the mundane and, in the process, miserably failed over the former. Contradictions have crept in because of this failure; the whole argument has been shaken and people have been led to think that the Sāṅkhya propounders were no better than blind teachers leading the blind. Shortcomings may be concealed by various kinds of special pleading, but the inconsistencies cannot escape the critic's eye.

Thought-systems are contributory, and their combined message boils down to unity. Time and space are unending quantitatively but not qualitatively. Every individual thing in the world comes into being and disappears, and time and space, as applied to it, are unending; but if the world is viewed devoid of time and space, it becomes homogeneous. So the world is transitory distributively but not collectively. Prakṛti contains the opposing constituents, Sattva and Tamas, yet they are reconciled by Rajas. So Guṇas both create divisions and differences and maintain unity also. So the activities of the world form, as it were, one broad stream, but superficialities, caused by the predominance of one Guṇa or the other, lead men to think there are several separate channels each small enough to make human knowledge of it possible. The Sāṅkhya for these reasons is dualistic, with Prakṛti and Puruṣa as co-eternal. But they are different from

each other and neither of them is a cause or effect of the other. Without the help of the Sāṅkhya, the world cannot be properly known, and as the unworldly can be studied only through the worldly, the Sāṅkhya has been given an important place by most of the systems. Without the many, there is not the one, and without differences there is not the uniform; and therefore, true knowledge implies seeing one in many and many in one, and seeing uniformity in diversity and diversity in uniformity. If dualism is deficient without the acceptance of one absolute being over and above Puruṣa and Prakṛti, which inspite of Him persist and prove their existence by their opposing natures, monism alone is not self-sufficient also. Monism through dualism is just and proper; but the Vedānta monism, with Māyā to explain the world, is unjust and improper. Similarly, the two ways to salvation are— to retain activity but to abandon its fruit; and to abandon the fruit as well as the action. The former, that is, objectless activity, means the substitution of major for minor desires, of collective for individual good, of soul-care for bodily care. Sāṅkhya sanyāsis who abandon the prescribed duty are in the wrong, because instead of foregoing the fruit they forego duty itself.[6] Sanyāsa is self-centred, while Karma-yoga is community-centred. The latter's outlook is broad because it procures a man's own good, through that of the community.

6. "A result of the combined doctrine of transmigration and karma is that it paralyses action, drives to asceticism, and makes action self-regarding, since it becomes the aim of every man to win salvation for himself individually by acquiring the right knowledge".—Macdonnell in *Comparative Religion*.

The exposition and justification of the Sāṅkhya theories follow. So far, the reader has been prepared for the right perspective in which to judge them. Considering the interdependence of different thought-systems, a man concludes, that there is no reason for followers of one system to think compelled to pick quarrels with others and holes in their system. So common a practice leads them to absurd exaggeration of the importance of their own tenets and deprecation of those of others. It leads them also to claim their system as complete and flawless for all and at all times; and to deny any truth in others. But in this variegated world no one system can boast to supply the needs of all individuals. One system suits some, and another suits others. A greater and greater realisation of this truth will keep each system within its limits and promote co-operation between all. Each has something to teach and something to learn.

A CRITICAL STUDY OF THE SĀṄKHYA SYSTEM ON THE LINE OF THE SĀṄKHYA-KĀRIKĀ, SĀṄKHYA-SŪTRA AND THEIR COMMENTARIES

The aim of the paper is to give a clear-cut exposition of the Sāṅkhya in its more developed form. Such explanation is intended to reconcile the many surface irregularities, seeming incongruities and superficial inconsistencies, which usually strike the casual reader and critic. Such misconceptions are not the lot of the unwary and the uninitiated only. All have with one voice deprecated this or the other aspect of the system. In view of its general misunderstanding by all and sundry, a new treatment of the subject will not be out of place.

A perfect thought-system should naturally grow out of its initial fundamental postulates, which do not require recurring subsequent reinforcements to account for all its developments. An attempt is made below to show that the Sāṅkhya does satisfy these requirements and that there is really no justification for the clamour which is usually raised against it.

There are two broad aspects of the Sāṅkhya which must be clearly distinguished in the present study; one is the Sāṅkhya before Īśvarakṛṣṇa's kārikā and the other is the Sāṅkhya after kārikā. There are undoubtedly many more types of the Sāṅkhya besides those which we shall have occasion to touch upon in course of the brief survey of the history of the Sāṅkhya. This review is necessary for a fuller insight into the meaning of the kārikā terminology and the development of the kārikā conceptions. The above divisions into pre-kārikā, kārikā and post-kārikā

Sāṅkhya are not intended to represent water-tight compartments without overlappings. The basis of classification in the three groups will be similarity of tenets and not mere chronological sequence. The consensus of opinion is that the pre-kārikā Sāṅkhya marks an embryonic state and that the post-kārikā a state of deterioration from the settled form in the kārikā. The pre-kārikā Sāṅkhya is vague and no complete book on the subject is extant. The few references we have are to be met with in unexpected, out-of-the-way contexts and these too are often found indifferently mixed up with other heterogeneous material. In dealing with this topic, therefore, emphasis will be laid only on facts that have in any way contributed to the shaping of the classical Sāṅkhya.

The Sāṅkhya is one of the oldest systems[1] of thought and we find it already prominent at the threshold of philosophical enquiry. The pre-kārikā Sāṅkhya is the characteristic product of an India newly stirred to its depths by the impulses of creative philosophical activity. In this period, the great systems of Indian thought have their fountain-heads. These springs were to remain, however, for long, mere rills and rivulets of negligible magnitude, till in the period of the Upaniṣads we have them swelling into a mighty boisterous current, and this in its turn was to split up and settle down finally into the six familiar channels of Indian philosophy which have watered through centuries this ancient land. The pre-kārikā

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[1] 'System' in this context does not imply that the Sāṅkhya had from the very beginning a well-planned scheme with some definite author to its credit, or that its tenets had taken their final shape.

Sāṅkhya, in the meanwhile, may be considered a notable legacy of the early thinkers.

The word Sāṅkhya first appears in the Śāntiparva of the Mahābhārata; and Sāṅkhya and Yoga in that book have been referred to as '*sanātane dve.*' Sāṅkhya at times stands for knowledge only and in that sense it has to be distinguished from the Sāṅkhya, which is the name for a particular system. Sāṅkhya standing for the system should not be derived to mean 'number' because enumeration is not a characteristic feature of the Sāṅkhya. Other Indian systems far surpass it in this respect. The natural and traditionally accepted interpretation is from Sāṅkhya—*buddhi* or knowledge. The term Sāṅkhya was earmarked after a time for the particular system which believed in liberation through true knowledge of the difference of Prakṛti and Puruṣa. Jacobi refers to *parisaṅkhyā* and distinguishes the practice of the Sāṅkhyas, who, when explaining the significance of a conception, give an exhaustive enumeration of things contained, from that of the Vaiśeṣikas, who give the *vis'eṣas* or distinctive qualities. Guṇaratna[2] holds that the Sāṅkhya derived its name from its first founder, Saṅkha.

The Sāṅkhya was ignored, it is often said, on account of its atheistic tendencies. This argument as it stands is not correct. The Sāṅkhya was classed amongst the orthodox systems and therefore it always ranked higher than the monistic philosophy of Śaṅkara in which everything was reduced to non-entity except Brahman, or than the deistic Vaiṣṇavaite and Śaivaite doctrines. The acceptance of the authority of the

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[2] In his commentary on Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya, p. 22, Bibliotheca Ed.

scripture may have been a device on the part of the Sāṅkhyas, but it was successfully carried and they enjoyed all the advantages of an orthodox system without losing their own characteristic of maintaining the system purely rationalistic. To allow free thinking, they are said to have denied the existence of God, which would hamper the progress of pure reasoning in ignorant minds. But the reason was otherwise. There was no place left for Him in the system, and Indian thinkers and Indian followers were bold enough to carry their conclusions to the logical ends, however horrifying the results may be to the popular mind, or they did not remain horrifying because they were logical.

Besides, the Sāṅkhya has not openly rejected the authority of the Vedas. It has definitely accepted the śrutipramāṇa as one of the pramāṇas, though śruti has a wider sense in the Sāṅkhya, meaning correct tradition or authoritative statement. The Sāṅkhya-Sūtra has a penchant for referring to śruti for validity. But judged otherwise, the Sāṅkhya has relegated *ānus'ravika* methods in the removal of misery to a secondary place, though they are called *pras'asya*, in comparison to the Sāṅkhya method which is *s'reyān*. Śaṅkara and other commentators of his type have questioned the Sāṅkhya interpretation of some śruti texts quoted for authenticity.

The Sāṅkhya is traced back to as early a text as the Ṛgveda, the hymns X, 221 and 129 of which give an idea of the creation of the world remotely resembling the series of Sāṅkhya evolution. References are made also to Atharvaveda, X, 8 and 43, which mention the lotus flower of nine doors, covered with three strands, and to Śatapatha and Sāṅkhāyana Brāhmaṇas in which Ātman is called the twenty-fifth principle. But these point to the critics' ingenuity. The Sāṅkhya,

or rather no philosophical system, can be easily traced from the Vedas. They were most likely composed when the Aryans were afraid of the natural surroundings of a newly discovered country and their thoughts were taken up in remedying the immediate evil and so they had no leisure to indulge in philosophical inquiry. But there is no denying the fact that the Sāṅkhya had its origin in the Upaniṣadic literature, from which it slowly branched off into separate existence.

The crude materials from which the Sāṅkhya grew as a well-knit system of philosophy are strewn in great abundance over the whole Upaniṣadic literature, though they were arranged later under the Sāṅkhya. For that reason it is repeatedly urged by Western scholars that the Brahma-Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa, which are a *samanvaya* form of the Upaniṣadic philosophy, truly mean what Rāmānuja represents and not what Śaṅkara superimposes. The crowning theory of the Upaniṣads is not pure dualism, but it is not unqualified monism also. It is preferably qualified dualism. They represent a period of great activity and Śaṅkara's theory of Māyā and its later developments had no chance of finding a place in them.

Kapila[3] is considered the author of the Sāṅkhya-Sūtras as well as the first teacher of the Sāṅkhya. One Kapila cannot be both, because it is generally believed that the Sāṅkhya-Sūtras were compiled about the 14th century A.D.[4] He is not a historical person. His

[3] Ahirbudhnya Saṁhitā says that his theory was Vaiṣṇava and Vijñāna-Bhikṣu has also emphasised the theistic character of the Sāṅkhya-Sūtra.

[4] Not later than Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha because one sūtra is quoted by Mādhvamantrin, who is a contemporary of Mādhavārya.—'Sources of Vijayanagara Hist.,' p. 51 and J. O. R., Madras, 1928, p. 148.

name occurs in various contexts and somehow it came to be associated with the Sāṅkhya. He was known as a *siddha* in the literature of the Nāthas and in the rasāyanaśāstra.[5] In the Bhagavadgītā, he is referred to as the best of *siddhas*. His case is classed in that of *janmasiddhi*. The assumption of *nirmāṇakāya* in Vyāsa's commentary on Yoga-Sūtra, 1. 25, attributed by Vācaspati to Pañcaśikha, implies that the Master had no physical body. He appears in Śvetāśvatara, 5. 2, as identical with Hiraṇyagarbha. In the epic he is identified with Agni, with Viṣṇu and Śiva, and all sorts of views are attributed to him, and he is the teacher of a number of sages. Śaṅkara refutes the argument that Kapila of the Vedic texts was any great personage and identifies him with the Kapila who burnt the sons of Sagara. Buddhist legends mention him as a predecessor of Buddha.[6]

Kārikā 70 places Āsuri next to Kapila. Āsuri and Pañcaśikha are mentioned in Mahābhārata (12. 219) as teacher and pupil, from which is picked up the statement of the Kārikā. The Sāṅkhya has an unbroken tradition from the time of Pañcaśikha[7] as indicated by *s'iṣyaparamparayāgatam* in Kārikā 71. He is considered to be the author of the first regular book on the subject and in that light, Bālarāma, while interpreting *samākhyātam* in Kārikā 69, says that the word means that Kapila only harangued and did not compile any book, the task being left to Pañcaśikha. In the Mahābhārata, Janaka professes himself to be a disciple of the beggar Pañcaśikha, belonging to the family of Parāśara. Mahābhārata and Yogabhāṣya present different accounts

[5] *Vide* the Introduction of Jayamaṅgalā by Pandit Gopinātha Kaviraj. [6] Compare Brahmajālasūtra.

[7] Assigned to first century A.D.

of Pañcaśikha's philosophical position. Mahābhārata itself has two separate views attributed to him in 12.321 and 96—112. His views in 12.219 do not correspond with the Sāṅkhya. He there holds *bala* as the sixth organ with reference to organs of action as *manas* is the sixth organ in relation with the organs of perception. His views correspond more with the Vedānta, where the separate existences of the individual souls finally merge into Brahman. He is considered the author of Ṣaṣṭitantra in Chinese tradition,[8] and Svapneśvara in Kaumudīprabhā assigns Sāṅkhya-Pravacana-Sūtra to him. Vācaspati identifies certain passages in Vyāsa's commentary on Yoga-Sūtra as his and they reappear in his name in the Sāṅkhya-Sūtra. From these extracts it can be said that his work must have been in prose. His views are more logical—that the souls are atomic in size, otherwise they could not be infinite in number; that the eternal connection of spirit is due to lack of discrimination[9] and not to works or to psychic body. Buddhist texts mention a Gandhabba Pañcaśikha.[10]

The Chinese Sāṅkhya-Kārikā mentions Gārgya and Ulūka as Sāṅkhya teachers. In Buddhacarita, Arāḍakalāma refers to Jaigīṣavya, Janaka and Parāśara as persons who obtained liberation through the Sāṅkhya.

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[8] Compare Jayamaṅgalā. [9] Cf. Sāṅkhya-Sūtra, 6. 68.

[10] Āsuri and Pañcaśikha adhere to a theistic Sāṅkhya that resembles the Sāṅkhya in the Mahābhārata.—Radhakrishnan. Pañcaśikha agrees with Caraka. Caraka excludes Puruṣa from the list of tattvas and Cakrapāṇi thinks that Prakṛti and Puruṣa both being unmanifested have been counted as one; Tanmātrās are not mentioned and senses are bhautika.—Dasgupta, 'Hist. of Ind. Phil.,' p. 213. Pañcaśikha probably modified Kapila's work in atheistic light as shown by '*tena bahudhā kṛtam tantram*' in Kārikā 70.

Kārikā 72 declares that the subject-matter of the Saptati is based on Ṣaṣṭitantra with the exclusion of *ākhyāyikā* and *paravāda*. The Kārikā is perhaps a later interpolation because the Saptati ended at Kārikā 69 where Gauḍapādabhāṣya finishes.[11] Does Ṣaṣṭitantra represent a work? The commentators do not touch the point. They differently enumerate the sixty topics that cover the whole Sāṅkhya and that have been successfully incorporated in the body of the Saptati. Vācaspati quotes Rājavārtika, which is in *anuṣṭubha* metre for their enumeration while Jayamaṅgalā repeats the same in *upajāti*. Paramārtha also quotes the same. The ten *maulikārthas*, according to others, represent the common or individual qualities of the *tattvas*, but Nārāyaṇa represents by them the twenty-five tattvas themselves, though their classification is strange—(1) *puruṣa*, (2) *prakṛti*, (3) *buddhi*, (4) *ahaṅkāra*, (5-7) three *guṇas*, (8) *tanmātrā*, (9) *indriya*, and (10) *bhūta*. Ahirbudhnya-Saṁhitā takes Ṣaṣṭitantra for a book having two *maṇḍalas* of 32 *prakṛtis* and 28 *vikṛtis*. Chinese tradition refers to a Ṣaṣṭitantra of 60,000 verses and this can be a misinterpretation of *bahudhā krtam tantram*, as denoting that an extensive book was composed. There is the possibility according to Schrader of two Ṣaṣṭitantras—one in prose, the other in verse.[12]

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[11] See ahead, note on Kārikā 70.

[12] Vācaspati Miśra in Bhāmatī attributes Ṣaṣṭitantra to Vārṣagaṇya, which can be supported by the Chinese tradition which ascribes Vindhyavāsa who is identified with Īśvarakṛṣṇa with rewriting of Vṛṣagaṇa's work; but if Vārṣagaṇya is the teacher of Vindhyavāsa and Ṣaṣṭitantra is attributed to him, it is not probable that so late a work should have been the basis of the Kārikā. But there is a doubt as to the identification of Vindhyavāsa with Īśvarakṛṣṇa.

Max Müller elevates the Tattvasamāsa to the pedestal of the basis of all later Sāṅkhya works. His arguments are that it is more popular amongst the paṇḍitas than the Kārikā; that it is a bare enumeration of principles and has many technical terms that are not met with in later works. For these very reasons Keith and Garbe assign it a later date.[13] The very name suggests that it is an abridgment of some bigger work. The mention of *duḥkha* looks like a device for novelty; and the acceptance of *devatās* over *indriyas* and *bhūtas* shows the influence of later Vedānta.

The appearance of Īśvarakṛṣṇa's Kārikā[14] removes a period of uncertainty[15] because it provides a clear and definite exposition of the Sāṅkhya to this day. It has been the basis of all later Sāṅkhya treatises and criticisms. The date of Īśvarakṛṣṇa[16] is to be determined by Chinese sources. Paramārtha left India in 546 A.D. and translated a work which resembles the Kārikā and a commentary on it in his last period of literary activity which falls in 557–568 A.D. Another

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[13] Older than seventh century A.D., because it is referred to in Bhagavadajjukīyam and in Māmaṇḍur inscriptions—J. O. R., Madras, 1928, p. 145.

[14] The Maṇimekhalaī account of the Sāṅkhya, a Tāmil work, which has been assigned a date earlier than that of the Kārikā differs in many respects from the Kārikā.—J. of Ind. Hist., Dec. 1929.

[15] Dasgupta divides the Sāṅkhya into three strata—(a) theistic, details of which are lost, but which is kept in a modified form in Pātañjaladarśana; (2) atheistic, represented by Pañcaśikha; (3) atheistic modification as the orthodox Sāṅkhya system.

[16] Svapneśvara identifies him with Kālidāsa.

Chinese tradition is that Vindhyavāsa,[17] who is sometimes identified with Īśvarakṛṣṇa, comes before Vasubandhu. The date of Vasubandhu was placed in the last three-quarters of the 5th century, but it has been pushed back by N. Peri a century earlier and further pushed by V. A. Smith to 280–360 A.D. Therefore, Īśvarakṛṣṇa cannot be placed in the 4th century as Keith[18] does. Dr. Belvalkar thinks that Vindhyavāsa wrote a commentary on the Kārikā. He places Īśvarakṛṣṇa in the first century A.D. or the 1st half of the 2nd century. According to him Māṭharavṛtti is the basis of the Chinese translation and Īśvarakṛṣṇa must be at least two centuries earlier than Māṭhara because his Vṛtti is confused and it often misinterprets the Kārikā. But how can Dr. Belvalkar reach his date? He cannot utilize the date of Vasubandhu and he must depend on the translation by Paramārtha of the Kārikā and Māṭharavṛtti that appears in 557–568 for his evidence. Therefore, his date is entirely based on the confused nature of the Vṛtti and the time it must have taken to become so popular as to be picked up by Paramārtha for translation. But why allow that time? Paramārtha may not have had another recourse but utilize the Vṛtti which, though fresh, was essential on

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[17] View of Vindhyavāsa as reported in Ślokavārttika, 393, 704; Bhoja on Yogasūtra, 4, 22; Medhātithibhāṣya, 1. 55; Syādvādamañjarī, 117, and Guṇaratna on Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha is not always consistent with that of Iśvarakṛṣṇa.—Kaviraj in Introduction to Jayamaṅgalā. Vindhyavāsa accepts only two types of inference and no *sūkṣmaś arīra*.

[18] Keith at another place holds that he cannot be later than 300 A.D.—'Sāṅkhya,' p. 43.

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account of the very brief character of the Kārikā itself. Prof. A. B. Dhruva thinks[19] that Anuyogadvārasūtra should be assigned to the latter part of the first century A.D. because it deals with Buddhism generally and does not refer to Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Asaṅga and Buddhaghoṣa; while in dealing with the Sāṅkhya it points to three works besides the general work of Kapila; and so he places the Kārikā in first century B.C. and Māṭhara in the early part of first century A.D.

Dr. Belvalkar does not consider that Hiraṇyasaptati is the same as the Kārikā. The work may have been so named because it brought to the author so many gold pieces, or because it treats of Hiraṇyagarbha. It can be a commentary on the Kārikā by Vindhyavāsa. Dr. Takakusu and Prof. Dhruva identify Hiraṇyasaptati and the Kārikā, and according to Prof. Dhruva it was wrongly attributed to Vindhyavāsa.

There was a very early commentary appended to the Kārikā as proved by the Chinese translation. Dr. Belvalkar identifies the commentary with Māṭharavṛtti,[20] because there is a great similarity between the two and passages, which are in the Chinese translation and which are not in Gauḍapādabhāṣya, are to be found in Māṭhara. The Chinese translation is not *verbatim*. It has been amplified at places to make easy for the Chinese to understand and to conciliate with their views.

Gauḍapādabhāṣya is an abridgment of the Vṛtti and therefore this Gauḍapāda cannot be the famous

[19] *Vide* his paper in the proceedings of the First Oriental Conference.

[20] Takakusu holds that neither Gauḍapādabhāṣya nor Māṭharavṛtti can be the original of the translation, but it has some earlier commentary on which these are based.

teacher of the teacher of Śaṅkara. He has been referred to by Alberuni who refers to one more commentary on the Kārikā and he ought to be earlier than Vācaspati. How then to account for the non-appearance of the last three Kārikās in the Bhāṣya? Gauḍapāda comes later than Māṭhara and therefore their absence in the Bhāṣya cannot prove that by the time of Gauḍapāda the last three Kārikās were not interpolated; it may be an oversight of his.

Jayamaṅgalā is wrongly attributed to Śaṅkara.[21] It cannot be his on account of the slipshod style. Benediction to *Lokottaravādi muni* makes it a work of some Buddhist. Śaṅkarārya has to his credit two commentaries—on Kāmandaka's Nītisāra and Vātsyāyana's Kāmasūtra, known as Jayamaṅgalā. This very person seems to be the author of the commentary with that name on the Kārikā.

A more important side of the study of the early history of the Sāṅkhya is to see how it gradually developed into the classical form. The Sāṅkhya of the Upaniṣads is theistic and the dividing line between it and the Yoga is not clear. The Upaniṣads do not present a settled form of the Sāṅkhya. The number of the *tattvas*, their order and their conception remain to be made definite and uniform. The subjective side of the *guṇas* possibly develops from the conception that the individual self was the result of the envelopment of the Absolute in the three *guṇas*. The actual

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[21] See Introduction to Jayamaṅgalā by Pandit Gopinātha Kaviraj; besides Mr. Kavi identifies him with the author of Yogasūtra-bhāṣyavivaraṇa and places him about 1400 A.D.—*Vide* Literary Gleanings in Q. J. of the Āndhra Hist. R. S., Oct. 1927.

influence of these tendencies on the final shape of the Sāṅkhya cannot be ascertained on account of lack of historical data. As long as the one or two cardinal principles, e.g., *svarūpa* of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, were not settled, these stray currents of thought and appearances in the Upaniṣads and other literature may have helped in the formulation of the Sāṅkhya concepts; but once they were suggested and ready, the system could stand on its legs and follow unhampered and unassisted its course of development. It must have remained dependent on extraneous matter till that light did not dawn; and next it must have rejected all unaccommodating material. Besides reservations are to be made on the subjective side. In spite of the ideas prevalent, the conception may have come in a moment of inspiration—though such flashes can also be explained as a product of the imperceptible influences of the times.

The extreme disinterestedness of Puruṣa and the claim of Prakṛti, constituted of three *guṇas*, to account for all the inner and outer world independently, as the Prakṛti's different manifestations without any inherent change, make the Sāṅkhya what it is. The earliest definite Sāṅkhya work that has come down to posterity is the Kārikā. Another important work, though not from the viewpoint of time, but from the viewpoint of development of thought is the Sāṅkhya-Sūtra. It comes much later and it softens dualism of the Kārikā. The Kārikā is a composite, short, complete work and it has the advantage, on account of its early date, of having received the attention of a mass of commentators within and beyond the Sāṅkhya pale. They put their own stamp on the text. They are the reflex of the then conditions and they create many new centres of

interest and activity. On account of these facilities a textual study of the Kārikā in its necessary and controversial details is attempted below. It is commonly read with the Tattva-Kaumudī and therefore Vācaspati's explanations are at times left out to be supplied by the reader.

Kārikā 1.*—All pain[22] is *mānasa* but it is divided into three groups on the ground of its separate causes. *Mānasa* (*ādhyātmika*) pain has been defined by Gauḍa[23] as separation from the desired and association with the undesired. Cessation of pain is not possible in the Sāṅkhya because pain being a form of *guṇa* and the latter being eternal pain must ever exist. Pain is only suppressed and its recurrence is not possible because the seeds of ignorance, wherefrom pain sprouts, are all burnt.

Vācaspati has laboured hard to show that it refers to the concept formed of threefold pain and not to the whole compound. But what has he gained thereby?

Bhautika according to Vācaspati includes trees and stones and his division is based on the four classes:—(1) born of the placenta, (2) born from eggs, (3) born from perspiration, and (4) born by bursting open the soil. Nārāyaṇa understands by *bhūta* things that are harmful to mankind. Gauḍa thinks that it means the five gross materials.

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[22] Yoga holds that our desire for liberation is not actuated by any hedonistic attraction for happiness or even removal of pain, but by an innate tendency of the mind to follow the path of liberation. Also compare Suzuki—'Mahāyāna Buddhism.'

[23] Gauḍa stands for Gauḍapāda.

* दुःखत्रयाभिघाताज्जिज्ञासा तदभिघातके हेतौ ।
दृष्टे साऽपार्था चेन्नैकान्तात्यन्ततोऽभावात् ॥ १ ॥

KĀRIKĀ 2.*—*Avis'uddhi* means some fault in the details of the performance of prohibited slaughter.[24] But how, for example, is animal sacrifice at all permitted? The reasons are :—firstly, shortcomings falling under *vidhi* or *niṣedha* do no harm[25]; secondly, the minor details help only in the fulfilment of the sacrifice and they have no bearing on the results[26]; thirdly, *hiṁsā* for man is disallowed and as such it is harmful to man, but it brings no blot on the sacrifice[27]; fourthly, the prohibition of *hiṁsā* applies to all cases generally, but because *niṣedha* has not been specially mentioned in the chapter on sacrifices it does harm to man alone.[28] The above attempts are to prove sacrificial slaughter as absolutely harmless, but that is shooting above the mark because then it would not remain *avis'uddhi*.

Max Müller has strained the meaning of *s'reyān* to show that there is no open hostility against Vedic rituals in the Sāṅkhya.

Vyakta is generally defined here by Vācaspati as other than *avyakta*. Some restrict it to *mahābhūtas* only. The differences are important because they create confusion later, when the objects of the different means of cognition are discussed. The contention of the Sāṅkhya Kārikā is that everything except Puruṣa and Pradhāna is an object of Pratyakṣa and as such *vyakta*, and, therefore, efforts are made to prove the existence of Pradhāna and Puruṣa by inference, while no efforts are made to prove *mahat*, *ahaṅkāra*, etc. But

[24] Candrikā. [25] Candrikā. [26] Bālarāma.
[27] Kalpataru and Parimala on Bhāmatī.
[28] Bālarāma.

* दृष्टवदानुश्रविकः स ह्यविशुद्धिक्षयातिशययुक्तः ।
तद्विपरीतः श्रेयान् व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञविज्ञानात् ॥ २ ॥

Vācaspati on Kārikā 6 changes and makes *vyakta* = earth, etc., which even a mudstained farmer can see, and *atīndriya* = *Pradhānapuruṣādi* forms the object of inference. *Ādi* will stand for sense-organs, etc., which have been elsewhere explained by him as the objects of *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* form of Anumāna. Another explanation of the differences in the meaning of *vyakta* is that at times 8 *prakṛtis*[29] are admitted because if the other seven are not pure *prakṛtis*, they are at least *prakṛti-vikṛtis*. *Vyakta* may have been made equal to earth, etc., because of the real part they play in differentiating knowledge.

KĀRIKĀ 3.*—The test of *prakṛtitva* is said to be the capacity to produce another *tattva*, and *tattvas* are to be judged by differences in *sthūlatā* and *indriyagrāhyatā*.[30] Such a definition was necessary to include *mahat*, *ahaṅkāra* and *tanmātras* and to exclude *indriyas* and *bhūtas*. There was no necessity of accepting the transformations of *bhūtas* as separate *tattvas* because the *bhūtas* by themselves were enough to bring a complete discriminative knowledge.

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[29] Gītā 7. 4 gives the five *bhūtas* and the threefold *antaḥkaraṇa* as the eightfold *prakṛti*. It may be a popular or an earlier doctrine.

[30] Some wrongly say that the test of *sthūlatā* applies to *mahat*, *ahaṅkāra*, *tanmātrās* and *indriyas* while *indriya-grāhyatā* to *bhūtas*. Their view is based on the invisibility of all else except *bhūtas*. On the other hand both tests should apply to all cases; some being prominent in some cases.

* मूलप्रकृतिरविकृतिर्महदाद्याः प्रकृतिविकृतयः सप्त ।
षोडशकस्तु विकारो न प्रकृतिर्न विकृतिः पुरुषः ॥ ३ ॥

KĀRIKĀ 4.*—Vācaspati has followed the practice of Nyāyasūtras in introducing this Kārikā when he says that general definitions of the means of cognition are given in this and the *vis'eṣalakṣaṇa* follows. The procedure is justified there by the text itself, but here the Kārikā is devoted to enumeration only.

The *pramāṇa* table below shows how the definitions of the different *pramāṇas* are not settled and therefore they are classed under different categories by the same commentator or by different commentators taking the shade of meaning that appeals to them.

Name.	Pratyakṣa.	Anumāna.	Śabda.	No pramāṇa.
Upamāna	Vācaspati ...	Vācaspati ... Māṭhara ... Jayamaṅgalā Vijñāna ...	Gauḍa Vācaspati Jayamaṅgalā	
Arthāpatti	...	Gauḍa ... Vācaspati ... Jayamaṅgalā		
Abhāva	Vācaspati Vijñāna, Jaya	Māṭhara ...	Gauḍa	Candrikā
Sambhava	...	Vācaspati ... Māṭhara ... Jayamaṅgalā	Gauḍa Candrikā	Vācaspati
Aitihya	...	Māṭhara ...	Gauḍa Candrikā Vijñāna	
Pratibhā	Jayamaṅgalā	Jayamaṅgalā Candrikā ...	Jayamaṅgalā Gauḍa	Jayamaṅgalā

* दृष्टमनुमानमाप्तवचनं च, सर्वप्रमाणसिद्धत्वात् ।
त्रिविधं प्रमाणमिष्टं, प्रमेयसिद्धिः प्रमाणाद्धि ॥ ४ ॥

Sarvapramāṇasiddhatvāt means that the three enumerated *pramāṇas* include all the remaining means of cognition[31] that are added by other systems. Nārāyaṇa distorts the sense and interprets—they are the only three means of cognition because they are accepted by all *pramātṛs* and to apply this sense to all cases, he has to make a further supposition that Vaiśeṣikas are no *pramātāraḥ* because they do not admit *s'abdapramāṇa*.

Kārikā 5.*—Vijñāna questions the possibility of final cognition in *buddhi* for two reasons :—firstly, the expression *pauruṣeyabodha* will become meaningless and, secondly, if the reflection alone of *puruṣa* is thought to serve the purpose, it cannot do so because it is unsubstantial, *tuccha*. The answer is that the image of a lifeless object may not be fit to cognize but the case is different with the image of a *cetana*.

In Guṇaratna's commentary[32] there appears a line—"*pratiniyatādhyavasāyaḥ s'rotrādisamuttho'dhyakṣam*," which is in the same metre as the Kārikā. It can be admitted as a reading of the Kārikā only if grave changes are permitted in the other half of the Kārikā or if one more kārikā is added, because the other line has no mention of *anumāna*.

Vācaspati turns *liṅgaliṅgipūrvakam* into faultless definition by repeating *liṅgi* once more. But Jayamaṅgalā interprets differently altogether—sometimes the inference is *liṅgapūrvaka* and sometimes *liṅgipūrvaka*, e. g., inferring cuckoo from her voice, or inferring her voice from the cuckoo.

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[31] Vācaspati, Jayamaṅgalā, Māṭhara.

[32] On Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya, Bibl. Ed.. p. 108.

* प्रतिविषयाध्यवसायो दृष्टं, त्रिविधमनुमानमाख्यातम् ।
तल्लिङ्गलिङ्गिपूर्वकं, आप्तश्रुतिराप्तवचनं च ॥ ५ ॥

Trividha anumāna[33] has everywhere been made to represent *pūrvavat*, *s'eṣavat*, and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*; but they have been so variously interpreted that the uniformity remains in name only. They respectively mean—firstly, an inference where the *vyāpya* is seen, one by the method of exclusion, and an instance of the inferred of which is not seen; secondly, that it is from cause to effect or of a future happening, that it is from effect to cause or of a past occurrence, and that there is no relation of cause and effect or of present object; thirdly, *trividha* is made equal to *trirūpa*, i. e., *pakṣadharmatā*, *sapakṣe sattvam* and *vipakṣe asattvam*, which do not remain a classification of inference but denote the three essential conditions of a valid inference; fourthly, they mean *kevalānvayī*, *kevalavyatirekī*, and *anvayavyatirekī*.[34] The observations made on the *pramāṇa* table hold good with this analysis also.

Āpta is restricted not only to Vedas but it includes all proper sources and *s'ruti* means the knowledge produced by sentences, and this sense can be extracted by *lakṣaṇā* or *lakṣitalakṣaṇā*. Firstly *s'ruti* is to be applied to any ordinary or Vedic sentence and then it is to apply to the knowledge produced by such sentences.

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[33] Sāṅkhya inference was probably from particular to particular on the ground of the seven kinds of relations mentioned in Tātparyaṭīkā.—Dasgupta, 'Hist. of Ind. Phil.,' p. 269.

[34] See for a detailed treatment Prof. Dhruva's paper on 'Trividhamanumānam' in Proceedings and Transactions of the First Oriental Conference, pages 251–280.

KĀRIKĀ 6.*—The majority[35] thinks that there was no necessity of giving the objects of *dṛṣṭapramāṇa*, because even an ordinary man knows them and therefore it takes the first half of the kārikā to mean:—invisible objects are known by *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* type of inference. Candrikā interprets the same line differently—common visible objects are known by *dṛṣṭa* and the invisible by inference. It has defined *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* as an inference from other than *kāryakāraṇa* relation and that may be some reason for its interpreting the kārikā differently. Vācaspati includes *s'eṣavat* in *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*, but his *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* alone even is of help in most cases, whereas that of Candrikā cannot infer *Pradhāna* and *Puruṣa.*

Ādi in *prakṛtipuruṣādi* of the Tattvakaumudī can only be interpreted as *tatsaṁyoga*[36] and not as *mahadādi*;[37] otherwise it is redundant.

KĀRIKĀ 7.†—A similar kārikā appears in Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya 4. 1. 1,[38] and there is every possibility that Īśvarakṛṣṇa borrowed his ideas from that kārikā. The

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[35] Vācaspati, Gauḍa, Māṭhara. [36] Vaṁśīdhara.

[37] Bālarāma; compare Sāṅkhya-Sūtra 1. 103; also see note on kārikā 2.

[38] Dasgupta strangely holds that such an enumeration is not seen in any other system of Indian Philosophy and he therefore suggests that it is the verse of a Sāṅkhya book paraphrased by Īśvarakṛṣṇa.

* सामान्यतस्तु दृष्टादतीन्द्रियाणां प्रसिद्धिरनुमानात् ।
तस्मादपि चासिद्धं परोक्षमाप्तागमात् सिद्धम् ॥ ६ ॥

† अतिदूरात् सामीप्यादिन्द्रियघातान्मनोऽनवस्थानात् ।
सौक्ष्म्याद् व्यवधानादभिभवात् समानाभिहाराच्च ॥ ७ ॥

causes given in the Mahābhāṣya are six and all of them except *tamasāvṛtatvāt* correspond with those given in the Sāṅkhya-Kārikā, and that too may be partially made to agree with *abhibhavāt*. The latter has made improvement over the former in number. It is not clear why both separately mention *indriyaghātāt* and *mano'navasthānāt*. Manas is also an *indriya*. Candrikā gives scope to add any number to the eight causes. Māṭhara adds four and Vācaspati one. Jayamaṅgalā reduces them to four—defects of space, of sense-organs, of objects and of other things. To be more exact they can be reduced to two—defects of the objects and of the sense-organs. *Des'adoṣa* and *arthāntaradoṣa* are no more than defects of the objects. The eight causes of the Sāṅkhya-Kārikā can be similarly reduced to two.

KĀRIKĀ 8.*—Inconsistency in Vācaspati's interpretation, similar to that pointed out above in kārikās 2 and 6, again crops up here. He introduces the kārikā—What then is the reason for the *anupalabdhi* of *pradhāna* and others? Why does he use the plural form in *Pradhānādīnām*? Does he want to introduce *mahat*, *ahaṅkāra*, etc., also? But at a later stage he mentions only *Puruṣa and Pradhāna*. These are all irregularities, which may be due to his uncertainty on the point. The plural can be explained if many *pradhānas* are admitted but the kārikā never mentions it.

KĀRIKĀS 10 and 11 show that *prakṛtisarūpam* and *prakṛtivirūpam* are common attributes of all *vyakta*, but they can be separately adjusted, the former applying to *prakṛtivikṛtis* and the latter to *vikṛtis*.

* सौक्ष्म्यात्तदनुपलब्धिर्नाभावात्, कार्यतस्तदुपलब्धिः ।
महदादि तच्च कार्यं, प्रकृतिविरूपं सरूपं च ॥ ८ ॥

KĀRIKĀ 9.*—Keith[39] correctly observes that "the last four arguments which are in effect but two, rest on the perception that in the product the original material is contained, though under change of appearance, and that definite materials give definite and distinct results; the first argument, on the other hand, rests not merely on the fact that the coming into being of any object save from a definite material is not observed, but also on the argument that if a thing does not exist there can be no possibility of its doing anything". He must have grouped together in the first instance *upādānagrahaṇāt* and *s'aktasya s'akyakaraṇāt*, and in the other *sarvasambhavābhāvāt* and *kāraṇabhāvāt*.

Vācaspati and Jayamaṅgalā mean by *grahaṇāt*=*sambandhāt*; but Gauḍa, Candrikā and Māṭhara take it in the literal sense of procuring.

KĀRIKĀ 10.†—The explanation of Vācaspati and Candrikā that *vyakta* is many because *buddhi*, etc., are different with each Puruṣa, seems more correct because the opposite suits to one Pradhāna which is common to all Puruṣas. Gauḍa, Māṭhara and Jayamaṅgalā hold *vyakta* many because *mahadādi* are twenty-three. Vijñāna introduces a farfetched sense—*vyakta* is many because it is different with different periods of creation, *sarga*. In his opinion, if the word is interpreted otherwise, Pradhāna will also become many on account of the three *guṇas*. Bālarāma points out the fallacy in

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[39] In 'Sāṅkhya System,' p. 73.

* असदकरणादुपादानग्रहणात्, सर्वसम्भवाभावात् ।
शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात्, कारणभावाच्च, सत्कार्यम् ॥ ९ ॥

† हेतुमदनित्यमव्यापि सक्रियमनेकमाश्रितं लिङ्गम् ।
सावयवं परतन्त्रं व्यक्तं विपरीतमव्यक्तम् ॥ १० ॥

Vijñāna's argument—Prakṛti is not divided into separate entities by the *guṇas*.

The best explanation of *sāvayavam* is that in which parts and wholes are mixed up.[40] It is also described as one in which sound, touch, etc., are found.[41] But all *vyakta* has not the qualities of sound etc. Some take it to mean that which has *guṇas*,[42] others one which has the two aspects of *ādhyātmika* and *bāhya*.[43] These explanations also do not cover all the cases of *vyakta*.

Candrika says that *avyakta* is *niṣkriya* because it does not suffer *s'āntādikriyā*; but then *tanmātras* will fall out from the manifest, *vyakta*. Jayamaṅgalā says that *kriyā* means *saṁsaraṇa* and therefore, though Pradhāna creates the universe, yet it does not move because it pervades the three worlds. Vijñāna removes the difficulty by explaining *kriyā* as some definite action like *adhyavasāya*, etc.

Hetumat means one that has a cause.[44] Māṭhara makes *hetu*=*kāraka* and *jñāpaka*, and according to him Pradhāna is also *kāraka*. But how then will these attributes be restricted to *vyakta* alone.

Ās'rita means existence in its cause[45] or in its parts.[46] It means *vṛttimat* according to Candrikā. Jayamaṅgalā explains the purpose in separately mentioning *hetumat* and *ās'rita* when they approximately mean the same:—the former means that a thing is produced and the latter means that that thing finds shelter in another.

Mahat, etc., also pervade the world. Why are they then called *avyāpi*? They pervade only in a

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[40] Vācaspati, Gauḍa. [41] Gauḍa, Jayamaṅgalā.
[42] Candrikā, Māṭhara. [43] Jayamaṅgalā.
[44] Vācaspati. [45] Vācaspati, Aniruddha. [46] Vijñāna.

secondary sense because they cannot pervade their own cause.[47]

KĀRIKĀ 11.*—Bālarāma says that Pradhāna is three *guṇas* itself and therefore it cannot be their *ādhāra*. To remove this difficulty he gives two explanations—firstly, that *guṇas* here should be taken to mean pleasure, etc., which are the qualities of *sattva* and others; secondly, they should be applied to Pradhāna in the manner 'trees in a forest.' Vaṁśīdhara says that *guṇas* are in the form of *kāraṇa* in *mahat*, etc., and in the form of *samūha* in Pradhāna. Do these commentators, then, mean that *mahat*, etc., have something more than the three *guṇas* and that *guṇas* are not in the form of *kāraṇa* in Pradhāna? These are unnecessary differences pointed out. How the *tanmātrās* will be *triguṇa*? They do not possess the qualities of pleasure and pain. They are *triguṇa* because they are the product of *ahaṅkāra* and because they produce the *bhūtas*, both of which possess pleasure, etc.

Sāmānya means common to all like a *mūlyadāsī*.[48] Candrikā gives an optional interpretation—alike on account of possessing *guṇas*. Vācaspati thinks that *sāmānya* and *viṣaya* have been purposely used to refute the principles of Vijñānavādins that objects have no external existence; they are *vijñānamaya*.

Puruṣa is opposite of the qualities mentioned in this and the previous kārikā. But is then Puruṣa one? Gauḍa and Māṭhara say that he is one, which is a con-

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[47] Vaṁs'īdhara.

[48] Gauḍa, Māṭhara, Jayamaṅgalā, Candrikā.

* त्रिगुणमविवेकि विषयः सामान्यमचेतनं प्रसवधर्मि ।
व्यक्तं तथा प्रधानं, तद्विपरीतस्तथा च पुमान् ॥ ११ ॥

tradiction; but Jayamaṅgalā uses a device to avoid it. It interprets *tadviparītaḥ* as different from *vyaktāvyakta* in some qualities only. Vācaspati is clear that one of the differences with Nyāya is that in the Sāṅkhya, the Ātman or Puruṣa does not possess *sukha*, etc. Jayamaṅgalā is wrong when it says that Puruṣa is *cetana* because he experiences pleasure, etc. He is *cetana* because he is all light and because his approximity moves Pradhāna to action.

KĀRIKĀ 12.*—Guṇas are not the qualities of Nyāya. They are Parārthāḥ, i.e., they execute enjoyment and renunciation for Puruṣa.

Artha means capacity[49] and therefore, though in the state of dissolution, there is no *prakās'a*, etc., their possibility persists.[50]

Anyonyās'rayāḥ-guṇās are all-pervading[51] and therefore *ās'raya* is used in the restricted sense that one *guṇa* is *ās'raya* of the other, with regard to which it acts.[52] Bālarāma points out the difference between *anyonyās'raya-vṛttayaḥ* and *anyonyajananavṛttayaḥ*:—the previous applies to dissimilar effects and the latter to similar effects; but then the statements cannot individually cover the whole field of *vyaktāvyakta*, the former will

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[49] Gauḍa. [50] Bālarāma.

[51] According to Bhāṣya on 1. 127, each *guṇa* cannot be *vibhu*, e.g., *sattva* represents many *sattva* entities classed under one group; otherwise, firstly there cannot be incalculable differences in the effects and secondly *sādharmyam* in the next sūtra will be meaningless.

[52] Vācaspati, Māṭhara.

* प्रीत्यप्रीतिविषादात्मकाः प्रकाशप्रवृत्तिनियमार्थाः ।
अन्योऽन्याभिभवाश्रयजननमिथुनवृत्तयश्च गुणाः ॥ १२ ॥

apply to *vyakta* and the latter to *avyakta*. This is in conflict with the meaning of Candrikā also, according to which '*ca*' shows that all the processes go on simultaneously and not partially. Vācaspati and Candrikākāra have taken *anyonya* and *vṛtti* with each of the remaining words of the compound ; but Gauḍa and Māṭhara take *vṛtti* separately to mean one additional process.

The *guṇas* may be regarded as representing the different stages of evolution of any particular product. *Sattva* signifies the pure and perfect stage that is to be reached, *tamas* the obstacles or the meanest stage, and *rajas* the force by which obstacles are overcome and the products become more defined and definite.

KĀRIKĀ 13.*—Gauḍa and Māṭhara give some examples of the effects of '*cala*' quality in *rajas* :—a bull becomes intoxicated, or it makes one quarrelsome or one wishes to go to a village, or one begins to love some women, etc.

Vācaspati has given the example of *vātapittas'leṣma* in addition to that of a lamp in the Kārikā to elucidate the harmonious working of opposite qualities and Bālarāma thinks that the additional example is more appropriate because they are more opposed to one another than oil, wick and flame.

Vācaspati says that like *sukhaduḥkhamohāḥ*, *sukhaprakās'alāghavāḥ* do not create more varieties. This statement is doubtful and groundless except that the latter represent the different phases of the one quality pleasure and not different *guṇas*. How do the conflicting *guṇas* combine ? Yogabhāṣya explains that *atis'ayas* only

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* सत्त्वं लघु प्रकाशकमिष्टमुपष्टम्भकं चलं च रजः ।
गुरुवरणकमेव तमः प्रदीपवच्चार्थतो वृत्तिः ॥ १३ ॥

are in conflict but they combine with *sāmānyas*. Why then do they not flood the perceiver all at once? The answer is that though the conflicting *guṇas* exist everywhere yet only one at a time comes to prominence in accordance with the corresponding environments, *nimittas*. But *dharmādyāḥ* also exist everywhere and at all times without distinction. No, they cannot, because they are momentary.

KĀRIKĀ 14.*—The predominant opinion is that the first half of the kārikā is to prove that Pradhāna is indiscriminative, etc., which is clear in the case of *vyakta*. Vācaspati takes the other option also in which both *vyakta* aud *avyakta* are to be proved indiscriminative, etc., by the *avīta* form of reasoning. Gauḍa accepts the optional meaning of Vācaspati. Candrikā holds it proved that Prakṛti is indiscriminative, etc., and proceeds to prove the same in *mahadādi*. Introducing the second half of the kārikā, it says that if *mahat*, etc., had no prime cause, there would be no liberation because *mahat*, etc., would become ever-existing.

KĀRIKĀ 15.†—*Samanvayāt* means similarity in the different evolutes.[53] Gauḍa gives a loose meaning—as one infers from the sight of a Brahmacārī that his parents must be Brāhmaṇas. The explanation of Vijñāna[54] does not directly fit in the kārikā.[55] He says

[53] Vācaspati, Candrikā.

[54] Vijñāna stands for Vijñānabhikṣu.

[55] On Sāṅkhya-Sūtra 1. 131.

* अविवेक्यादिः सिद्धः त्रैगुण्यात्तद्विपर्ययाभावात् ।
कारणगुणात्मकत्वात् कार्यस्याव्यक्तमपि सिद्धम् ॥ १४ ॥

† भेदानां परिमाणात्, समन्वयात्, शक्तितः प्रवृत्तेश्च ।
कारणकार्यविभागात्, अविभागाद्वैश्वरूप्यस्य ॥ १५ ॥

that the emaciated *buddhi*, etc., on account of fasting, again grow strong after taking food; this shows that they are effects. But the kārikā is about the existence of *avyakta*.

KĀRIKĀ 16.*—The second part of the first half of the kārikā has been interpreted differently. Vācaspati keeps *triguṇataḥ* to indicate the activity of Prakṛti in the state of dissolution which is of the type of similar effects'[56] and *samudayāt* is to denote its activity in the state of creation which is in the form of prominence and subordination of *guṇas*; but Gauḍa, Candrikā and Māṭhara apply both the words to the movement of Prakṛti in the state of creation only. According to Gauḍa, the former is used to express that the three *guṇas* in Prakṛti are utilized in the effects; and according to Candrikā, it is used to account for the manifoldness of effects.

To refute the objections that there would be always movement or no movement, the Sāṅkhya-Sūtra—'*sāmya-vaiṣamyābhyām kāryadvayam*,' and the Pañcaśikha-Sūtra —'*ubhayathā cāsya pravṛttiḥ pradhānavyavahāram labhate nānyathā*' are worth remembering.

KĀRIKĀ 17.†—It is strange coincidence that the existence of Puruṣa, Prakṛti, and *satkāryatā* have been all proved by five arguments.

Aniruddha on sūtra 1.140 has said, or *dravakaṭhinatā* is *saṁhatatvam;* but this is not proper because it does not

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[56] Sarala Sāṅkhya denies (similar) effects in the state of equilibrium.

* कारणमस्त्यव्यक्तं प्रवर्तते त्रिगुणतः समुदयाच्च ।
परिणामतः सलिलवत् प्रतिप्रतिगुणाश्रयविशेषात् ॥ १६ ॥

† संघातपरार्थत्वात् त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययादधिष्ठानात् ।
पुरुषोऽस्ति भोक्तृभावात् कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तेश्च ॥ १७ ॥

contribute towards the necessity of accepting Puruṣa; the word must carry the sense of enjoyability in some aspect to need someone else to enjoy.

Puruṣa is *adhiṣṭhātā* only by nearness to Pradhāna and its effects,[57] or he dominates as a king does and therefore his superintendence should not be objected on the ground that he has no attributes or that he has no activity.

KĀRIKĀ 18.—Order in birth is ordinarily meant to convey that when one is born, everybody is not born and order in death means that when one is dead, everybody is not dead. But Māṭhara gives one more meaning to the expressions :—some are born low and some high; accordingly there is order in death when we say that my brother is dead or my father is dead.[58]

Puruṣas must be many.[59] One Puruṣa cannot be divided into many by mere adjuncts, *upādhis*, because—(1) then hands and feet will also represent separate Puruṣas, (2) the distinction between the released and the bound will disappear because the portion of space that falls vacant by the ruin of a pot can be filled in by procuring another pot.

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[57] See Sāṅkhya-Sūtra 1. 96.

[58] Radhakrishnan objects to the argument because then birth and death will apply to the eternal Puruṣa who is *asaṅga*.

[59] The plurality is not so much a reaction against some philosophical principle as a survival of primitive animism.—Carpenter, 'Theism in Mediaeval Ind.' Oldenberg suggests the appropriateness of the grammatical interpretation of Puruṣa—dwells in the body (locative), which it can leave.

* जननमरणकरणानां प्रतिनियमादयुगपत्प्रवृत्तेश्च ।
पुरुषबहुत्वं सिद्धं त्रैगुण्यविपर्ययाच्चैव ॥ १८ ॥

KĀRIKĀ 19.*—Puruṣa is *draṣṭā* because he is *cetana*,[60] or because he is *madhyastha*.[61] He is *akartā* because he is *vivekī* and *aprasavadharmī*,[62] or because he is the latter[63] or because he is *madhyastha*.[64] This shows how differently the attributes of Puruṣa in this kārikā are derived from the attributes given in kārikā 11. Vijñāna justifies the mention of two like words, *sākṣitva* and *draṣṭṛtva* by pointing an imaginary difference that Puruṣa is *sākṣī* with reference to *buddhi* and *draṣṭā* in relation to others.[65]

KĀRIKĀ 21.†—The prime cause of creation is the nature of Pradhāna to move for the enjoyment and release of Puruṣa and not their union alone as emphasized in kārikā 66 also. This to some extent reduces the force of the objection generally raised against the examples of the lame and the blind—Prakṛti is *jaḍa* and Puruṣa is *akartā* and therefore, they cannot express their intention to combine like the lame and the blind.

Vācaspati takes *dars'anārtham* with *pradhānasya* and *kaivalyārthaṃ* with *puruṣasya*. Gauḍa and Māṭhara take otherwise. This makes a paltry difference in their interpretation, because both processes proceed from Pradhāna in the interest of Puruṣa.

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[60] Vācaspati, Jayamaṅgalā. [61] Gauḍa. [62] Vācaspati. [63] Jayamaṅgalā. [64] Gauḍa. [65] On Sūtra 1. 161.

* तस्माच्च विपर्यासात् सिद्धं साक्षित्वमस्य पुरुषस्य ।
कैवल्यं माध्यस्थ्यं द्रष्टृत्वमकर्तृभावश्च ॥ १९ ॥
तस्मात्तत्संयोगादचेतनं चेतनावदिव लिङ्गम् ।
गुणकर्तृत्वे च तथा कर्तेव भवत्युदासीनः ॥ २० ॥

† पुरुषस्य दर्शनार्थं कैवल्यार्थं तथा प्रधानस्य ।

Kārikā 22.*—Vācaspati, Māṭhara, Jayamaṅgalā and Candrikā hold that one *tanmātrā* combines with one, two, three, or four to produce the more complex *bhūtas* with the corresponding number of qualities. Gauḍa says that they can singly produce the *bhūtas*. As regards they themselves, according to Vyāsabhāṣya, *tanmātrā* of sound accompanied by *ahaṅkāra* produces the *tanmātrā* of touch and so on. A meaningless question is raised by Vijñāna—how then ether gross and fine is to be contrasted; and the question raised has been answered thus—gross ether takes the help of *bhūtādi*. The difference is there simply because gross ether is a further stage in evolution.

A fictitious etymology is given to *ahaṅkāra*, when it is said that the word was coined by taking the first and the last letter from the list of 64 letters to represent all objects that can be denoted by the combinations of those letters.

Kārikā 23.†—The determination of objects by *buddhi* is compared to the forthcoming sprout in a seed by Gauḍa, but this has no meaning.

Gauḍa has divided knowledge, *jñāna*, into external, *bāhya*, and internal, *ābhyantara*. The external knowledge gives worldly pleasures and the internal causes liberation. There is no room for such classification because *jñāna* in the kārikā means nothing else than the

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* प्रकृतेर्महान् , ततोऽहङ्कारः तस्माद्गणश्च षोडशकः ।
तस्मादपि षोडशकात् पञ्चभ्यः पञ्च भूतानि ॥ २२ ॥

† अध्यवसायो बुद्धिर्धर्मो ज्ञानं विराग ऐश्वर्यम् ।
सात्त्विकमेतद्रूपं तामसमस्माद्विपर्यस्तम् ॥ २३ ॥
अभिमानोऽहङ्कारस्तस्माद्द्विविधः प्रवर्तते सर्गः ।
एकादशकश्च गणस्तन्मात्रः पञ्चकश्चैव ॥ २४ ॥

final knowledge of the distinction of Pradhāna and Puruṣa. *Vimocayatyekarūpeṇa* and *siddheḥ purvo'ṅkus'astrividhaḥ* in kārikā 63 and 51 respectively establish the same meaning. Gauḍa has continued the craze for division in *vairāgya* also and he has become ridiculous in explaining internal *vairāgya*—Pradhāna also is here like dream or magic representation.[66] *Vairāgya* is only helpful in true knowledge which is differentiation of attributeless soul from Pradhāna and its creation. These must not be any more owned by Puruṣa.

Garimā is one of the *ais'varyas* according to Vācaspati. Gauḍa, and Jayamaṅgalā place *kāmāvasāyitvam* in its place; and Māṭhara mentions both, raising the number to nine. Bālarāma's edition does not give *garimā* in the text of the Tattvakaumudī, while Vaṁśīdhara's edition counts *kāmāvasāyitvam* as the eighth variety instead of *īs'itva*.

KĀRIKĀ 25.*—Vijñāna is of the opinion that only *manas* emanates from the *sāttvikāhaṅkāra*. The sense cannot be extracted from the kārikā without grave distortions. Rajoguṇa is not considered to have separate effects. It only makes possible the working of the other two *guṇas* by imparting movement to them. The masculine in *ekādas'akaḥ* also cannot point to *manas* alone. The sūtra—*sāttvikamekādas'akam*, relevant to the matter in hand, is confusing, but *ekādas'akam* is fixed down to mean eleven in a latter sūtra—*karmendriyabuddhīndriyairāntaramekādas'akam*. There is no difficulty in deriving *karmendriyas* from *vaikārika*, because if that question is raised, the

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[66] Contrast Sāṅkhya-Sūtra 1. 45.

* सात्त्विक एकादशकः प्रवर्तते वैकृतादहङ्कारात् ।
भूतादेस्तन्मात्रः स तामसः, तैजसादुभयम् ॥ २५ ॥

division of Vijñāna also cannot stand on its merits—how can *buddhīndriyas* be derived from *taijasa*. Bālarāma divides the *sattva* into *utkaṭa*, *madhyama* and *nikṛṣṭa* to account for *manas*, *buddhīndriyas* and *karmendriyas* respectively. The last support is awkwardly removed by Vaṁśīdhara, who maintains that organs only in a body[67] have been called *taijasa* in Smṛtis and not individual organs.

Vijñāna thinks that separation of *ahaṅkāra* and evolution of *tanmātras* take place in *mahat* and this has been brought in line with the kārikā conception by Dasgupta by using the Yoga expression, *samsṛṣṭāḥ vivicyante*—the two conceptions take the two aspects of the matter in hand.

KĀRIKĀ 26.*—*Indrasyātmans'cihnatvam* is not a satisfactory and exclusive definition of *indriyāṇi*[68] because it applies to other *tattvas* than *indriyas* also. Candrikā and Māṭhara give another meaning—in *padena viṣayāh tān prati dravanti*. This excludes *manas*.

KĀRIKĀ 27.†—The second half of the kārikā should refer to the eleven *indriyas*; *nānātvam* should stand for *vṛttiniyama* and *bāhyabhedāḥ* for *des'aniyama*,[69] *i. e.*, how the organs are differently situated in the body. But Vācaspati and Candrikā take *bāhyabhedāḥ* as an example showing that there is similar multiplicity in *tanmātras* that are products of one *bhūtādi*. Candrikā and Māṭhara

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[67] While Sāṅkhya Saṅgraha says that the godlike *indriyas* of *svayambhū* are produced from *vaikārika* and individual organs from *taijasa*.

[68] Vācaspati. [69] Jayamaṅgalā.

* बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि चक्षुःश्रोत्रघ्राणरसनस्पर्शनकानि ।
वाक्पाणिपादपायूपस्थान् कर्मेन्द्रियाण्याहुः ॥ २६ ॥

† उभयात्मकमत्र मनः संकल्पकमिन्द्रियं च साधर्म्यात् ।
गुणपरिणामविशेषान्नानात्वं बाह्यभेदाश्च ॥ २७ ॥

give *grāhyabhedācca* as an optional reading and then it becomes one more argument for numerousness of organs besides *guṇapariṇāmavis'eṣāt*. Vaṁśīdhara has expressed a foreign idea that *manas* also becomes many as it comes in contact with the different *indriyas*. The first half of the kārikā is not well-arranged and well-worded; at the first reading *saṅkalpakam* and *indriyam* seem to express the meaning of *ubhayātmakam*, but then *sādharmyāt* is left alone and therefore at second thought the line has to be differently construed.

KĀRIKĀ 28.*—The word *mātra* stands to show that *buddhīndriyas* have only indeterminate knowledge,[70] while Vijñāna thinks that they have determinate knowledge, which conception will relegate *manas* to a very subordinate position, and it will remain no more than a seat of desire, doubt and imagination, while only the previous kārikā has called *manas* as *saṅkalpakam*. Gauḍa and Māṭhara think that *mātra* is to indicate that one sense-organ has one's own field and that it does not encroach over another's, *e. g.*, eyes only perceive objects and do not taste. Candrikā thinks it limits the sense tc seeing, hearing, etc., and it excludes fetching, etc., which are the functions of *karmendriyas*.

Bālarāma thinks that the sense of *vṛttayaḥ* has to be strained to apply to *karmendriyas*.

KĀRIKĀ 29.†—Gauḍa is preferable because he gives a homogeneous division. He takes the previous kārikā and this together, and transfers both uncommon and

[70] Compare Kumārila and Pras'astapāda.

* शब्दादिषु पञ्चानामालोचनमात्रमिष्यते वृत्तिः ।
वचनादानविहरणोत्सर्गानन्दाश्च पञ्चानाम् ॥ २८ ॥

† स्वालक्षण्यं वृत्तिस्त्रयस्य सैषा भवत्यसामान्या ।
सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणाद्या वायवः पञ्च ॥ २९ ॥

common *vṛttis* to *bāhyendriyas* and *antaḥkaraṇa* jointly.[71] The objection that *prāṇas* continue to function even in deep sleep when *indriyas* disappear remains to be answered. Nobody advocates the disappearance of *indriyas* in deep sleep. They stop functioning only.[72] The consensus of opinion is with Gauḍa. Sāṅkhya-Sūtra 5. 113 is of opinion that *prāṇas* are from *indriya-s'akti* and the *Pāñcarātras* hold the *rajas* element in *mahat* as *prāṇa*. Each of the five *prāṇas* is not always similarly located by the different commentators. Their functions are also differently given and Māṭhara seems to connect them with the three *guṇas*.

KĀRIKĀ 30.*—*Catuṣṭaya* according to Gauḍa means *buddhi*, *ahaṅkāra*, *manas* and some one *indriya*, but then it will exclude the case, say that of *dīrghas'aṣkulī*, in which two or more sense-organs[73] work simultaneously. The latter case is also possible because the majority of Sāṅkhya authors admit *manas* to be of *madhyama parimāṇa*. The objection that such *manas* will be transitory cannot arise in the Sāṅkhya.

'*Tat*' does stand for *dṛṣṭa*, but that meaning cannot be naturally extracted from the construction in the kārikā. Gauḍa holds *kramas'aḥ jñānam* in *adṛṣṭa* only as arbitrary. If he had to make an arbitrary supposition in spite of what the kārikā purports, he should have done otherwise, because *kramas'aḥ jñāna* is possible under

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[71] When the uncommon *vṛtti* of both *antaḥkaraṇa* and *indriyas* has been related, why should common *vṛtti* apply to the former only ?—Vaidikī Vṛtti on 2. 31.

[72] Vaidikī Vṛtti on Sāṅkhya-Sūtra 2. 31.

[73] Sūtra 2. 31 mentions *indriyas* only.

* युगपच्चतुष्टयस्य तु वृत्तिः क्रमशश्च तस्य निर्दिष्टा ।
दृष्टे तथाऽप्यदृष्टे त्रयस्य तत्पूर्विका वृत्तिः ॥ ३० ॥

the following circumstances:—in dim light according to Vācaspati and Candrikā, or when at a distance according to Māṭhara and Gauḍa, which means that external limiting factors account for *kramas'aḥ jñāna*. They are absent in *adṛṣṭa*. To be consistent with the kārikā *kramas'aḥ jñāna* in *aurṣṭa* may be explained by the mental state that at times hastens and at times lingers the process.

KĀRIKĀ 31.*—Gauḍa incorrectly applies the kārikā only to the threefold *antaḥkaraṇa*. Candrikā maintains the observations made in the previous kārikā—when there is no obstruction like that of doubt, etc., the action is simultaneous otherwise it is *kramas'aḥ*, and *svām svām pratipadyante* is to emphasize that even in simultaneous action each organ keeps to its function.

Māṭhara says that *karaṇas* act after getting a signal from *buddhi* but to be more correct the process in the case of perception, etc., begins with the *bāhyendriyas* and in the case of speaking, etc., it begins with *buddhi* downwards.

KĀRIKĀ 32.†—The functions have been differently attributed and their results differently enumerated. The functions are so classified :—

Name.	Gauḍa.	Māṭhara.	Vācaspati, Candrikā.
Āharaṇam ...	Karmendriyas.	Indriyas ...	Karmendriyas.
Dhāraṇam ...	,,	Ahaṅkāra ...	Threefold antaḥkaraṇa.
Prakāśakaraṇam ...	Buddhīndriyas.	Buddhi ...	Buddhīndriyas.

* स्वां स्वां प्रतिपद्यन्ते परस्पराकूतहेतुकां वृत्तिम् ।
पुरुषार्थ एव हेतुर्न केनचित्कार्यते करणम् ॥ ३१ ॥

† करणं त्रयोदशविधं तदाहरणधारणप्रकाशकरम् ।
कार्यं च तस्य दशधाऽऽहार्यं धार्यं प्रकाश्यं च ॥ ३२ ॥

The explanation of Gauḍa ignores *antaḥkaraṇa*. According to Vācaspati, *antaḥkaraṇa* preserves life by means of *prāṇas*.[74] Gauḍa, Māṭhara, and Jayamaṅgalā do not take ten with *āhāryam, dhāryam* and *prakās'yam* separately, and, therefore, the ten effects according to them are the objects of *buddhīndriyas* and *karmendriyas*—*s'abda*, etc., and *vacana*, etc. Vācaspati and Candrikā take ten with each and their ten *āhāryas* are *divyādivya vacana*, etc.; ten *dhāryas* are *prāṇādilakṣaṇayā vṛttyā s'arīram, tacca pārthivādi pāñcabhautikam, s'abdādīnāṁ pañcānāṁ samūhaḥ pṛthivī, teṣām divyādivyatayā*, and the same are ten *prakās'yas*. Mystery attaches to the meaning of this kārikā even after the extensive explanation. The kāryas are not clear, but the interpretation of Vācaspati and Candrikā has an advantage over others because the former have been able to justify the occurrence of *das'adhā* with each.

Vidha is used according to Vaṁśīdhara to show that though the *karaṇas* are numberless on account of numberless Puruṣas, yet they can be grouped under 13 heads.

Kārikā 33.*—Gauḍa strangely joins *sāmpratakālam* with *viṣayākhyam*. Vācaspati takes it to mean those periods of past and future also that are near the present so as to avoid *avyāpti* in the *vṛtti* of *vāk*. How can *karmendriyas* be *dvāri* to *antaḥkaraṇa*? Candrikā answers—that they can also be of use in the function of *antaḥkaraṇa* through the *buddhīndriyas*.

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[74] This statement cannot stand according to Gauḍa, etc.; see notes on kārikā 29.

* अन्तःकरणं त्रिविधं दशधा बाह्यं त्रयस्य विषयाख्यम् ।
साम्प्रतकालं बाह्यं त्रिकालमाभ्यन्तरं करणम् ॥ ३३ ॥

KĀRIKĀ 34.*—Why *tanmātras* are *avis'eṣa*? The different opinions are—(1) *mātra* only excludes the specialities of *s'ānta*, etc., and does not exclude the qualities that have come from previous stages[75]; (2) they have not been called *vis'eṣa* like the *indriyas*, though both are produced from *ahaṅkāra* because they further produce *bhūtas*[76]; (3) they are pleasure-giving to the gods, *sattva* is predominant in them and, therefore, they are called *avis'eṣāh*.[77]

KĀRIKĀ 35.†—*Sarvam* has been interpreted by Gauḍa and Māṭhara to mean past, present and future objects, but the kārikā can only be indirectly applied to past and future objects because in their cognition, the deposited results only, of the use of *bāhyendriyas* at some previous occasion, are utilized; and, therefore, there is no sense in calling *antaḥkaraṇa*, *dvāri*, in such *adṛṣṭa* cognitions.

KĀRIKĀ 36.§—*Pradīpakalpāḥ* means that they illuminate the objects like a lamp and so it can be construed with *prakās'ya*; but Vācaspati interprets it as wick, oil and flame to elucidate *parasparavilakṣaṇāḥ*.

KĀRIKĀ 37.‡—The kārikā is to prove the supreme position that *buddhi* occupies. Vācaspati takes the two

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[75] Vācaspati; Yogavārttika; justified by kārikā 38.

[76] Yogavārttika. [77] Māṭhara; Gauḍa on kārikā 38.

* बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि तेषां पञ्च विशेषाविशेषविषयाणि ।
वाग्भवति शब्दविषया शेषाणि तु पञ्चविषयाणि ॥ ३४ ॥

† सान्तःकरणा बुद्धिः सर्वं विषयमवगाहते यस्मात् ।
तस्मात् त्रिविधं करणं द्वारि द्वाराणि शेषाणि ॥ ३५ ॥

§ एते प्रदीपकल्पाः परस्परविलक्षणा गुणविशेषाः ।
कृत्स्नं पुरुषस्यार्थं प्रकाश्य बुद्धौ प्रयच्छन्ति ॥ ३६ ॥

‡ सर्वं प्रत्युपभोगं यस्मात् पुरुषस्य साधयति बुद्धिः ।
सैव च विशिनष्टि पुनः प्रधानपुरुषान्तरं सूक्ष्मम् ॥ ३७ ॥

halves of the kārikā as two arguments but Gauḍa and Māṭhara introduce the first and second halves with *yasmāt* and *tasmāt*, respectively, i. e., introduce causal relation between the two statements. Candrikā introduces the kārikā thus—*buddhi* though supreme does not work for herself, but for Puruṣa.

Vis'inaṣṭi pradhānapuruṣāntaram is interpreted by Vācaspati as ' makes known the already existing minute difference between Pradhāna and Puruṣa.'

KĀRIKĀ 38.*—Vācaspati and Candrikā say that one ' *ca* ' is to denote *hetu* and the other to denote *samuccaya*. This is superfluous but it is characteristic of Indian commentators who try to attach significance to every word in the text.

Vaṁśīdhara illustrates pleasure, etc., by the examples—the touch of air, fire and poison, but there cannot be separate examples for individual *guṇas*. Each object represents all the three *guṇas* and it becomes pleasurable, painful or indifferent as they come to prominence.

KĀRIKĀ 39.†—Candrikā ingeniously makes the statement in the kārikā—*mātāpitṛjāḥ nivartante*, to include *prabhūtaḥ* also and it says that the former have been specially mentioned to show the *gauṇatva* of jīva.

KĀRIKĀ 40.§—The kārikā uses such attributes as could have been differently interpreted but there is

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* तन्मात्राण्यविशेषाः तेभ्यो भूतानि पञ्च पञ्चभ्यः ।
एते स्मृता विशेषाः शान्ता घोराश्च मूढाश्च ॥ ३८ ॥

† सूक्ष्मा मातापितृजाः सह प्रभूतैस्त्रिधा विशेषाः स्युः ।
सूक्ष्मास्तेषां नियता मातापितृजा निवर्तन्ते ॥ ३९ ॥

§ पूर्वोत्पन्नमसक्तं नियतं महदादिसूक्ष्मपर्यन्तम् ।
संसरति निरुपभोगं भावैरधिवासितं लिङ्गम् ॥ ४० ॥

not much difference amongst the commentators which may be due to their meaning having behind it a continuous tradition.

Niyatam means which persists from the first creation to the great dissolution[78] or which persists as long as true knowledge does not arise.[79] But Candrikā interprets it as different for every soul.

Gauḍa does not include *bāhyendriyas* in the *sūkṣmas'arīra*. Sāṅkhya-Sūtra enumerates *buddhīndriya*, *prāṇas*, *buddhī* and *manas*. A modern writer[80] has suggested that the non-inclusion at times of *ahaṅkāra* in the constituents is because in the beginning there was only one *sūkṣmas'arīra*.[81] This would be at once contradicted by Vācaspati who says that in the beginning, Pradhāna created separate *liṅgas* for each Puruṣa. Others say that *ahaṅkāra* is not mentioned because it is included in *buddhi*. Vijñāna on sūtra 3. 11 says that there are three types of bodies and they are sometimes said to be two because *liṅgas'arīra* and *adhiṣṭhānas'arīra* are confused into one for two reasons—firstly, because each depends on the other, and, secondly, because they are subtle.

KĀRIKĀ 41.*—The explanation of Gauḍa seems more appropriate because he means the subtle body by *liṅga*. *Liṅga* has been used in the previous and the next *kārikās* to mean *sūkṣmas'arīra* and, therefore, that is the meaning that spontaneously strikes the reader. It has

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[78] Vācaspati. [79] Gauḍa, Jayamaṅgalā.

[80] Ghosh : 'Sāṅkhya System and Modern Thought.'

[81] *Hiraṇyagarbhopādhirūpa*, Bhāṣya on 3. 10.

* चित्रं यथाश्रयमृते स्थाण्वादिभ्यो यथा विना छाया ।
तद्वद्विनाऽविशेषैः न तिष्ठति निराश्रयं लिङ्गम् ॥ ४१ ॥

been used in kārikā 10 for *buddhyādayaḥ* and Vācaspati takes that sense and makes *vis'eṣaiḥ = sūkṣmaiḥ s'arīraiḥ* on the basis of kārikā 39, but this means a repetition of *buddhyādayaḥ* except the *mahābhūtas*, which are absent in *sūkṣmas'arīra*. *Liṅga* in kārikā 10 qualifies and covers the whole field of *vyakta*. Gauḍa has been wise in making *nirās'rayam*[82] qualify *liṅgam*, so that, *tanmātras* are excluded, and he joins *vināvis'eṣaih* and takes out of it not *vis'eṣaiḥ* like Vācaspati, Māṭhara and Candrikā, but *avis'eṣaiḥ* which has been used in kārikā 38 for *tanmātras*. Māṭhara also takes out *avis'eṣaiḥ* but interprets it like Vācaspati—*tanmātrāṇi tairārabdhaṁ sūkṣmas'arīram*. Candrikā adopts the meaning of Vācaspati, and as an optional meaning gives that *liṅga = samudayātmakaṁ liṅgas'arīram* cannot exist without the support of gross body.

KĀRIKĀ 42.*—*Prasaṅgena* has been rendered by *prasakti*[83] but it can be better rendered—'on account of.'

Vibhutva has been correctly explained by Vācaspati and Candrikā as *vais'varūpyāt* ; but Gauḍa and Māṭhara interpret it—'as a king is surpreme in his dominions.'

KĀRIKĀ 43.†—The kārikā has been made ambiguous by the commentators. Vācaspati thinks that this kārikā gives the division in *nimitta* and *naimittika*, while the next tells as to what *naimittikas* proceed from what *nimittas*. In the previous kārikā all had agreed to render *naimittika* as *sthūladehādi* and the other as *dharmādi*. But here *vaikṛtāh* is equated to *naimittikāḥ*

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[82] Vācaspati makes it modify *na tiṣṭhati*. [83] Vācaspati.

* पुरुषार्थहेतुकमिदं निमित्तनैमित्तिकप्रसङ्गेन ।
प्रकृतेर्विभुत्वयोगात् नटवद्व्यवतिष्ठते लिङ्गम् ॥ ४२ ॥

† सांसिद्धिकाश्च भावाः प्राकृतिका वैकृतिकाश्च धर्माद्याः ।
दृष्टाः करणाश्रयिणः कार्याश्रयिणश्च कललाद्याः ॥ ४३ ॥

which are *dharmādyāḥ* according to the kārikā. Jayamaṅgalā introduces kārikā 46—the 16 *nimittanaimittikas* related before are here briefly stated as of four kinds. Vācaspati, Candrikā and Jayamaṅgalā divide the *bhāvas* in two types only but Māṭhara and Gauḍa divide them in three—(1) *sāṁsiddhikāḥ* as of Kapila; (2) *prākṛtikāḥ* as of the sons of Brahman; (3) *vaikṛtikāḥ* as ours.

To Vācaspati and Gauḍa, *karaṇa* = *buddhi*, but to Māṭhara it is equal to *buddhikarmāntaḥ karaṇabhedāḥ trayodas'a*. Are *prākṛtikābhāvāḥ* limited to *karaṇas* only? The question rises in reading Jayamaṅgalā and Vaṁśīdhara. If *prākṛtikābhāvāḥ* were only in Kapila, the question is decided, otherwise both types of *bhāvaḥ* can have their *ās'raya* in *karaṇa* and *kārya*.

An odd opinion appears in Candrikā—*prākṛtikāḥ* are those that stay as long as the thing itself, e.g., *ahaṅkāra*, etc., from *mahat*, and vaikṛtikāḥ, that stay by fits and starts.

KĀRIKĀ 44.*—Inclusion of *dakṣiṇābandha* in the *bandhāḥ* has been used as an evidence of the jealousy of the Sāṅkhya towards Vedic rituals. *Prakṛtibandha* is when one worships *Prakṛti* thinking it Puruṣa.[84] Māṭhara includes in it the eight prakṛtis. *Vaikṛtikāḥ* are when one worships *bhūtendriyāhaṅkārabuddhīḥ* taking them for Puruṣa.[85] Māṭhara considers them due to *ais'varya* or due to believing *brahmādisthāna* as the final goal. *Adhastāt* is *sutalādiloka*[86] or *tiryagyoni*.[87]

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[84] Vācaspati, Jayamaṅgalā. Why should Vācaspati not equate this *bandha* with his *aṣṭavidhāvidyā* in karikā 48?

[85] Vācaspati. [86] Vācaspati, Candrikā.

[87] Jayamaṅgalā, Gauḍa, Māṭhara.

* धर्मेण गमनमूर्ध्वं गमनमधस्ताद् भवत्यधर्मेण ।
ज्ञानेन चापवर्गो विपर्ययादिष्यते बन्धः ॥ ४४ ॥

Dharma is not an important conception in the Sāṅkhya and therefore it is loosely interpreted.

Kārikā 45.*—Prakṛti is explained as *mahadahaṅkāra-bhūtendriyāṇi* by Vācaspati and *bhūtendriyāṇi* are replaced by *tanmātrāṇi* by Gauḍa, Māṭhara and Jayamaṅgalā. It is strange how *bhūtendriyāṇi* have been included in Prakṛti. Why should Vācaspati differ from what he has said in the previous kārikā about *prakṛtibandha*? All have qualified *vairāgya* in the kārikā by *jñānas'ūnya*, and that is necessary because *vairāgya* coupled with *jñāna* alone is a means to liberation as mentioned in the Sāṅkhya Sūtra.

Kārikā 46.†—Keith[88] thinks that the kārikās 46 to 51 are possibly later interpolations. The reason given is that they uselessly reclassify the *pratyayasarga* in a different manner from what has been done in the previous two kārikās and kārikā 23. The argument is not correct because there appear other such unimportant kārikās in the body of the work and their presence should be accounted for by the further *viveka*, distinctive knowledge, they give. The kārikās, if this procedure is admitted, will also lose their importance of determining the character of the Ṣaṣṭitantra. Gauḍa and Māṭhara have become crude in trying to become simple and illustrative about the divisions :—*as'akti* as after properly seeing the post, one is not able to remove doubt; *tuṣṭi*, he is not anxious to know the post because

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[88] In 'The Sāṅkhya System,' p. 85.

* वैराग्यात् प्रकृतिलयः संसारो भवति राजसाद्रागात् ।
ऐश्वर्यादविघातो विपर्ययात् तद्विपर्यासः ॥ ४५ ॥

† एष प्रत्ययसर्गो विपर्ययाशक्तितुष्टिसिद्ध्याख्यः ।
गुणवैषम्यविमर्देन तस्य भेदास्तु पञ्चाशत् ॥ ४६ ॥

of what use is that knowledge to him; *siddhi*, he sees the creeper that runs along the post and he has the knowledge of the post.

Siddhi alone is regarded capable of bringing salvation, and Gauḍa says that *tuṣṭi* is the *tāmasa* knowledge and *siddhi* the *sāttvika* knowledge of persons on the path of liberation.

KĀRIKĀ 47.*—How can *asmitā, rāga, dveṣa* and *abhinives'a* be *viparyayas*? The answer is that though they do not proceed from *viparyaya* still they are of the nature of *viparyaya*. Candrikā says that the propriety of saying *karaṇavaikalyāt* is in debarring many more *as'aktis* caused by diseases, and in limiting the number to twenty-eight.

KĀRIKĀ 48.†—Vācaspati suggests, as if, leaving *avidyā*, the remaining *viparyayas* affect only *devāḥ*, gods. It seems that *avidyā* alone matters for common people; and the rest, because they include *diūyādivya* and *aṇimādayaḥ*, affect yogins.

KĀRIKĀ 49.§—*Indriyavadha* cannot be *pratyayasarga*; it may be partially *ahaṅkārasarga*; and therefore it can be called *pratyayasarga* only indirectly because it proceeds from *ahaṅkāra* which is in *pratyayasarga*.[89]

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[89] Jayamaṅgalā.

* पञ्च विपर्ययभेदा भवन्त्यशक्तिश्च करणवकल्यात् ।
अष्टाविंशति भेदाः तुष्टिर्नवधाऽष्टधा सिद्धिः ॥ ४७ ॥

† भेदस्तमसोऽष्टविधो मोहस्य च, दशविधो महामोहः ।
तामिस्रोऽष्टादशधा, तथा भवत्यन्धतामिस्रः ॥ ४८ ॥

§ एकादशेन्द्रियवधाः सह बुद्धिवधैरशक्तिरुद्दिष्टा ।
सप्तदश वधा बुद्धेर्विपर्ययात् तुष्टिसिद्धीनाम् ॥ ४९ ॥

Kārikā 50.*—Vācaspati and Māṭhara say that *viṣayas* are five and *uparamas* are also five. If the similarity is only in number, the expression is harmless, but if it denotes causal relation, the statement cannot be justified because each *uparama* does not proceed from one *viṣaya* separately but it proceeds from the collective restraint of the five objects. Candrikā and Gauḍa avoid such ambiguity. Rāmāvatāra Śarmā realized the difficulty and, therefore, he divided *uparamas* into two kinds—firstly, the five *vairāgyas* arising from seeing the futility of the five enjoyable objects, and, secondly, from seeing the dark side of *arjanarakṣaṇa*, etc.

Prakṛtyākhya[90] is when one feels that the realization of true knowledge is a natural phase of Prakṛti and therefore it needs no meditation, etc.,[91] or when one knows the Prakṛti, its *saguṇanirguṇatva* and its similar products and is satisfied with that,[92] or when one knows the Prakṛti but not its *saguṇanirguṇatva*, etc.[93] Candrikā names *megha*, the *ādhyātmika tuṣṭi* that Vācaspati calls *ogha*. Rāmāvatāra Śarmā thinks that *salila* is actually *s'arīra* and it has been formed by suffixing *iran* to the root *sar*. *R* has been replaced by *L* because they are the same. *Ogha* and *vṛṣṭi* have been so called because they resemble rain in uncertainty.

The names of the five *bāhyāḥ tuṣṭayaḥ* are variously given :—*pāram*, *supāram*, *pārāpāram*, *anuttamāmbhaḥ*, *uttamāmbhaḥ* (Vācaspati, Candrikā), *sutamah*, *pāram*,

[90] These four are differently given in Sāṅkhya Saṅgraha as *paramātmatva* in Prakṛti, *buddhi*, *ahaṅkāra* and *tanmātras*.

[91] Vācaspati, Candrikā, Jayamaṅgalā.

[92] Gauḍa. [93] Māṭhara.

* आध्यात्मिकाश्चतस्रः प्रकृत्युपादानकालभाग्याख्याः ।
बाह्या विषयोपरमात् पञ्च, नव तुष्टयोऽभिहिताः ॥ ५० ॥

sunetram, nārīkam, anuttamāmbhasikam (Gauḍa), *tāram, sutāram, sunetram, sumarīcam, uttamāmbhasikam* (Māṭhara), *sutāram, supāram,* . . . , *anuttamāmbham, uttamāmbham* (Jayamaṅgalā). This shows the uncertainty about their names. Rāmāvatāra Śarmā has forced some interpretation into the names given by Vācaspati— the first is called *pāra* because it carries one beyond the pains of earning; the second is called *supāra* because one may be tempted to enjoy even when one has realized the troubles of earning, but it is practically impossible for one to think of enjoying when one sees the troubles of protecting ; the third is called *pārāvāra* because one who observes depreciation is at times tempted, and at others not tempted; the fourth is *anuttamāmbhaḥ* because it arises from a selfish desire, i.e., on account of the fear of diseases in enjoyment ; and the fifth is *uttamāmbhaḥ* because it is prompted by mercy.

KĀRIKĀ 51.*—Vācaspati has explained the five *siddhis* in two ways and the other commentators have adhered to one method or the other, or they have drawn material from both the sets. The first meaning given by Vācaspati looks artificial. He has distorted the meanings to class the eight *siddhis* into *hetu, hetu-hetumatī* and *hetumatī*. He could not have remained satisfied without introducing regularity where it was wanting. The other meaning sounds more correct and natural because in it there is neither the necessity of twisting the sense of words, nor of changing their order. This meaning has been picked up by Jayamaṅgalā and there is every possibility that Vācaspati borrowed it

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* ऊहः शब्दोऽध्ययनं दुःखविघातास्त्रयः सुहृत्प्राप्तिः ।
दानं च सिद्धयोऽष्टौ सिद्धेः पूर्वोऽङ्कुशस्त्रिविधः ॥ ५१ ॥

from Jayamaṅgalā, or that there were two concurrent traditions.

Vācaspati thinks that *aṅkus'a* is used in the sense of distractive, *nivāraka*, and therefore, for him the threefold *aṅkus'a* is *viparyaya*, *as'akti* and *tuṣṭi*. Vijñāna says that it means attractive, *ākarṣaka*, and therefore the threefold *aṅkus'a* is *ūha*, *s'abda* and *adhyayana*; *suhṛtprāpti* and *dāna* being of lesser importance. The objection that *tuṣṭi* and *atuṣṭi* cannot be both averse to *siddhi* is answered thus—that they represent two independent *dharmas* and not the absence of each other. *Ūha*, etc., are themselves *siddhis* and therefore they should not be counted as *aṅkus'a*. Vācaspati is therefore correct and the confusion arises because *aṅkus'a* bears a double meaning.

The *atuṣṭis* and *asiddhis* can be settled with great difficulty. Gauḍa and Māṭhara have given them opposite names because they represent opposite ideas —*anambhaḥ*, *asalilaḥ*, etc.; but Jayamaṅgalā gives to the *asiddhis* the names *moṣamuṣṇamānoparamityādyāḥ*.

KĀRIKĀ 52.*—Naturally *bhāva* means *pratyayasarga* and *liṅga*, *sūkṣmas'arīra*. They have been used in previous kārikās in this sense but in this kārikā their sense has been slightly strained. Vācaspati makes *liṅga* = word, etc., and the twofold body, and *bhāva* = the thirteen karaṇas which are not possible without dharma, etc., because these two *sargas* are essential for the enjoyment and release of Puruṣa. According to Gauḍa, *liṅga* is *tanmātrasarga* up to the fourteen *bhūtas*; according to Candrikā it is the non-visible group of *mahat*, etc.,

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* न विना भावैर्लिङ्गं न विना लिङ्गेन भावनिर्वृत्तिः ।
लिङ्गाख्यो भावाख्यस्तस्माद् द्विविधः प्रवर्तते सर्गः ॥ ५२ ॥

and according to Māṭhara, it is *sūkṣmas'arīra* and the thirteen *karaṇas*. Vijñāna regards the two kinds more closely to a creation of intellect, regarding *liṅga* as *buddhi* itself and *bhāva* as its conditions.

KĀRIKĀ 53.*—There is no harm in calling the *bhautikasarga* as a phase of the *liṅgasarga*; Jayamaṅgalā and Māṭhara hint it as a third *sarga*. Aniruddha on sūtra 3. 46 divides the whole creation into six—*sura*, *asura*, *nara*, *preta*, *nāraka* and *tiryak*, and *sthāvara* are included into *nāraka*. Candrikā has two alternative devices for the case of pot, etc.—(1) they are not included because *bhautika* means bodily, or (2) they are to be included in *sthāvara*. The latter view is held by Vācaspati.

KĀRIKĀ 55.†—*Liṅgasyāvinivṛtteḥ* is dissolved in two ways by Vācaspati—(1) *liṅgasya avinivṛtteḥ*, (2) *liṅgasya ā vinivṛtteḥ*. The latter device is resorted to by Gauḍa, Candrikā, Māṭhara, and Jayamaṅgalā. Māṭhara reads *samāsena* = *saṅkṣepeṇa* in the kārikā instead of *svabhāvena*. Jayamaṅgalā thinks that *jarā* and *maraṇa* include *garbha* and *janma* also. *Liṅga* should mean *sūkṣmas'arīra* because that will suit the belief that *liṅga* disappears after *viveka* only.

KĀRIKĀ 56.§—Māṭhara and Gauḍa have given a worldly example of *svārtha*;—as one does his friend's work as

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* अष्टविकल्पो दैवस्तैर्यग्योनश्च पञ्चधा भवति ।
मानुष्यश्चैकविधः समासतोऽयं त्रिधा सर्गः ॥५३ ॥
ऊर्ध्वं सत्त्वविशालस्तमोविशालश्च मूलतः सर्गः ।
मध्ये रजोविशालो ब्रह्मादिस्तम्बपर्यन्तः ॥ ५४ ॥

† तत्र जरामरणकृतं दुःखं प्राप्नोति चेतनः पुरुषः ।
लिङ्गस्याविनिवृत्तेः, तस्माद् दुःखं स्वभावेन ॥ ५५ ॥

§ इत्येष प्रकृतिकृतो महदादिविशेषभूतपर्यन्तः ।
प्रतिपुरुषविमोक्षार्थं स्वार्थ इव परार्थ आरम्भः ॥ ५६ ॥

if it is for himself. Candrikā extracts another shade of meaning. It says—as others work for their own interest, so the movement of Prakṛti for the sake of Puruṣa is also possible because movement requires some sort of purpose. *Vimokṣārtham* according to Vācaspati is to indicate that the ever-active Prakṛti does stop for some particular Puruṣa, who has gained knowledge; and according to Candrikā it is to indicate that the world may cease for one but continue for the rest.

KĀRIKĀ 57.*—Gauḍa, Māṭhara and Jayamaṅgalā apply the example to *nivṛtti* also—as the cow stops giving milk when the calf is nourished. Rāmāvatāra Śarmā says that a cow does not give milk as long as she does not give birth to a calf, though she takes her regular food; this is the force of *vatsavivṛddhaye*.

KĀRIKĀ 59.†—*Prakās'ya* cannot mean after giving direct knowledge of Pradhāna because it is always to be inferred. Therefore *ātmānam* in the kārikā means *s'abdādyātmanā*. The same can be further elucidated by what Abhyaṅkara[94] says on the necessity of postulating *bhūtas* and *indriyas*—the formula is that liberation is caused by the knowledge of the difference in Puruṣa and Prakṛti but Prakṛti is too subtle to be known and it can be known through its effects only; *prakṛti-*

[94] In commenting on Sarvadars'anasaṅgraha, Bhandarkar O. R. I. Publication, p. 319.

* वत्सविवृद्धिनिमित्तं क्षीरस्य यथा प्रवृत्तिरज्ञस्य ।
पुरुषविमोक्षनिमित्तं तथा प्रवृत्तिः प्रधानस्य ॥ ५७ ॥
औत्सुक्यनिवृत्त्यर्थं यथा क्रियासु प्रवर्तते लोकः ।
पुरुषस्य विमोक्षार्थं प्रवर्तते तद्वदव्यक्तम् ॥ ५८ ॥

† रङ्गस्य दर्शयित्वा निवर्तते नर्तकी यथा नृत्यात् ।
पुरुषस्य तथाऽऽत्मानं प्रकाश्य विनिवर्तते प्रकृतिः ॥ ५९ ॥

vikṛtis are also difficult to know and therefore *bhūtas* and *indriyas* are admitted as *tattva*; and there is no necessity of multiplying the *tattvas* by further accepting cow, pot, etc., separately.

How can Prakṛti, which is *vibhu*, turn aside? The trouble could be simplified, if it was held that the Prakṛti did not turn aside but that it was only recognized in its true colour and so the *saṁsāra* ceased for the individual Puruṣa. This explanation would have been faultless, but the Sāṅkhya bases all movement in Prakṛti on its *saṁyoga*[95] with Puruṣa[96] without which it will remain always inactive. The meaning of *saṁyoga* cannot be restricted to sympathetic response[97] because Puruṣa is quality-less.

Some say that after the release of Puruṣa, Prakṛti keeps aloof, assuming the form of some god. Different *tattvas* having different superintending deities, *adhidaiva*, is a conception of the later Sāṅkhya.

KĀRIKĀ 60.*—Vācaspati and Candrikā have used the kārikā to strengthen the pre-mentioned idea of selflessness in Prakṛti, but Māṭhara and Gauḍa wrongly think

[95] But in kārikā 66, *saṁyoga* is left of no importance—creation is due to ignorance and it ceases when Prakṛti has accomplished the enjoyment and release of Puruṣa because then there remains nothing more for it to do, even if there is *saṁyoga*.

[96] Pāñcarātras add one more principle, kāla.

[97] Vijñāna holds a real contact and differentiates between contact and change; therefore contact does not bring change in Puruṣa.

* नानाविधैरुपायैरुपकारिण्यनुपकारिणः पुंसः ।
गुणवत्यगुणस्य सतस्तस्यार्थमपार्थकं चरति ॥ ६० ॥

that the kārikā gives some clue to the cause of cessation of activity in Prakṛti. Māṭhara has well characterized the relation of it and Puruṣa as—like the feather of a peacock he is painted only on one side.

KĀRIKĀ 61.*—Gauḍa has a quaint explanation in store—Prakṛti has no further cause and therefore it does not again come in view of the released Puruṣa; for that reason it is *sukumāratara*,[98] *i.e.*, it has no better lord over it like *īs'vara*, etc., as its cause. While Jayamaṅgalā says that before knowledge Prakṛti shows itself only in *vyakta* form and when knowledge is attained, it feels that it has no subtler[99] form than *avyakta*. It should plainly mean sensitiveness.[100] Vaṁśīdhara uselessly tries to justify on all fours the example of *kulavadhū* by saying that it refers to the *jaḍa* body and *buddhi* that looks *cetana* on account of the approximity of Puruṣa; but he has not noted a greater disharmony when Vācaspati and Gauḍa say that she does not see other persons.[101] The case is opposite with Prakṛti; it ceases for the Puruṣa who has the discriminative knowledge, and continues to charm the remaining lot.

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[98] Here = *subhogyatara*. [99] Here = *sūkṣmatara*.

[100] Nyāyamañjarī objects to the delicacy of Prakṛti which is enjoyed by infinite number of Puruṣas; and Hall in translation of Gore: 'Hindu Phil. Systems', objects because it is insentient.

[101] They could have safely said that she does not see again the same person.

* प्रकृतेः सुकुमारतरं न किञ्चिदस्तीति मे मतिर्भवति ।
या दृष्टास्मीति पुनर्न दर्शनमुपैति पुरुषस्य ॥ ६१ ॥
तस्मान्न बध्यते नापि मुच्यते नापि संसरति कश्चित् ।
संसरति बध्यते मुच्यते च नानाश्रया प्रकृतिः ॥ ६२ ॥

KĀRIKĀ 63.*—Candrikā wrongly says that *ātmanā* = *buddhirūpeṇa* and *ātmānam* = *puruṣam*, Prakṛti binds itself by itself, no blot stains the Puruṣa.[102] How is *acetana* Prakṛti either bound or released? *Bhoga* will mean *avasthā*, *lakṣaṇa*, and *pariṇāmabhedas* that are visible in Prakṛti.

KĀRIKĀ 64.†—*Kevalam* = not mixed with *viparyaya*[103] but Candrikā strangely equates it with what is visible to Puruṣa only, which is not a sound expression because of the disinterestedness of Puruṣa.

KĀRIKĀ 65.§—*Svasthaḥ—ātmani sthito na prakṛtisthaḥ, tataḥ prakṛteḥ nivṛttatvāt* according to Jayamaṅgalā; but Vācaspati reads *susthaḥ* and strains its meaning to suit the context—he still has a slight mixture of *sāttvikī buddhi*,[104] otherwise he cannot see Prakṛti. Vācaspati admits this mixture only in *Jīvanmukta* state; but what is the harm if it continues in *mokṣa* state also? It will then facilitate the understanding of the multiplicity of Puruṣas even when they are released.

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[102] Strengthened by *saiva* in the second half of the kārikā.

[103] Vācaspati, Gauḍa.

[104] Tilak in Gītārahasya thinks it a device to avoid increasing the number of *guṇas* by accepting one more finer state.

* रूपैः सप्तभिरेव तु बध्नात्यात्मानमात्मना प्रकृतिः ।
सैव च पुरुषार्थं प्रति विमोचयत्येकरूपेण ॥ ६३ ॥

† एवं तत्त्वाभ्यासान्नास्मि न मे नाहमित्यपरिशेषम् ।
अविपर्ययाद्विशुद्धं केवलमुत्पद्यते ज्ञानम् ॥ ६४ ॥

§ तेन निवृत्तप्रसवामर्थवशात् सप्तरूपविनिवृत्ताम् ।
प्रकृतिं पश्यति पुरुषः प्रेक्षकवदवस्थितः स्वस्थः ॥ ६५ ॥

KĀRIKĀ 66.*—Gauḍa and Māṭhara have given two worldly examples to illustrate the cessation of all activity in Pradhāna—(1) when debts are cleared, and (2) as no progeny from cohabitation of the old.

KĀRIKĀ 67.†—*Jīvanmukta* state[105] is not possible because when indiscrimination is destroyed there can remain no body. Vijñāna[106] surmounts the difficulty by saying that indiscrimination and actions work only through *saṁyoga* and this *janmākhyasaṁyoga* is not destroyed without the fruition of *prārabdha.*

KĀRIKĀ 70.§—Rāmāvatāra Śarmā has pointed out *yatibhaṅga* in '*Pañcas'ikhāya tena.*'

The last three kārikās are missing in Gauḍapāda-Bhāṣya. Wilson was the first man to point out that the Sāṅkhya-Kārikā had only 69 verses and one verse was lost. Mr. Tilak reconstructed the missing verse from bhāṣya on kārikā 61 and thought that it was

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[105] Yogavārttika thinks that *asamprajñātayoga* is superior to knowledge because it overcomes *prārabdhakarma.*

[106] On Sūtra 1. 24.

* रङ्गस्थ इत्युपेक्षक एको दृष्टाहमित्युपरमत्येका ।
सति संयोगेऽपि तयोः प्रयोजनं नास्ति सर्गस्य ॥ ६६ ॥

† सम्यग्ज्ञानाधिगमाद्धर्मादीनामकारणप्राप्तौ ।
तिष्ठति संस्कारवशाच्चक्रभ्रमवद्धृतशरीरः ॥ ६७ ॥
प्राप्ते शरीरभेदे चरितार्थत्वात् प्रधानविनिवृत्तौ ।
ऐकान्तिकमात्यन्तिकमुभयं कैवल्यमाप्नोति ॥ ६८ ॥
पुरुषार्थज्ञानमिदं गुह्यं परमर्षिणा समाख्यातम् ।
स्थित्युत्पत्तिप्रलयाश्चिन्त्यन्ते यत्र भूतानाम् ॥ ६९ ॥

§ एतत्पवित्रमग्र्यं मुनिरासुरयेऽनुकम्पया प्रददौ ।
आसुरिरपि पञ्चशिखाय तेन च बहुधा कृतं तन्त्रम् ॥ ७० ॥

dropped because it was very atheistic. But it is not clear on what ground the loss of one kārikā is manifest. If the already existing 70th verse is to be rejected as not forming an essential part of the *Saptati*, the 69th verse can also be rejected on the same ground. Disquisition of the principles of the Sāṅkhya is over at the 68th kārikā and if the 69th kārikā is necessary to impress the authenticity of the work, the 70th is needed to give the line of succession of the old teachers, and the uninterrupted tradition of the system.

शिष्यपरम्परयाऽऽगतमीश्वरकृष्णेन चैतदार्याभिः ।
संक्षिप्तमार्यमतिना सम्यग्विज्ञाय सिद्धान्तम् ॥ ७१ ॥
सप्तत्यां किल येऽर्थास्तेऽर्थाः कृत्स्नस्य षष्टितन्त्रस्य ।
आख्यायिकाविरहिताः परवादविवर्जिताश्चापि ॥ ७२ ॥

श्रीकपिलमहामुनिप्रणीतानि

सांख्यसूत्राणि

तथा च

श्रीमदीश्वरकृष्णप्रणीताः

सांख्यकारिकाः

मेधाकरशास्त्रिणां प्रस्तावना सहिताश्च

विद्वद्वर

विष्णु वेङ्कटेश सोवनी, एम्.ए., एल्एल्.बी.

इत्येतैः संशोधिताः

पुण्यपत्तने

ओरिएन्टल बुक एजन्सी

१९३५

dropped because it was very atheistic. But it is not clear on what ground the loss of one kārikā is manifest. If the already existing 70th verse is to be rejected as not forming an essential part of the *Saptati*, the 69th verse can also be rejected on the same ground. Disquisition of the principles of the Sāṅkhya is over at the 68th kārikā and if the 69th kārikā is necessary to impress the authenticity of the work, the 70th is needed to give the line of succession of the old teachers, and the uninterrupted tradition of the system.

शिष्यपरम्परयाऽऽगतमीश्वरकृष्णेन चैतदार्याभिः ।
संक्षिप्तमार्यमतिना सम्यग्विज्ञाय सिद्धान्तम् ॥ ७१ ॥
सप्तत्यां किल येऽर्थास्तेऽर्थाः कृत्स्नस्य षष्टितन्त्रस्य ।
आख्यायिकाविरहिताः परवादविवर्जिताश्चापि ॥ ७२ ॥

श्रीकपिलमहामुनिप्रणीतानि

सांख्यसूत्राणि

तथा च

श्रीमदीश्वरकृष्णप्रणीताः

सांख्यकारिकाः

मेधाकरशास्त्रिणां प्रस्तावना सहिताश्च

विद्वद्वर

विष्णु वेङ्कटेश सोवनी, एम्.ए., एल्एल्.बी.

इत्येतैः संशोधिताः

पुण्यपत्तने

ओरिएन्टल बुक एजन्सी

१९३५

प्रस्तावना।

आत्मानात्मपदार्थवर्णनायप्रवृत्तानि शास्त्राणि हि दर्शनशास्त्राणीति निगद्यन्ते। तानि पुनः कपिलाक्षपाद (गौतम) कणाद (उलूक) जैमिनि पतञ्जलि कृष्णद्वैपायन (व्यास) महर्षिभिः संपादितानि क्रमेण सांख्यन्याय-वैशेषिकमीमांसायोगोत्तरमीमांसानामभिर्व्यवह्रियन्ते च। ज्ञानकाण्डापरपर्याय-वाचीन्युपनिषद्विद्यामूलकानि शास्त्राण्येतानि मोक्षविषयिणीं धिषणां विस्तार-यितुमलन्तरां मुमुक्षूणामित्यलमतिगिरा। अनस्तंगमितमहिमान्यलौकिक-ज्ञानाधिकरणानि चामूनि लोकोत्तरचमत्कारव्याप्तिमद्ब्रह्मविद्यापरपर्यायोपनिष-त्प्रादुर्भूतिसमकालमेव लोके प्राकाशन्त। तदक्षराधिगतिहेतुतयाऽविरतं विप-श्चिद्भिराद्रियमाणानि परमोपकारीणि तान्यधुनापि सूत्रवृत्तिभाष्यरूपशरीरैः मूर्ता-नीवास्मत्सकाशे समुल्लसितानि वरीवर्तन्ते। परमप्रतिपन्नमनीषावन्तो वयं तान्यु-पेक्षामहेऽन्वहमिति सुतरामसमञ्जसो विषयः। दर्शितं हि परापरतया विद्यानां द्वैविध्यम्। तत्र ऋगादिरपरा प्राणिनां भोगभूतये प्रवृत्ता परा च निःश्रेयसायेति। न जातु कश्चित् जीवातुर्भोगभृतिं कैवल्यं वा उपेक्षेतेति भगवती श्रुतिः समाह "आत्मा वारे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यश्च" इति। एतदेवाभि-ध्याय महर्षयः शमदमादिषट्कसंपत्तिपरकालं ब्रह्म जिज्ञासितव्यमिति शासतो दर्शनानि प्रादुरदधुः।

तदेतदन्तःपातिविषयेषु तावज्जगत्समालोचयितुमर्हम्—किमिदं जगदिति? प्रकृतिपरिणाममयं विंशतितत्त्वात्मकं तदिति कापिलं मतम्। योगदर्शनकारो-प्येवमेव समर्थयति सांख्यमतवत्। परमाण्वारब्धसंयोगवियोगजन्याकृति-विशेषस्तदिति न्यायसिद्धान्तः। तत्सहायो वैशेषिकोऽपि तद्वन्मन्यते। स्वरूप-तोऽनाद्यनन्तप्रवाहरूपसंयोगवियोगवज्जगदवधारयति जैमिनिः। नानारूप-क्रियात्मकं मायापरिणामः चेतनविवर्त एवेति मायावादिनः।

तद्बीजं त्रिगुणात्मकप्रकृतिरिति सांख्याः। कर्मानुयोगं प्रकृतिस्तन्नियामक ईश्वरश्चेति पतञ्जलिः। ईश्वरादिनवपरमाणव इति नैयायिकाः वैशेषिकाश्च। जीवादृष्टपरमाणव इति जैमिनिः। अभिन्ननिमित्तोपादानमीश्वर इति वेदान्तिनः।

ईश्वरो नित्येच्छाज्ञानादिगुणवान् विभुः कर्तृविशेष इत्यास्तिकः। सांख्योऽनास्तिकश्चेश्वरस्थाने पुरुषविशेषो नानाव्यक्तिरनेकसंख्य इति यावद् ब्रूते। क्लेशकर्मविपाकाशयैरपरामृष्टः पुरुषविशेष ईश्वर इति पतञ्जलिः। नित्येच्छाज्ञानादिगुणवान् विभुः कर्तेति न्यायवैशेषिकौ। शून्यमेवेति जैमिनिः। मायाविशिष्टश्चेतन इति मायावादिनः।

जीवस्वरूपे निर्णयेऽसंगश्चेतनो विभुर्नाना भोक्ता च स इति सांख्या योगश्च। ज्ञानादिचतुर्दशगुणवान् कर्ता भोक्ता जडः विभुर्नाना चेति न्यायवैशेषिकौ। जडचेतनात्मको विभुः नाना कर्ता भोक्तेति मीमांसकाः। अविद्याविशिष्टश्चेतन इति अद्वैतिनः।

केन हेतुना बध्यते इति बन्धहेतुं निर्णयन्ति—अविवेको बन्धहेतुरिति सांख्ययोगौ। अज्ञानमिति न्यायवैशेषिकौ। निषिद्धकर्माणीति जैमिनिः। अविद्यैवेत्यद्वैती।

बन्धशब्दस्य परिभाषानिर्णयः— अध्यात्मादित्रिविधदुःखानि बन्ध इति सांख्यो वदति। प्रकृतिपुरुषसंयोगजन्याविद्यादिक्लेशपंचकं बन्ध इति पतञ्जलिः। एकविंशतिदुःखानीति न्यायवैशेषिके। नरकादिदुःखसम्बन्ध इति मीमांसकः। अविद्या तत्कार्याणीति मायावादिनः।

मोक्षपदार्थः क इत्यत्र त्रिविधदुःखध्वंसो मोक्ष इति सांख्यः। प्रकृतिपुरुषसंयोगाभावपूर्वकाविद्यादिपंचक्लेशात्यन्तविरहः इति योगः। एकविंशतिदुःखध्वंस इति न्यायवैशेषिकौ। स्वर्गप्राप्तिरिति मीमांसकः। अविद्यातत्कार्यहानपूर्वकपरमानन्दविन्दनमिति वेदान्तिनः।

मोक्षसाधनानि जिज्ञासितव्यानीत्युच्यते—प्रकृतिपुरुषविवेको मोक्षसाधनमिति सांख्यः। निर्विकल्पकसमाधिपूर्वको विवेक इति पातञ्जलाः। इतरभिन्नात्मज्ञानमिति गौतमकणादौ। वेदविहितकर्मेति जैमिनिः। ब्रह्मात्मैक्यबोध इति वेदान्तिनः।

उद्दिष्टं संक्षेपेण षड्दर्शनस्थविषयजातम्। इदानीं सांख्यशास्त्रं मीमांसमानैर्यदनुभूतं तन्निवेद्यते—नास्तिककपिलेन स्वयं पूर्वमुपनिबद्धस्य सांख्यप्रवचनसंज्ञकस्य तत्त्वसमासाख्यस्य द्वाविंशतिसंख्यकस्य संक्षिप्तसूत्रस्य विस्तरेण षडध्यायात्मकोऽथ त्रिविधदुःखात्यन्तनिवृत्तिरत्यन्तपुरुषार्थ इत्यारभ्य यद्वा

तद्वा तदुच्छित्तिरित्येतावत्पर्यन्तः सूत्रोपनिबद्धः ग्रन्थो व्यरचि। तदनुपादेयत्वं चापि महाभारतादौ कथितम्। कर्दमाद्देवहूत्यामभिजातस्य सेश्वरसांख्यवादिनः कपिलस्योपदेशसूत्राणि त्विदानीं नोपलभ्यन्त इत्यनुसन्धायकानां परामर्शः। संभाव्यते चैतन्नास्तिकसांख्यवादसम्प्रदायां नानाविधप्रसृमरमिथ्यातर्कवितर्कसंघर्षप्रकर्षरूपान्धतमसि विलुप्तानि समभूवन्, इति कर्णाकर्णिकाऽपि निरूढातराम्। आस्तिककपिलस्य भगवदवतारता—"सिद्धानां कपिलो मुनिः" इति भगवद्वाक्येन व्यक्तैव। श्रुत्या च "ऋषिं प्रसूतं कपिलं यस्तमग्रे ज्ञानैर्बिभर्ति जायमानं च पश्येत्" इति, अनया सिद्धा। सत्येवमपि चर्षेः कपिलस्य परिचयमवाप्तुं भूमा प्रयासोऽपेक्षितः।

इदानीं वैशेषिकाक्षरैः सांख्यमतं स्मर्यम्—सत्त्वरजस्तमसां साम्यावस्था प्रकृतिः। साचैकैव। पुरुषास्तु परं भिद्यन्ते। ते च नित्याः। अपरिणामिनो नित्यचैतन्यस्वभावाः। ते च पंगवोऽपरिणामित्वात्। प्रकृतिस्त्वन्धा जडत्वात्। यथा विषयभोगेच्छा प्रकृतिपुरुषभेदादिदृक्षा च प्रकृतेर्भवति तदास्य पुरुषोपरागवशात् परिणमते। तस्याश्चाद्यः परिणामो बुद्धिरन्तःकरणविशेषः। बुद्धिरेव महत्तत्त्वम्। सा च बुद्धिर्दर्पणवन्निर्मला। तस्याश्च बहिरिन्द्रियप्रणाडिकया विषयाकारो यः परिणतिभेदो घट इति पट इति-आकारकस्तज्ज्ञानं वृत्तिरिति चाख्यायते। स्वच्छायां बुद्धौ वर्तमानेन ज्ञानेन चैतन्यस्य पुरुषस्य भेदाग्रहात् अहं जानामीति योऽभिमानविशेषः सैवोपलब्धिः। स्रक्चन्दनादिविषयसन्निकर्षात् इन्द्रियप्रणाडिकयैव सुखदुःखाद्याकारो बुद्धेरेव यः परिणामविशेषः स प्रत्ययः। अत एव ज्ञानसुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नसंस्कारधर्माधर्माः सर्व एव बुद्धेः परिणामविशेषाः सूक्ष्ममात्रतया प्रकृतावेव वर्तमानाः अवस्थाभेदादाविर्भवन्ति तिरोभवन्तीति च। पुरुषस्तु पुष्करपलाशवन्निर्लेपः प्रतिबिंबते बुद्धौ। तन्मते तत्त्वानि पंचविंशतिः। मूलप्रकृतिः महत्तत्त्वमहङ्कारः शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धाः पञ्चतन्मात्राणि पंचभूतानि पंचज्ञानेन्द्रियाणि पंचकर्मेन्द्रियाणि मनः पुरुषश्च परिणामवादः। केवला प्रकृतिः केवला विकृतिः प्रकृतिविकृत्युभयमनुभयं च। तथाच—"मूलप्रकृतिरविकृतिः महदाद्याः प्रकृतिविकृतयः सप्त। षोडशकस्तु विकारो न प्रकृतिर्न विकृतिः पुरुषः"—इतिन्यायकोशतोऽध्याहृतम्। (पृष्ठ ९०५)

स्फुटतराक्षरैरिदमपि ज्ञेयम् द्वैताद्वैतपरेषु दर्शनग्रन्थेषु पूर्वमीमांसाऽदृष्टवादिनी, वेदान्तडिंडिमोऽद्वैतपरः द्वैतपराणि चेतराणि शिष्टानि दर्शनानि केवलमेकमेवाद्वितीयं ब्रह्मेति स्वानुभूत्येकमानस्यात्मनो विशुद्धगुणातीतत्वनिर्णयाय तावद् वेदान्तशास्त्रं प्रवृत्तं तद्वत् प्रकृतेः परः परः पुरुष इति सेश्वरसांख्यैरक्षरःस्थिरीकृतः। 'विज्ञातारमरे केन विजानीयात्' इति संभाव्य कापिलं शास्त्रं कर्त्र्याः प्रकृतेः समालोचकं पुरुषतत्त्वमपरं प्रकृतेः परं निरणैषीत् अयं च सत्कार्यवादः। अन्यथा कथमसतः सज्जायेतेति विप्रतिपत्तिरापद्येत सुतराम्। अचेतनाचेतनोत्पत्तिं विवक्षन्तः सांख्यसत्कार्यवादेन द्वारा परास्ताः। स्वयं स्वस्कन्धारोहणवदसंगतं कर्त्र्याः प्रकृतेः स्वज्ञात्रीत्वमिति सांख्यीया युक्तिः।

अद्वैतवादे प्रकृतिपुरुषतत्त्वे एकरूपत्वेन गृहीते मायया च पिण्डं ब्रह्माण्डं च प्रकल्प्य स्वाभिमतं मतं स्थापितम्। यथा चोक्तं—

'कर्तृतन्त्रं भवेत् कर्म कर्मतन्त्रं शुभाशुभम्।
प्रमाणतन्त्रं विज्ञानं मायातन्त्रमिदं जगदिति।

सांख्यैरपि प्रकृतिं विविच्य तद्विकृतिरूपमनोबुद्ध्यहंकारपदार्थाः प्रकृतेरवयवा गुणा वा वर्तन्ते इति तेभ्यः परः पुरुषोऽस्तीति स्वमतं स्थापितम्। उक्तं चापि तैः—

"कार्यकारणकर्तृत्वे हेतुः प्रकृतिरुच्यते।
पुरुषः सुखदुःखानां भोक्तृत्वे हेतुरुच्यते" इति। गी० १३, २०

बौद्धाः काणादाश्च परमाणुभ्यो जगदेतन्मन्वानाः परमाणुसंयोजयित्रीं शक्तिं ख्यापयितुं न पारयन्ति इति तेषामारंभवादं स्थगयितुं सांख्यशास्त्रं प्रवृत्तम्। सांख्यास्तु परमाणुरूपावयवभेदाभाववती प्रकृतिः, प्रधाना, गुणक्षोभिणी, बहुधानका, प्रसवधर्मिणी चास्तीति समाख्याय सर्गरचनैकनिसर्गां तां सिद्धान्तयन्ति। अद्वैतिनां सगुणसृष्टिं यावदेवैतस्य सत्कार्यवादस्योपयोगो मतः। निर्गुणात् सगुणोत्पत्तौ तु तैः अघटनघटनापटीयसी माया शरणीकृता।

एवमेकस्यैव मूलपदार्थस्य विकासाद् विविधजगद्विकासोऽपीति अर्थात् एकस्या एवाव्यक्तप्रकृतेर्विविधव्यक्तसर्गो जायत इति सांख्यैः चारुतरो विषयः समुपन्यस्तः।

वैशेषिकोक्त–कारणे ये गुणा न सन्ति ते कार्ये स्वातन्त्र्येणोद्भवन्तीति सांख्यानां नेष्टम्। अन्यथा नीराद् दध्युद्भवः किं न स्यादिति समाधातुं दुःशकं स्यात्। यन्मूले नास्ति न तत्कार्येऽपीति सांख्यवादः। इदमेवाद्वैतवादिनामिष्टम्।

अष्टमकारिकायां प्रकृतिर्यद्यपीन्द्रियप्रत्यक्षगोचरा न भवति तथापि तस्याः आस्तित्वं सौक्ष्म्येण नूनं इष्टम्। अनेकव्यक्तपदार्थावलोकनं प्रकृतेरस्तित्वमव-धारयति।

सांख्यैः प्रकृतिर्निरवयवा समुद्दिष्टा। काणादैः प्रत्येकपरमाणुस्वतन्त्र-व्यक्त्याऽवयविता निर्धारिता परमाणूनां तत्र परमाणुद्वयमध्ये केन पदार्थेन स्थीयतामिति शिष्यते प्रश्नः।

उक्तं तावदतिवचनेन। प्रकृतिपुरुषयोरुभयभेदज्ञानं कैवल्यमिति सांख्याना-मन्तिमःसिद्धान्तः। सत्त्वगुणस्यात्यन्तोत्कर्षात् त्रिगुणातीतावस्था पुरुषेण लभ्यते इयं च कैवल्यायोपयुज्यत इति दिक्।

राजकुमारकॉलेज
रायपुर
फाल्गुनवदि १३
शककाल १८५६

सोवनीनिर्दिष्टानुवादकः

मेधाकरशास्त्री

अथ सांख्यसूत्राणि

अथ त्रिविधदुःखात्यन्तनिवृत्तिरत्यन्तपुरुषार्थः १

न दृष्टात् तत्सिद्धिर्निवृत्ते[2]ऽप्यनुवृत्तिदर्शनात् । २

[3]प्रात्यहिकक्षुत्प्रतीकारवत् तत्प्रतीकारचेष्टनात् [4]पुरुषार्थत्वम् । ३

सर्वासंभवात् [5]सम्भवेऽपि सत्त्वासम्भवाद्धेयः प्रमाणकुशलैः ४

उत्कर्षादपि मोक्षस्य सर्वोत्कर्षश्रुतेः ५

अविशेषश्चोभयोः ६

न स्वभावतो बद्धस्य मोक्षसाधनोपदेशविधिः ७

स्वभावस्या[6]नपायित्वादननुष्ठानलक्षणमप्रामाण्यम् ८

नाशक्योपदेशविधिरुपदिष्टेऽप्यनुपदेशः ९

शुक्लपटवद् बीजवच्चेत् १०

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१. भूयस्त्वादत्यन्तनिरूढानि सांख्यप्रवचनसूत्राणि सपाठान्तरभेदं तावद् विज्ञाप्य विश्वतोमुखीं सारवतीमार्षां वाचमप्याद्रत्याथानतितरां प्रसिद्धान्यपि संक्षिप्तानि कापिलसांख्यसूत्रत्वेनोपनिबद्धानि कतिपयानि सूत्राण्युपलभ्यन्ते तानि यथा निवेदयामः—

अथातस्तत्त्वे समासः १. कथयामि अष्टौ प्रकृतयः २. षोडशस्तु विकारः ३. पुरुषः ४. त्रैगुण्यम् ५. सञ्चरः प्रतिसञ्चरः ६. अध्यात्ममधिभूतमधिदैवञ्च ७. पञ्चाभिबुद्धयः ८. पञ्च कर्मयोनयः ९. पञ्च वायवः १०. पञ्चकर्मात्मानः ११. पञ्चपर्वा अविद्याः १२. अष्टाविंशतिधा अशक्तिः १३. नवधा तुष्टिः १४. अष्टधा सिद्धिः १५. दश मूलिकार्थाः १६. अनुग्रहः सर्गः १७. चतुर्दशविधो भूतसर्गः १८. त्रिविधो बन्धः १९. त्रिविधो मोक्षः २०. त्रिविधं प्रमाणलक्षणम् २१. एतत्सम्यग्ज्ञात्वा कृतकृत्यः स्यान्न पुनस्त्रिविधेन दुःखेनानुभूयते २२. शम् ॥ २. निवृत्तेरपि. ३. प्रात्याहिक. ४. तत्पुरुषार्थत्वम्. ५. ‘तत्सम्भवेऽप्यत्यन्तासम्भवाद्धेयः’ ‘संभवेऽपि सत्तासम्भवाद्धेयः’ वा. सर्वांता, सर्वत्र वा ६. अनपायत्वात्. ७. रुपदेशो.

शक्त्युद्भवानुद्भवाभ्यां[1] नाऽशक्योपदेशः ११

न कालयोगतो व्यापिनो नित्यस्य सर्वसम्बन्धात् १२

न[2] देशयोगतोऽप्यस्मात् १३

नावस्थातो देहधर्मत्वात् तस्याः १४

असङ्गोऽयं पुरुष इति[3] १५

न कर्मणा[4]न्यधर्मत्वादतिप्रसक्तेश्च[5] १६

विचित्रभोगानुपपत्तिरन्यधर्मत्वे १७

प्रकृतिनिबन्धना[6]च्चेन्न तस्या अपि पारतन्त्र्यम् १८

न[7] नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावस्य तद्योगस्तद्योगादृते १९

नाविद्यातोऽप्यवस्तुना बन्धायोगात् २०

वस्तुत्वे सिद्धान्तहानिः २१

वि[8]जातीयद्वैतापत्तिश्च २२

विरुद्धोभयरूपा चेत् २३

न तादृक्पदार्थाप्रतीतेः २४

न वयं षट्पदार्थवादिनो वैशेषिकादिवत् २५

[9]अनियतत्वेऽपि नायौक्तिकस्य संग्रहोऽन्यथा बालोन्मत्तादिसमत्वम् २६

नानादिविषयोपराग[10]निमित्तकोऽप्यस्य २७

न बाह्याभ्यन्तरयोरु[11]परज्योपरञ्जकभावोऽपि दे[12]शव्यवधानात् स्रुघ्नस्थ-पाटलिपुत्रस्थयोरिव २८

द्वयोरेकदेशलब्धोपरागान्न व्यवस्था २९

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१ शक्त्युद्भवाभिभवाभ्यां. २. इदं सूत्रं क्वचिन्नास्ति. ३. 'श्रुतिरस्ति सा बाधिता स्यात्' इत्यपि योजयन्ति. ४. कर्मणो. ५. 'च' रहितोऽपि पाठः ६. प्रकृतिनिबन्धना चेन्न. ७. 'नित्य' रहितोऽपि पाठः ८. विजातीये; 'च' विरहितोऽपि. ९. क्वचित् 'बालोन्मत्तादिसमत्वम्' इत्येव सूत्रं. १०. निमित्ततः ' 'निमित्तः' वा. ११. उपरज्य. १२. 'देशभेदात्'.

अदृष्टवशाच्चेत् ३०

न द्वयोरेककालायोगादुपकार्योपकारकभावः ३१

पुत्रकर्मवदिति चेत् ३२

नास्ति हि[1] तत्र स्थिर एकात्मा[2] यो गर्भाधानादिना[3] संस्क्रियते ३३

स्थिरकार्यासिद्धेः क्षणिकत्वम्[4] ३४

न[5] प्रत्यभिज्ञाबाधात् ३५

श्रुतिन्यायविरोधाच्च ३६

दृष्टान्तासिद्धेश्च ३७

युगपज्जायमानयोर्न कार्यकारणभावः ३८

पूर्वापाये उत्तरायोगात्[6] ३९

तद्भावे तदयोगादुभयव्यभिचारादपि न ४०

पूर्वभावमात्रे[7] न नियमः ४१

न विज्ञानमात्रं बाह्यप्रतीतेः ४२

तदभावे तदभावाच्छून्यं तर्हि ४३

शून्यं तत्त्वं भावो विनश्यति वस्तुधर्मत्वाद्विनाशस्य ४४

अपवादमात्रमबुद्धानाम् ४५

उभयपक्षसमानक्षेमत्वादयमपि[8] ४६

अपुरुषार्थत्वमुभयथा ४७

न गतिविशेषात् ४८

निष्क्रियस्य तदसंभवात् ४९

मूर्तत्वाद् घटादिवत् समानधर्मापत्तावपसिद्धान्तः ५०

गतिश्रुतिरप्युपाधियोगादाकाशवत् ५१

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१. 'हि' शब्दरहितोऽपि पाठः. २. एक आत्मा. ३. गर्भाधानादिकर्मणा. ४. क्षणिकत्वे सत्त्वमर्थक्रियाकारित्वं. ५. 'न' रहितोऽपि. ६. उत्तरयोगात्. ७. पूर्वभावित्वमात्रेन, पूर्वभाविमात्रेण वा. ८. °क्षमाद°

न कर्मणाप्य[1]तद्धर्मत्वात् ५२

अतिप्रसक्तिरन्यधर्मत्वे[2] ५३

निर्गुणादि[3]श्रुतिविरोधश्चेति[4] ५४

तद्योगो[5]ऽप्यविवेकान्न समानत्वम् ५५

नियतकारणात्तदुच्छित्तिर्ध्वान्तवत् ५६

प्रधाना[6]विवेकादन्याविवेकस्य तद्धाने हानम् ५७

वाङ्मात्रं न तु[7] तत्त्वं चित्तस्थितेः ५८

युक्तितोऽपि न बाध्यते दिङ्मूढवदपरोक्षादृते ५९

अचाक्षुषाणामनुमानेन बोधो धूमादिभिरिव वह्नेः ६०

सत्त्वरजस्तमसां साम्यावस्था प्रकृतिः प्रकृतेर्महान्
महतोऽहङ्कारोऽहङ्कारात् पञ्चतन्मात्राण्युभयमिन्द्रियं
तन्मात्रेभ्यः[8] स्थूलभूतानि पुरुष इति पञ्चविंशतिर्गणः ६१

स्थूलात् प[9]ञ्चतन्मात्रस्य ६२

बाह्याभ्यन्तराभ्यां तैश्चा[10]हङ्कारस्य ६३

तेनान्तःकरणस्य ६४

ततः प्रकृतेः ६५

संहत[11]परार्थत्वात् पुरुषस्य ६६

मूले मूलाभावादमूलं मूलम् ६७

पारम्पर्येऽप्येकत्र परिनिष्ठेति संज्ञामात्रम् ६८

समानः प्रकृतेर्द्वयोः ६९

अधिकारित्रैविध्यान्न नियमः ७०

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१. °प्येत° २. अग्रिमसूत्रादनन्तरमपि पाठः. ३. विरुद्धः, ४. 'इति' शून्योऽपि पाठः. ५. तद्योगे. ६. प्रथमाविवेकरहितोऽपि पाठः. ७. क्वचित् तुकारो नकारात् पूर्वं. ८. 'तन्मात्रेभ्यः' रहितोऽपि. ९. पञ्चतन्मात्रा. १०. 'च' रहितोऽपि पाठः. ११. संघातपरार्थत्वात्.

महदाख्यमाद्यं[1] कार्यं तन्मनः ७१
चरमोऽहङ्कारः ७२
तत्कार्यत्वमुत्तरेषाम्[2] ७३
आद्यहेतुता तद्द्वारा[3] पारम्पर्येऽप्यणुवत्[4] ७४
पूर्वभावित्वे[5] द्वयोरेकतरस्य हानेऽन्यतरयोगः[6] ७५
परिच्छिन्नं न[7] सर्वोपादानम् ७६
तदुत्पत्तिश्रुतेश्च[8] ७७
नावस्तुनो वस्तुसिद्धिः ७८
अबाधाददुष्टकारणजन्यत्वाच्च नावस्तुत्वम् ७९
भावे तद्योगेन तत्सिद्धिरभावे तदभावात् कुतस्तरां[9] तत्सिद्धिः ८०
न कर्मण[10] उपादानत्वायोगात्[11] ८१
नानुश्रविकादपि[12] तत्सिद्धिः साध्यत्वेनावृत्तियोगादपुरुषार्थत्वम् ८२
तत्र प्राप्तविवेकस्यानावृत्तिश्रुतिः ८३
दुःखाद्दुःखं जलाभिषेकवन्न जाड्यविमोकः[13] ८४
काम्येऽकाम्येऽपि[14] साध्यत्वाविशेषात् ८५
निजमुक्तस्य बन्धध्वंसमात्रं[15] परं न समानत्वम्[16] ८६
द्वयोरेकतरस्य वाप्यसन्निकृष्टार्थपरिच्छित्तिः[17] प्रमा तत्साधकं[18] यत्तत् त्रिविधं[19] प्रमाणम् ८७
[20]तत्सिद्धौ सर्वसिद्धेर्नाधिक्यसिद्धिः ८८

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१. आख्यारहितः पाठः. २. अन्येषाम्. ३. आद्यहेतुद्वारा ४. पारम्पर्येणाणुवत्. ५. पूर्वाभावित्वे. ६. द्वयोरेकतरहानेनान्यतरयोगः. ७. 'न' इति आदौ अपि; परिच्छिन्नत्वान्न वा. ८. 'च' रहितोऽपि. ९. 'तरां' इति वर्जितः. १०. कर्मणा. ११. उपादानायोगात्. १२. श्रा. १३. विमोक्षः १४. काम्याकाम्ये. १५. मात्र परं. १६. समत्वम्. १७. चाप्य, वासं वा. १८. साधकतमं. १९. 'त्रिविधं' रहितः पाठः, 'त्रिविधं प्रमाणं' रहितो वा. २०. आदौ त्रिविधं प्रमाणं, इति संयोज्य.

यत्सम्बद्धं[1] सत् तदाकारोल्लेखि विज्ञानं तत्प्रत्यक्षम् ८९

योगिनामबाह्यप्रत्यक्षत्वान्न दोषः[2] ९०

लीनवस्तुलब्धातिशयसम्बन्धाद्वाऽदोषः ९१

ईश्वरासिद्धेः ९२

[3]मुक्तबद्धयोरन्यतराभावान्न तत्सिद्धिः ९३

उभयथाप्यसत्करत्वम् ९४

मुक्तात्मनः[4] प्रशंसा उपासा[5] सिद्धस्य वा[6] ९५

तत्सन्निधानादधिष्ठातृत्वं मणिवत् ९६

विशेषकार्येष्वपि[7] जीवानाम् ९७

सिद्धरूपबोद्धृत्वाद्वाक्यार्थोपदेशः ९८

अन्तःकरणस्य तदुज्ज्वलितत्वाल्लोहवदधिष्ठातृत्वम्[8] ९९

[9]प्रतिबन्धसदृशः प्रतिबद्धज्ञानमनुमानम् १००

आप्तोपदेशः शब्दः १०१

उभयसिद्धिः प्रमाणात् तदुपदेशः १०२

सामान्यतो दृष्टादुभयसिद्धिः १०३

चिदवसानो भोगः १०४

अकर्तुरपि फलोपभोगोऽन्नाद्यवत्[10] १०५

[11]अविवेकाद्वा तत्सिद्धेः कर्तुः फलावगमः[12] १०६

नोभयं च तत्वाख्याने १०७

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१. ‘सत्’ इत्यस्य स्थाने सिद्धं वा पाठः, ‘यत्सम्बन्धसिद्धं वा. २. ‘न दोषः’ इति वा–संबन्धान्न दोषः. ३. ‘मुक्ताऽमुक्तयोः’ इति वा. ४. ‘प्रशंसोपासा’ वा; ‘विधिं वाक्योत्तम्भनाया’ इति विशेषो वा. ५. उपासना, उपास्या. ६. वेति. ७. विशेषकार्येपि. ८. ‘उपज्वलित’ इति वा. ९. ‘प्रतिबन्धदृशः’ ‘प्रतिबद्धदृशः’ इति वा. १०. अन्नादिवत्’, वा. ११. आविवेकाद्वा तत्सिद्धिः’ इत्येतावान् एव पाठः. १२. ‘गतः.

विषयो[1]ऽविषयोऽप्यतिदूरादेर्हानोपादानाभ्यामिन्द्रियस्य १०८

सौक्ष्म्यात्त[2]दनुपलब्धिः १०९

कार्यदर्शनात्तदुपल[3]ब्धेः ११०

वादिविप्रतिपत्तेस्तदसिद्धिरिति चेत्[4] १११

तथा[5]प्येकतरदृष्ट्या एकतर[6]सिद्धेर्नापलापः ११२

त्रिविधविरोधापत्तेश्च[7] ११३

नासदुत्पादो नृशृंगवत् ११४

उपादाननियमात् ११५

सर्वत्र सर्वदा सर्वासम्भवात् ११६

शक्तस्य[8] शक्यकरणात्[9] ११७

कारणभावाच्च[10] ११८

न[11] भावे भावयोगश्चेत् ११९

नाभिव्यक्तिनिबन्धनौ व्यवहाराव्यवहारौ १२०

नाशः कारणलयः १२१

पारम्पर्यतोऽन्वेषणा[12] बीजाङ्कुरवत १२२

उत्पत्तिवद्वा[13]ऽदोषः १२३

हेतुमद[14]नित्यमव्यापि सक्रियम[15]नेकमाश्रितं लिङ्गम् १२४

आञ्जस्यादभेदतो वा गुणसामान्यादेस्तत्सिद्धिः प्रधानव्यपदेशाद्वा[16] १२५

त्रिगुणा[17]चेतनत्वादि द्वयोः १२६

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१. अविषयो रहितः. २. ‘ तत् ’ इत्यनेन विरहितः पाठः. ३. प्रथमान्तो वा पाठः. ४. ‘ चेत् ’ इति वर्जितं. ५. अथा°. ६. °दृष्टयान्तर°. ७. ‘ चे ’ ति नावश्यं ८. शक्यस्य. ९. °कारणात्. १०. ‘ च ’ रहितः. ११. ‘नाभावः’ इति वा; भावे भावयोगश्चेन्न वाच्यम् वा वाक्यं वा. १२. ऽन्वेषणाद्बी°. १३. ‘ वा ’ रहितो वा पाठः. १४. ‘ लिङ्गं ’ इत्येव वा सूत्रं; अव्यापि रहितः वा. १५. सक्रियकम°. १६. ‘ तथा प्रधानशब्दात् ’ इत्यधिकं सूत्रं. १७. ‘ त्रिगुणचेतनत्वादि द्वयोः ’ वा.

प्रीत्यप्रीतिविषादाद्यैर्गुणानामन्योन्यं[1] वैधर्म्यम् १२७
[2]लघ्वादिधर्मैः साधर्म्यं वैधर्म्यं च गुणानाम् १२८
उभयान्यत्वात् कार्यत्वं महदादेर्घटादिवत् १२९
परिमाणात्[3] १३०
समन्वयात् १३१
शक्तितश्चेति १३२
तद्धाने प्रकृतिः पुरुषो वा १३३
तयोरन्यत्वे[4] तुच्छत्वम्[5] १३४
कार्यात् कारणानुमानं तत्साहित्यात् १३५
अव्यक्तं त्रिगुणाल्लिङ्गात् १३६
तत्कार्यतस्तत्सिद्धेर्नापलापः १३७
सामान्येन विवादाभावाद्धर्मवन्न साधनम्[6] १३८
शरीरादिव्यतिरिक्तः पुमान् १३९
संहतपरार्थत्वात्[7] १४०
त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययात् १४१
अधिष्ठानाच्चेति[8] १४२
भोक्तृभावात् १४३
कैवल्यार्थं[9] प्रवृत्तेश्च १४४
जडप्रकाशायोगात् प्रकाशः १४५
निर्गुणत्वान्न[10] चिद्धर्मा १४६
श्रुत्या सिद्धस्य नापलापस्तत्प्रत्यक्षबाधात् १४७

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१. 'अन्योन्यवैधर्म्यं' इति समासान्तः पाठः. २. लघ्वादिधर्मैरन्योऽन्यं साधर्म्यं वैधर्म्यं गुणानाम्. ३. परिणामात्. ४. उभयोरपि. ५. तुच्छता. ६. तत्साधनम्. ७. संहतपदार्थत्वात् ८. अधिष्ठातृत्वाच्चेति. ९. समस्तं सूत्रं; कैवल्यार्थं वा; प्रकृतेः वा; 'च' रहितः वा. १०. निर्गुणत्वाच्च न.

सुषुप्त्याद्यसाक्षित्वम्[1] १४८

जन्मादिव्यवस्थातः पुरुषबहुत्वम्[2] १४९

उपाधिभेदेऽप्येकस्य नानायोग आकाशस्येव[3] घटादिभिः १५०

उपाधिर्भिद्यते न तु तद्वान् १५१

एवमेकत्वेन[4] परिवर्तमानस्य न विरुद्धधर्माध्यासः १५२

अन्यधर्मत्वेऽपि नारोपात् तत्सिद्धिरेकत्वात् १५३

नाद्वैतश्रुतिविरोधो जातिपरत्वात् १५४

विदितबन्धकारणस्य दृष्ट्याऽतद्रूपम्[5] १५५

नान्धादृष्ट्या[6] चक्षुष्मतामनुपलम्भः १५६

वामदेवादिर्मुक्तो[7] नाद्वैतम् १५७

अनादावद्य यावदभावाद्भविष्यदप्येवम् १५८

इदानीमिव सर्वत्र नात्यन्तोच्छेदः १५९

व्यावृत्तोभयरूपः[8] १६०

साक्षात्सम्बन्धात्[9] साक्षित्वम् १६१

नित्यमुक्तत्वम्[10] १६२

औदासीन्यं चेति १६३

उपरागात् कर्तृत्वं चित्सान्निध्याच्चित्सान्निध्यात् १६४

इति प्रथमोऽध्यायः ।

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१. सुषुप्त्यादिसाक्षित्वं. २. पुरुषस्य बहुत्वम्. ३. इवार्थे 'व' शब्दो वा. ४. 'एकमेकत्वेन' वा, परमेकत्वेन वा. ५. तद्रूपं' वा. ६. 'नान्धदृष्ट्या' वा. ७. °दिमुक्तेः. ८. °भयं रूपः. ९. अक्षसम्बन्धात्. १०. 'नित्यमुक्तत्वमौदासीन्यं चेती' ति एकं सूत्रं वा.

अथ द्वितीयोऽध्यायः

विमुक्तमोक्षार्थं[1] स्वार्थं वा प्रधानस्य १

विरक्तस्य तत्सिद्धेः[2] २

न श्रवणमात्रात्[3] तत्सिद्धिरनादिवासनाया[4] बलवत्त्वात् ३

बहुभृत्यवद्वा प्रत्येकम् ४

प्रकृतिवास्तवे च पुरुषस्याध्यासासिद्धिः ५

कार्यतस्तत्सिद्धेः[5] ६

चेतनोद्देशान्नियमः कण्टकमोक्षवत् ७

अन्ययोगेऽपि तत्सिद्धिर्नाञ्जस्येनायोदाहवत् ८

रागविरागयोर्योगः सृष्टिः[6] ९

महदादिक्रमेण पंचभूतानाम् १०

आत्मार्थत्वात् सृष्टेर्नैषामात्मार्थ आरम्भः ११

दिक्कालावाकाशादिभ्यः १२

अध्यवसायो बुद्धिः १३

तत्कार्यं धर्मादि[9] १४

महदुपरागाद्विपरीतम् १५

अभिमानोऽहङ्कारः। १६

एकादश[10]पंचतन्मात्रं यत्कार्यम्[11] १७

सात्त्विकमेकादशकं प्रवर्तते वैकृतादहङ्कारात् १८

कर्मेन्द्रियबुद्धीन्द्रियैरान्तरमेकादशकम् १९

आहङ्कारिकत्व[12]श्रुतेर्न भौतिकानि २०

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१. विमोक्षार्थं. २. तत्सिद्धिः. ३. न वाङ्मात्रात्तत्सिद्धिर०. ४. अनादिवासनापटुत्वात. ५. प्रथमान्तः पाठः. ६. रागविरागयोगः सृष्टेः. ७. च सहितः पाठः, पञ्चस्थाने च वा. ८. मात्मार्थं. ९. धर्मादिः. १०. एकादशं. ११. तत्कार्यं. १२. अहङ्कारिकत्वं.

देवतालय[1]श्रुतिर्नारम्भकस्य २१

[2]तदुत्पत्तिश्रुतेर्विनाशदर्शनाच्च २२

[3]अतीन्द्रियमिन्द्रियं भ्रान्तानामधिष्ठाने[4] २३

श[5]क्तिभेदेऽपि भेदसिद्धौ नैकत्वम् २४

न कल्पनाविरोधः प्रमाणदृष्टस्य २५

[6]उभयात्मकं मनः २६

गुणपरिणामभेदान्नानात्वमवस्थावत् २७

रूपादिरसमलान्त[7] उभयोः २८

द्रष्टृत्वादिरात्मनः[8] करणत्वमिन्द्रियाणाम् २९

त्रयाणां स्वालक्षण्यम्[9] ३०

[10]सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः[11] प्राणाद्या वायवः पञ्च ३१

क्रमशोऽक्रमशश्चेन्द्रियवृत्तिः[12] ३२

वृत्तयः पञ्चतय्यः क्लिष्टाक्लिष्टाः[13] ३३

तन्निवृत्तावुपशान्तोपरागः[14] स्वस्थः ३४

कुसुमवच्च मणिः ३५

पुरुषार्थं करणोद्भवोऽप्यदृष्टोल्लासात् ३६

धेनुवद्वत्साय ३७

करणं [15]त्रयोदशविधमवान्तरभेदात् ३८

इन्द्रियेषु [16]साधकतमत्वगुणयोगात् कुठारवत् ३९

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१. श्रुतेः. २. तदुत्पत्तिः श्रूयते. ३. 'इन्द्रियं' रहितः. ४. °धिष्ठानं. ५. शक्तिभेदसिद्धौ. ६. उभयात्मकं च मनः. ७. °वर्गान्त. ८. °रात्मनां. ९. सूत्रान्ते 'महदहङ्कारमनसां;' स्वलक्षण्यं वा. १०. सामान्या. ११. 'सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः' इत्येतावदेव सूत्रं. १२. वृत्तयः. १३. सूत्रान्ते 'प्रमाणविपर्ययविकल्पनिद्रास्मृतयः'; च वा. १४. °वुपशान्तोपक्लेशः. १५. द्वादशविधं; त्रयोदशम°; बाह्यान्तरभेदात्. १६. साधकतमत्वं; गुण रहितः.

द्वयोः [1]प्रधानं मनो लोकवद् भृत्यवर्गेषु ४०

अव्यभिचारात्[2] ४१

[3]तथाऽशेषसंस्काराधारत्वात् ४२

स्मृत्यानुमानाच्च ४३

सम्भवेन्न स्वतः ४४

आपेक्षिको गुणप्रधानभावः[4] क्रियाविशेषात् ४५

तत्कर्मार्जितत्वात् तदर्थमभि[5]चेष्टा लोकवत्[6] ४६

[7]समानकर्मयोगे बुद्धेः प्राधान्यं लोकवल्लोकवत् ४७

इति द्वितीयोऽध्यायः।

अथ तृतीयोऽध्यायः

अविशेषाद्विशेषारम्भः १

[8]तस्माच्छरीरस्य २

तद्बीजात्संसृतिः ३

[9]आ विवेकाच्च प्रवर्तनमविशेषाणाम् ४

[10]उपभोगादितरस्य ५

संप्रति परिमुक्तो[11] द्वाभ्याम् ६

मातापितृजं स्थूलं प्रायश इतरन्न तथा ७

पूर्वोत्पत्तेस्तत्कार्यत्वं भोगादेकस्य नेतरस्य ८

सप्तदशैकं लिङ्गम् ९

व्यक्तिभेदः कर्मविशेषात् १०

[12]तदधिष्ठानाश्रये देहे तद्वादात् तद्वादः ११

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१. बुद्धिः. २. अव्यभिचारी. ३. यथा. ४. गुणप्रवाहभावः. ५. अपि चेष्टा. ६. 'लोकवत्' इत्यस्य आम्रेडितत्वं. ७. त्यक्तमिदं सूत्रं. ८. इदं च त्यक्तं. ९. अविवेकाच्च. १०. इदमपि त्यक्तं; यदुपभोगा°. ११. परिष्वक्तो. १२. तदधिष्ठाना-श्रयदेहे.

न स्वातन्त्र्यात् तद्दते छायावच्चित्रवच्च १२

मूर्तत्वेऽपि न[1] सङ्घातयोगात् तरणिवत् १३

अणुपरिमाणं तत्कृतिश्रुतेः[2] १४

तदन्नमयत्वश्रुतेश्च[3] १५

पुरुषार्थं संसृ[4]तिर्लिङ्गानां सूपकारवद्राज्ञः[5] १६

पाञ्चभौतिको देहः १७

चातुर्भौतिकमित्येके[6] १८

ऐकभौतिकमित्यपरे[7] १९

न सांसिद्धिकं चैतन्यं [8]प्रत्येकादृष्टेः २०

[9]प्रपञ्चमरणाद्यभावश्च २१

मदशक्तिवच्चेत्[10] प्रत्येकपरिदृष्टे [11]सांहत्ये तदुद्भवः २२

ज्ञानान्मुक्तिः २३

बन्धो विपर्ययात् २४

नियतकारणत्वान्न[12] समुच्चयविकल्पौ २५

[13]स्वप्नजागराभ्यामिव मायिकाभ्यां नोभयोर्मुक्तिः पुरुषस्य २६

इतरस्यापि नात्यन्तिकम्[14] २७

सङ्कल्पितेऽप्येवम् २८

भावनोपचयाच्छुद्धस्य[15] सर्वं प्रकृतिवत् २९

रागोपहति[16]र्ध्यानम् ३०

वृत्तिनिरोधात् तत्सिद्धिः ३१

धारणासनस्वकर्मणा तत्सिद्धिः ३२

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१. 'न संगात् योगात्'; 'न संघातः योगात्' २. तद्गतिश्रुतेः. ३. च रहितः. ४. 'संसृतिलिङ्गानां' 'प्रवृत्तिलिङ्गानां' वा. ५. °कारवद्वा. ६. °मित्यन्ये. ७. अपरः; °कमपरे. ८. प्रत्येकादृष्टे. ९. प्रपञ्चत्वाद्यभावश्च. १०. चैतत्. ११. सौक्ष्म्यात्सांहत्ये. १२. नियतकारणज्ञानान्न. १३. 'जागराभ्यां' इति विशेषः. १४. नात्यन्तिकत्वम्' १५. बुद्धस्य. १६. रागापहतिः.

निरोधश्छर्दिविधारणाभ्याम्[1] ३३

स्थिरसुखमासनम् ३४

स्वकर्मस्वाश्रमविहितकर्मानुष्ठानम्[2] ३५

वैराग्यादभ्यासाच्च ३६

विपर्ययभेदाः पञ्च ३७

अशक्तिरष्टाविंशतिधा[3] तु ३८

तुष्टिर्नवधा ३९

सिद्धिरष्टधा ४०

अवान्तरभेदाः[4] पूर्ववत् ४१

एवमितरस्याः ४२

आध्यात्मिकादिभेदान्नवधा तुष्टिः ४३

ऊहादिभिः सिद्धिः[5] ४४

नेतरादितरहानेन विना ४५

दैवादिप्रभेदा[6] ४६

आब्रह्मस्तम्भपर्यन्तं तत्कृते[7] सृष्टिराविवेकात् ४७

ऊर्ध्वं[8] सत्त्वविशाला ४८

तमोविशाला मूलतः ४९

मध्ये रजोविशाला ५०

कर्मवैचित्र्यात् प्रधानचेष्टा गर्भदासवत् ५१

आवृत्तिस्तत्राप्युत्तरोत्तरयोनियोगाद्धेयः ५२

समानं[9] जरामरणादिजं दुःखम् ५३

न कारणलयात् कृतकृत्यता मग्नवदुत्थानात्[10] ५४

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१. अग्रिमसूत्रादनन्तरमपि पाठः. २. °विहितं. ३. 'तु' रहितः. ४. भेदात्. ५. 'अष्टधा' इति अधिकं. ६. दैवादिप्रभेदाः. ७. तत्कृता सृष्टिः ८. सत्य. ९. समान; सर्वत्र. १०. स्नानवद्.

अकार्यत्वेऽपि तद्योगः पारवश्यात् ५५
स हि सर्ववित् सर्वकर्ता ५६
ईदृशेश्वरसिद्धिः सिद्धा ५७
प्रधानसृष्टिः परार्थं स्वतोप्यभोक्तृत्वादुष्ट्रकुङ्कुमवहनवत्[१] ५८
अचेतनत्वेऽपि क्षीरवच्चेष्टितं प्रधानस्य ५९
कर्मवद्दृष्टेर्वा[२] कालादेः ६०
स्वभावाच्चेष्टितमनभिसन्धानाद् भृत्यवत् ६१
कर्माकृष्टेर्वा[३]नादितः ६२
विविक्तबोधात् सृष्टिनिवृत्तिः प्रधानस्य सूदवत् पाके ६३
इतर इतरवत्[४] तद्दोषात् ६४
[५]द्वयोरेकतरस्य वौदासी[६]न्यमपवर्गः ६५
अन्यसृ[७]ष्ट्युपरागेऽपि न विरज्यते[८] प्रबुद्धरज्जुतत्त्वस्येवोरगः ६६
कर्मनिमित्तयोगाच्च ६७
नैरपेक्ष्ये[९]ऽपि प्रकृत्युपकारे[१०]ऽविवेको निमित्तम् ६८
नर्तकीवत् प्रवृत्तस्यापि[११] निवृत्तिश्चारितार्थ्यात् ६९
दोषबोधेऽपि[१२] नोपसर्पणं प्रधानस्य कुलवधूवत् ७०
नैकान्ततो बन्धमोक्षौ पु[१३]रुषस्याविवेकादृते ७१
प्रकृतेराञ्जस्यात् [१४]ससङ्गत्वात् पशुवत् ७२
रूपैः सप्तभिरात्मानं बध्नाति प्रधानं कोश[१५]कारवद्विमो[१६]चयत्येकरूपेण[१७] ७३
निमित्तत्वमविवेकस्य[१८] न दृष्टहानिः[१९] ७४

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१. उष्ट्रकुङ्कुमवत्. २. कर्मकरकृष्टं वा; कर्मकरकृतवद्वा. ३. °र्वाप्यना° ४. इतरज्जहाति; इतरत्. ५. द्वयोरितरस्य ६. वाप्यौदासीन्यं. ७. 'तत्वस्येवोपरागः' च परिवर्तितं; °स्यै°, अन्यसृष्ट्युपरागान्न. ८. विरमते अ०; 'निवर्तते' ९. नैरपेक्षे. १०. °प्य°. ११. प्रवर्तकस्यापि. १२. °बोधो. १३. पुरुषस्य विवेकादृते. १४. संसर्गत्वात्. १५. कोष°. १६. मोच°. १७. त्येकेन रूपेण. १८. कस्येति. १९. दृष्टान्तहानिः.

तत्त्वाभ्यासान्नेति नेतीति[1] त्यागाद् विवेकसिद्धिः ७५

अधिकारि[2]प्रभेदान्न नियमः ७६

बाधितानु[3]वृत्त्या [4]मध्यविवेकतो[5]ऽप्युपभोगः ७७

जीवन्मुक्तश्च[6] ७८

[7]उपदेश्योपदेष्टृ[8]त्वात् तत्सिद्धिः ७९

श्रुतिश्च ८०

इतरथान्धपरंपरा ८१

चक्रभ्रमणवद् [9]धृतशरीरः ८२

संस्का[10]रलेशतस्तत्सिद्धिः ८३

विवेकान्निःशेषदुःखनिवृत्तौ [11]कृतकृत्यता नेतरान्नेतरात् ८४

इति तृतीयोऽध्यायः।

अथ चतुर्थोऽध्यायः

राजपुत्रवत् तत्त्वोपदेशात्[12] १

पिशाचवदन्यार्थोपदेशेऽपि[13] २

आवृत्तिरसकृदुपदेशात् ३

पितापुत्रवदुभयोर्दृष्टत्वात् ४

श्येनवत्[14] सुखदुःखी त्यागवियोगाभ्याम्[15] ५

अहिनिर्ल्वयिनीवत्[16] ६

छिन्नहस्तवद्वा ७

असाधना[17]नुचिन्तनं बन्धाय भरतवत् ८

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१. अन्तिमेतिशब्दवर्जं. २. अधिकार°. ३. बाधितानुवृत्तेः. ४. मध्यविवेकता. ५. अपभोगः ६. 'च' रहितः. ७. उपदेशो°. ८. °पदेशत्वात्. ९. हृतशरीरः. १०. संस्कारलोपस्त°; संस्कारालेशतस्त°. ११. कृतकृत्यो. १२ राजपुत्रस्तत्वो°. १३. उपदेशोऽपि. १४. श्वानवत्. १५. श्येनवत्सुखदुःखभोगाभ्यां. १६. °निर्ल्वयनीवत्; °निर्लिवयिनीवत्. १७. चिन्तनवधाय बन्धवत्.

बहुभिर्योगे विरोधो[1] रागादिभिः[2] कुमारीशङ्खवत् ९

द्वाभ्यामपि तथैव[3] १०

निराशः सुखी पिङ्गलावत्[4] ११

अनारंभेऽपि[5] परगृहे सुखी सर्पवत् १२

बहुशास्त्रगुरूपासनेऽपि सारादानं षट्पदवत् १३

इषुकारवन्नैकचित्तस्य समाधिहानिः १४

[6]कृतनियमलङ्घनादानर्थक्यं लोकवत् १५

तद्विस्मरणेऽपि[7] भेकीवत् १६

नोपदेशश्रवणे[8]ऽपि [9]कृतकृत्यता परामर्शादृते विरोचनवत् १७

दृष्टस्तयोरिन्द्रस्य १८

प्रणतिब्रह्मचर्योपसर्पणानि कृत्वा[10] सिद्धिर्बहुकालात् तद्वत् १९

न कालनियमो वामदेववत् २०

अध्यस्तरूपोपासनात् पारंपर्येण यज्ञोपासकानामिव २१

इतरलाभेऽप्यावृत्तिः[11] पञ्चाग्नियोगतो जन्मश्रुतेः २२

विरक्तस्य हेयहानमुपादेयोपादानं हंसक्षीरवत् २३

[12]लब्धातिशययोगाद्वा तद्वत् २४

न[13] [14]कामचारित्वं रागोपहते शुकवत् २५

गुणयोगाद् बद्धः[15] शुकवत् २६

न भोगाद्रागशान्तिर्मुनिवत् २७

दोषदर्शनादुभयोः २८

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१. °र्योगविरोधो. २. कुमारीकङ्कणशङ्खवत्. ३. सूत्रान्ते चकारोऽपि. ४. पिङ्गलादिवत्. ५. अपिस्त्यक्तः. ६. व्रतनियमोलङ्घनात्, वृत°; वृत्त°. ७. अपिस्त्यक्तः. ८. नोपदेशे. ९. कृतकृत्यः. १०. °पसर्पणान्कृत्वा. ११. व्यावृत्तिः. १२. लब्धातिशये योगाद्वा; वा रहितः. १३. नकारस्यान्ते शुकवत् इत्युक्त्वा पठितं. १४. कामविचारित्वं; कामिचारित्वं. १५. बन्धः.

न मलिनं[1]चेतस्युपदेशबीजप्ररोहोऽजवत् २९

नाभासमात्रमपि मलिनदर्पणवत् ३०

न तज्जस्यापि[2] तद्रूपता पङ्कज[3]वत् ३१

न भूतियोगेऽपि[4] कृतकृत्यतोपास्यसिद्धिवदुपास्यसिद्धिवत् ३२

इति चतुर्थोऽध्यायः

अथ पञ्चमोऽध्यायः

मङ्गलाचरणं शिष्टाचारात् फलदर्शनाच्छ्रुतितश्चेति[5] १

नेश्वराधिष्ठिते[6] फ[7]लनिष्पत्तिः कर्मणा तत्सिद्धेः २

स्वोपकारादधिष्ठानं लोकवत् ३

लौकिकेश्वरवदितरथा ४

पारिभाषिको वा ५

न रागादृते तत्सिद्धिः[8] प्रतिनियतकारणत्वात् ६

तद्योगेऽपि न नित्यमुक्तः ७

प्रधानशक्तियोगाच्चेत् सङ्गापत्तिः ८

सत्तामात्राच्चेत् सर्वैश्वर्यम् ९

प्रमाणाभावान्न तत्सिद्धिः १०

सम्बन्धाभावान्नानुमानम् ११

श्रुतिरपि प्रधानकार्यत्व[9]स्य १२

नाविद्याशक्तियोगो निःसङ्गस्य १३

तद्योगे तत्सिद्धावन्योन्याश्रयत्वम् १४

न बीजाङ्कुरवत् सा[10]दिसंसारश्रुतेः १५

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१. मलिने. २. तज्जन्यस्यापि. ३. पङ्कजादिवत्. ४. अपि रहितः. ५. °द्भूतितश्चेति. ६. °धिष्ठितैव; °धिष्ठित; °धिष्ठितः. ७. फलसंपत्तिः, °संपत्; सदाफलसंपत्तिः ८. जगत्सिद्धिः. ९. कार्यस्य. १०. सादिश्रतेः.

विद्यातोऽन्यत्वे ब्रह्म[1]बाधप्रसंगः १६

अबाधे नैष्फल्यम्[2] १७

विद्याबाध्यत्वे जगतोऽप्येवम् १८

तद्रूपत्वे सादित्वम् १९

न धर्मापलापः प्रकृतिकार्यवैचित्र्यात् २०

श्रुतिलिङ्गादिभिस्तत्सिद्धिः २१

न नियमः प्रमाणान्तरावकाशात् २२

उभयत्राप्येवम् २३

अर्थात् सिद्धिश्चेत् समानमुभयोः २४

अन्तःकरणधर्मत्वं धर्मादीनाम् २५

गुणादीनाञ्च [3]नात्यन्तबाधः २६

पञ्चावयवयोगात्[4] [5]सुखसंवित्तिः २७

न सकृद्ग्रहणात् सम्बन्धसिद्धिः[6] २८

नियत[7]धर्मसाहित्य[8]मुभयोरेकतरस्य वा व्याप्तिः २९

न तत्त्वान्तरं वस्तुकल्पनाप्रसक्तेः ३०

निजशक्त्युद्भवमित्याचार्याः ३१

आधेयशक्तियोगे[9] इति पञ्चशिखः ३२

न स्व[10]रूपशक्तिर्नियमः पुनर्वादप्रसक्तेः ३३

विशेषणानर्थक्यप्रसक्तेः ३४

पल्लवादिष्वनुपपत्तेश्च[11] ३५

आधेयशक्तिसिद्धौ निजशक्तियोगः समानन्यायात् ३६

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१. ब्रह्मबाधप्रसक्तेः. २. नैफल्यं; नैष्कल्यं. ३. च रहितः. ४. °संयोगात्. ५. सुखादिसंवित्तिः ६. सूत्रान्ते ‘ स्वप्रतीतिविरोधात् ’ इत्यपि निवेशनीयं. ७. नियतं. ८. साहित्य उभयो°. ९. योग इति. १०. स्वरूपशक्तिनियमः. ११. चकारो रहयितः.

[1]वाच्यवाचकभाव: सम्बन्ध: [2]शब्दार्थयो: ३७

त्रिभि: [3]सम्बन्धसिद्धि: ३८

न कार्ये नियम उभयथा दर्शनात् ३९

लोके[4] व्युत्पन्नस्य वेदार्थ[5][6]प्रतीति: ४०

न त्रिभिरपौरुषेयत्वाद्वेदस्य तदर्थस्या[7]प्यतीन्द्रियत्वात् ४१

न यज्ञादे: स्वरूपतो धर्मत्वं वैशिष्ट्यात्[8] ४२

निजशक्तिर्व्युत्पत्या व्यवच्छिद्यते[9] ४३

योग्यायोग्येषु प्रतीतिजनकत्वात् तत्सिद्धि:[10] ४४

न नित्यत्वं वेदानां कार्यत्वश्रुते:[11] ४५

न पौरुषेयत्वं तत्कर्तु: पुरुषस्याभावात् ४६

[12]न मुक्तामुक्तयोरयोग्यत्वात् ४७

नापौरुषेयत्वान्नित्यत्वमङ्कुरादिवत् ४८

तेषामपि तद्योगे दृष्टबाधादिप्रसक्ति: ४९

यस्मिन्नदृष्टेऽपि कृतबुद्धिरुपजायते तत् पौरुषेयम् ५०

निज[13]शक्त्यभिव्यक्ते: स्वत: प्रामाण्यम् ५१

नासत: ख्यानं नृशृङ्गवत् ५२

न सतो बाधदर्शनात् ५३

नानिर्वचनीयस्य तदभावात् ५४

नान्यथाख्याति: स्ववचोव्याघातात् ५५

[14]सदसत्ख्यातिर्बाधा[15]बाधात् ५६

प्रतीत्यप्रतीतिभ्यां न स्फोटात्मक: शब्द: ५७

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१. वाच्यवाचकसम्बन्ध:; २. 'शब्दार्थयो:' इति तु न विवक्षितं. ३. सम्बन्धसिद्धे:. ४. लोकव्यु°. ५. कार्यप्रतीते:. ६. प्रतीते:. ७. अपिस्त्यक्त:. ८. वैशेष्यात्. ९. विच्छिद्यते. १०. तत्सिद्धे:. ११. कार्यश्रुते:. १२. 'न' वर्जित: १३. निजशक्त्याभिव्यक्ते:. १४. सदसत्ख्यातिबाधाबाधात्; सदसख्याति. १५. बाधाबाधाभ्यां.

न शब्दनित्यत्वं कार्यताप्रतीतेः ५८

पूर्वसिद्ध[1]सत्त्वस्याभिव्यक्तिर्दीपेनेव[2] घटस्य ५९

सत्कार्यसिद्धान्तश्चेत् सिद्धसाधनम् ६०

नाद्वैतमात्मनो[3] लिङ्गात् तद्भेदप्रतीतेः[4] ६१

नानात्मनापि प्रत्यक्षबाधात् ६२

नोभाभ्यां तेनैव ६३

अन्यपरत्वमविवेकानां तत्र ६४

नात्माविद्या नोभयं जगदुपादानकारणं निःसङ्गत्वात् ६५

नैकस्या[6]नन्दचिद्रूपत्वे द्वयोर्भेदात् ६६

दुःखनिवृत्तेर्गौणः ६७

विमुक्तिप्रशंसा मन्दानाम् ६८

न व्यापकत्वं मनसः करणत्वादिन्द्रियत्वाद्वा वांस्यादिवच्चक्षुरादिवत् ६९

सक्रियत्वाद्गतिश्रुतेः ७०

न निर्भागत्वं तद्योगाद् घटवत्[9] ७१

प्रकृतिपुरुषयोरन्यत् सर्वमनित्यम् ७२

न भागलाभो[10] भोगिनो निर्भागत्वश्रुतेः[11] ७३

नानन्दाभिव्यक्तिर्मुक्तिर्निर्धर्मत्वात्[12] ७४

न विशेष[13]गुणच्छित्तिस्तद्वत् ७५

न विशेषगतिर्निष्क्रियस्य[14] ७६

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१. 'सिद्ध' वर्जमपि पाठः. २. व्यक्तिः प्रदीपेनेव. ३. नाद्वैतमात्मनां°.
४. लिङ्गाच्च भेदप्रतीतेः. ५. नात्मा नाविद्या; नात्मानाद्यविद्या; नात्मनाविद्या.
६. कुत्रचित् त्यक्तं. ७. कुत्रचित् त्यक्तोऽयमंशः कुत्रचित् 'तदाशुसंचारि-
त्वात्' पूरितोऽयम्. ८. सूत्रान्ते चकारोऽपि निवेशितः. ९. घटादिवत्.
१०. भागिनो वा पाठः ११. निर्भागित्व°. १२. निर्धर्मकत्वाद्वा पाठः. १३.
गुणोच्छित्तिर्वा पाठः. १४. निष्क्रियस्येति नापेक्षितमपि; °गतिनिष्क्रियस्य°.

नाकारोपरागोच्छित्तिः क्षणिकत्वादिदोषात् ७७
न सर्वोच्छित्तिरपुरुषार्थत्वादिदोषात्[1] ७८
एवं शून्यमपि ७९
संयोगाश्च वियोगान्ता इति[2] न देशादिलाभोऽपि ८०
न[3] भागियोगो भागस्य ८१
नाणिमादियोगोऽप्यवश्यंभावित्वात्[4] तदुच्छित्ते[5]रितरयोगवत्[6] ८२
नेन्द्रादिपदयोगोऽपि तद्वत् ८३
न भूताप्रकृतित्व[7]मिन्द्रियाणामाहङ्कारिकत्वश्रुतेः[8] ८४
न षटपदार्थनियमस्तद्बोधान्मुक्तिः[9] ८५
षोडशादिष्वप्येवम् ८६
नाणुनित्यता तत्कार्यश्रुतेः ८७
न[10] निर्भागत्वं कार्यत्वात् ८८
न रूपनिबन्धनात्[11] प्रत्यक्षनियमः[12] ८९
न परिमाण[13]चातुर्विध्यं द्वाभ्यां तद्योगात् ९०
अनित्यत्वेऽपि स्थिरतायोगात् प्रत्यभिज्ञानं सामान्यस्य ९१
न तदपलापस्तस्मात् ९२
नान्यनिवृत्तिरूपत्वं भावप्रतीतेः ९३
न तत्त्वान्तरं सादृश्यं प्रत्यक्षोपलब्धेः ९४
निजशक्त्यभिव्यक्ति[14]र्वा वैशिष्ट्यात्तदुपलब्धेः ९५
न संज्ञासंज्ञि[15]सम्बन्धोऽपि ९६

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१. पुरुपार्थत्वादि २. इति वर्जितः° ३. न भागयोगोऽभागस्य ४. °भावितत्वात्. ५. °त्ति° ६. °रितरवियोगवत्. ७. भूतप्रकृतित्वं. ८. अहंकारत्व°; अहंकारिकत्व°; अहंकारकत्व°. ९. मुक्तिश्चेतिपाठः. १०. प्राचीनपुस्तके नोध्दृतम्; न तन्निर्भाग त्वं. ११. रूपनिबन्धनः १२. प्रत्यक्षत्वनियमः; प्रत्यक्षत्वमिति नियमः १३. परिमाणे. १४. निजधर्माभिव्यक्तिः १५. संज्ञासंज्ञिनोः

न सम्बन्धनित्योभयानित्यत्वात् ९७

नातः[1] सम्बन्धो धर्मिग्राहक[2]प्रमाणबाधात् ९८

न समवायोऽस्ति[3]प्रमाणाभावात् ९९

[4]उभयथाप्यन्यथासिद्धेर्न[5] प्रत्यक्षमनुमानं[6] वा १००

नानुमेयत्वमेव क्रियाया नेदिष्ठस्य तत्तद्वतोरेवा[7]परोक्षप्रतीतेः १०१

न पाञ्चभौतिकं शरीरं बहूनामुपादानायोगात् १०२

न स्थूलमिति नियमोऽतिवाहिकस्यापि विद्यमानत्वात् १०३

नाप्राप्तप्रकाशकत्वमिन्द्रियाणामप्राप्तेः सर्वप्राप्तेर्वा १०४

न तेजोऽपसर्पणात्तैजसं चक्षुर्वृत्तितस्तत्सिद्धेः १०५

प्राप्तार्थप्रकाशलिङ्गात् वृत्तिसिद्धिः १०६

भागगुणाभ्यां तत्त्वान्तरं वृत्तिः सम्बन्धार्थं सर्पतीति[8] १०७

न द्रव्य[9]नियमस्तद्योगात् १०८

न[10] देशभेदेऽप्यन्योपादानताऽस्मदादिवन्नियमः[11] १०९

निमित्तव्यपदेशात्तद्व्यपदेशः ११०

ऊष्मजाण्डजजरायु[12]जोद्भिज्ज[13]साङ्कल्पिकसांसिद्धिकं चेति न नियमः[14] १११

सर्वेषु पृथिव्युपादानमसाधारण्यात् तद्व्यपदेशः पूर्ववत् ११२

न देहारंभकस्य प्राणत्वमिन्द्रियशक्तितस्[15]तत्सिद्धेः ११३

भोक्तुरधिष्ठानाद्भोगायतननिर्माणमन्यथा[16] पूतिभावप्रसंगात्[17] ११४

भृत्य[18]द्वारा[19] स्वाम्यधिष्ठितिर्नैकान्तात्[20] ११५

समाधिसु[21]षुप्तिमोक्षेषु ब्रह्मरूपता ११६

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१. नाजः. २. मानबाधात्. ३. तत्राप्यस्ति. ४. उभयत्राप्यन्यथेति. ५. नरहितः; °सिद्धिर्न ६. प्रत्यक्षानुमाने ७. both एव omitted. ८. सर्पयतीति ९. द्रव्ये. १०. देशभेदोऽपि ११. °स्मदादाविव नियमः. १२. जरायुज उद्भिज्ज° १३. संकल्पज साङ्कल्पिकं; १४. नकारो नापेक्षितः. १५. तत्सिद्धो वा पाठः. १६. भूतिभावप्रसक्तेः १७. प्रवृत्तिः; प्रसक्तिः; प्रसंगः. १८. 'भृत्यवद धिष्ठानं' इत्येव सूत्रं. १९. भृत्यवर्गद्वारा. २०. नैकान्त्यदिति वा पाठः. २१. °सुषुप्त°

द्वयोः सबीजमन्यत्र तद्धतिः ११७[1]
द्वयोरिव त्रयस्यापि[2] दृष्टत्वान्न तु[3] द्वौ ११८
वासनयानर्थख्यापनं[4] दोषयोगेऽपि न निमित्तस्य प्रधानबाधकत्वम् ११९
एकः संसारः क्रियानिर्वर्तको[5] न तु प्रतिक्रियं संस्कारभेदा[6] बहुकल्पनाप्रसक्तेः १२०
न[7] बाह्यबुद्धिनियमो वृक्षगुल्मलतौषधिवनस्पतितृणवीरुधादीनामपि भोक्तृभोगायतनत्वं पूर्ववत् १२१
स्मृतेश्च १२२
न देहमात्रतः कर्माधिकारित्वं वैशिष्ट्यश्रुतेः १२३
त्रिधा त्रयाणां व्यवस्था कर्मदेहोपभोगदेहोभयदेहाः १२४
न किञ्चिदप्यनुशयिनः[9] १२५
न बुद्ध्यादिनित्यत्वमाश्रयविशेषेऽपि वह्निवत् १२६
आश्रयासिद्धेश्च[10] १२७
योगसिद्धयोऽप्यौषधादिसिद्धिवन्नापलपनीयाः १२८
न भूतचैतन्यं प्रत्येकादृष्टेः[11] सांहत्ये[12]ऽपि[13] च सांहत्येऽपि च १२९

इति पञ्चमोऽध्यायः

अथ षष्ठोऽध्यायः

अस्त्यात्मा नास्तित्वसाधनाभावात्[14] १
देहादिव्यतिरिक्तोऽसौ[15] वैचित्र्यात् २

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१. द्वयोः सबीजत्वमन्यस्य तद्धानिः. २. अपि रहितः ३. 'तु' रहितः पाठोऽपि. ४. वासनया न स्वार्थख्यापनं;न वासनाया आनर्थक्यख्यापनं ५. °निवर्तको; °नुवर्तको ६. संस्कारभेदा रहितः. ७. नेत्यारभ्य नियमान्तं वृक्षेत्यारभ्य पूर्ववदित्यन्तं च योगविभागात् सूत्रद्वयं कल्पितं. ८. वीरुदादीनां वा पाठः ९. °नुशायिनः १०. 'च' रहितः पाठः क्वापि ११. °कानुपलब्धेः १२. स्वसांहत्ये १३. अपि रहितः १४. नास्तित्वे. १५. ऽसौ रहितः.

षष्ठीव्यपदेशादपि ३

न शिलापुत्रवद्[1] धर्मिग्राहकमानबाधात् ४

अत्यन्तदुःखनिवृत्त्या कृतकृत्यता ५

यथा दुःखात् क्लेशः[2] पुरुषस्य न तथा सुखादभिलाषः ६

[3]कुत्रापि कोऽपि सुखीति ७

तदपि दुःखशबलमिति दुःखपक्षे निःक्षिपन्ते[4] विवेचकाः ८

सुखलाभाभावादपुरुषार्थत्वमिति[5] चेत् न[6] द्वैविध्यात्[7] ९

निर्गुणत्वमात्मनोऽसङ्गत्वादि[8]श्रुतेः १०

परधर्मत्वेऽपि तत्सिद्धिरविवेकात् ११

अनादिरविवेकोऽन्यथा दोषद्वयप्रसक्तेः १२

[9]न नित्यः स्यादात्मवदन्यथानुच्छित्तिः[10] १३

प्रतिनियतकारणनाश्यत्वमस्य ध्वान्तवत् १४

अत्रापि प्रतिनियमोऽन्वयव्यतिरेकात् १५

[11]प्रकारान्तरासंभवादविवेक एव बन्धः १६

न मुक्तस्य पुनर्बन्धयोगोऽप्यनावृत्तिश्रुतेः १७

अपुरुषार्थत्वमन्यथा[12] १८

अविशेषापत्तिरुभयोः १९

मुक्तिरन्तरायध्वस्तेर्न[13] परः २०

तत्राप्यविरोधः[14] २१

अधिकारित्रैविध्यान्न नियमः २२

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१. शिलापुत्रकव°. २. द्वेषः. ३. 'न कुत्रापि इत्यादिः. ४. निक्षिपन्ते; निक्षिपन्ति. ५. °पुरुपार्थमिति. ६. 'चेन्नैवं'. ७. वैचित्र्यात्. ८. असङ्गादिश्रुतेः; ऽसङ्गत्वश्रुतेः. ९. कूटस्थपरिणामि. १०. स्यादात्मवदुच्छित्तेः. ११. प्रकारान्तराभावाद. १२. सूत्रान्ते 'पुनर्बन्धकत्वं' इत्यपि योजितं; अन्यथापुरुपार्थत्वं; अन्यथा रहितः. १३. 'न परा' 'नापरः' वा; °ध्वंसो न परः; °ध्वस्तेः पर्वपरः; परा. १४. सूत्रान्तरमपि 'अन्यथा कौटस्थ्यहानिः'.

दाढर्यार्थमुत्तरेषाम् २३

स्थि[1]रसुखमासनमिति न नियमः २४

ध्यानं निर्विषयं मनः २५

[2]उभयथाऽप्यविशेषश्चेन्नैवमुपरागनिरो[3]धाद्विशेषः २६

निःसङ्गेऽप्युपरागोऽविवेकात् २७

[4]जपास्फटिकयोरिव नोपरागः किन्त्वभिमानः २८

ध्यानधारणाभ्यासवैराग्यादिभिस्तन्निरोधः २९

लयविक्षेपयोर्व्यावृत्त्येत्याचार्याः ३०

न स्थाननियमश्चि[5]त्तप्रसादात् ३१

प्रकृतेराद्योपादानतान्येषां कार्यत्वश्रुतेः ३२

नित्यत्वेऽपि नात्मनो योग[6]त्वाभावात् ३३

श्रुतिविरो[7]धान्न कुतर्कापसदस्यात्मलाभः ३४

पारम्पर्येऽपि प्रधानानुवृत्तिरणुवत् ३५

सर्वत्र कार्यदर्शनाद्विभुत्त्वम् ३६

गतियोगेऽप्याद्यकारणताहानिरणुवत् ३७

प्रसिद्धाधिक्यं प्रधानस्य न नियमः ३८

सत्त्वादीनामतद्धर्मत्वं तद्रूपत्वात् ३९

अनुपभोगेऽपि पुमर्थं सृष्टिः प्रधानस्योष्ट्रकुङ्कुमवहनवत् ४०

कर्मवैचित्र्यात् सृष्टिवैचित्र्यम् ४१

साम्यवैषम्याभ्यां कार्यद्वयम् ४२

विमुक्तबोधान्न सृष्टिः प्रधानस्य लोकवत् ४३

नान्योपसर्पणेऽपि[8] मुक्तोपभोगो[9] निमित्ताभावात् ४४

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१. स्थिरं. २. अप्यविशेषं. ३. °विरोधात्. ४. जवास्फटिकयोरिव. ५. चित्तप्रसादाभावात्. ६. अयोग्यत्वाभावात् योग्यत्वाभावात् चेति पाठद्वयं. ७. आत्मविरोधान्न. ८. विमुक्तो.° ९. विमुक्तभोगो भवति.

पुरुषबहुत्वं व्यवस्थातः ४५
उपाधिश्चेत्[1] तत्सिद्धौ पुनर्द्वैतम् ४६
द्वाभ्यामपि[2] प्रमाणविरोधः ४७
द्वाभ्यामप्यविरोधान्न पूर्वमुत्तरं च साधकाभावात् ४८
प्रकाशतस्तत्सिद्धौ कर्मकर्तृविरोधः[3] ४९
जडव्यावृत्तो[4] जडं प्रकाशयति चिद्रूपः ५०
न श्रुतिविरोधो रागिणां वैराग्याय तत्सिद्धेः ५१
जगत्सत्यत्वमदुष्टकारणजन्यत्वाद् बाधकाभावात् ५२
प्रकारान्तरासम्भवात् सदुत्पत्तिः[5] ५३
अहङ्कारः कर्ता न पुरुषः ५४
चिदवसाना मुक्तिस्तत्कर्मार्जितत्वात् ५५
चन्द्रादिलोकेऽप्यावृत्तिर्निमित्तसद्भावात्[6] ५६
लोकस्य नोपदेशात् सिद्धिः[7] पूर्ववत् ५७
पारम्पर्येण तत्सिद्धौ विमुक्तिश्रुतिः[8] ५८
गतिश्रुतेश्च व्यापकत्वेऽप्युपाधियोगाद्भोगदेशकाललाभो[9] व्योमवत् ५९
अनधिष्ठितस्य[10] पूतिभावप्रसंगान्न तत्सिद्धिः ६०
अदृष्टद्वारा चेदसम्बद्धस्य तदसम्भवाज्जलादिवदङ्कुरे ६१
निर्गुणत्वात् तदसंभवादहङ्कारधर्मा ह्येते ६२
विशिष्टस्य जीवत्वमन्वयव्यतिरेकात् ६३
अहङ्कारकर्त्रधीना कार्यसिद्धिर्नेश्वराधीना प्रमाणाभावात् ६४
अदृष्टोद्भूतिवत्[11] समानत्वम् ६५

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१. उपाधिसिद्धिश्चेत्तत्सिद्धौ. २. द्वाभ्यामयं. ३. कर्मकर्तृत्वविरोधः; कर्तृकर्मविरोधः ४. ० व्यावृत्तो ५. तदुत्पत्तिः ६. निमित्तसंभवात् ७. तत्सिद्धिः ८. विमुक्तश्रुतिः ९. भोगदेशकालादिलाभो १०. पूतिभावयोगात् ११. अदृष्टोद्भूतवत्।

महतोऽन्यत् ६६

कर्मनिमित्तः प्रकृतेः स्वस्वामिभावोऽप्यनादिर्बीजाङ्कुरवत् ६७

[1]अविवेकनिमित्तो वा पञ्चशिखः ६८

लिङ्गशरीरनिमित्तक इति सनन्दनाचार्यः ६९

यद्वातद्वा तदुच्छित्तिः पुरुषार्थस्तदुच्छित्तिः पुरुषार्थः ७० ॥ ॐ ॥

इति शम्

इति सांख्यसूत्राणि समाप्तानि ।

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१. 'अविवेकनिमित्ते' 'अविवेकनिमित्तको' वा

श्रीमदीश्वरकृष्णप्रणीताः

सांख्यकारिकाः

दुःखत्रयाभिघाताज्जिज्ञासा तदभिघातके हेतौ ।
दृष्टे साऽपार्था चेन्नैकान्तात्यन्ततोऽभावात् ॥ १ ॥

दृष्टवदानुश्रविकः स ह्यविशुद्धिक्षयातिशययुक्तः ।
तद्विपरीतः श्रेयान् व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञविज्ञानात् ॥ २ ॥

मूलप्रकृतिरविकृतिर्महदाद्याः प्रकृतिविकृतयः सप्त ।
षोडशकस्तु विकारो न प्रकृतिर्न विकृतिः पुरुषः ॥ ३ ॥

दृष्टमनुमानमाप्तवचनं च, सर्वप्रमाणसिद्धत्वात् ।
त्रिविधं प्रमाणमिष्टं, प्रमेयसिद्धिः प्रमाणाद्धि ॥ ४ ॥

प्रतिविषयाध्यवसायो दृष्टं, त्रिविधमनुमानमाख्यातम् ।
तल्लिङ्गलिङ्गिपूर्वक, माप्तश्रुतिराप्तवचनं च ॥ ५ ॥

सामान्यतस्तु दृष्टादतीन्द्रियाणां प्रसिद्धिरनुमानात् ।
तस्मादपि चासिद्धं परोक्षमाप्तागमात् सिद्धम् ॥ ६ ॥

अतिदूरात् सामीप्यादिन्द्रियघातान्मनोऽनवस्थानात् ।
सौक्ष्म्याद् व्यवधानादभिभवात् समानाभिहाराच्च ॥ ७ ॥

सौक्ष्म्यात्तदनुपलब्धिर्नाभावात्, कार्यतस्तदुपलब्धिः ।
महदादि तच्च कार्यं, प्रकृतिविरूपं सरूपं च ॥ ८ ॥

असदकरणादुपादानग्रहणात्, सर्वसम्भवाभावात् ।
शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात्, कारणभावाच्च, सत्कार्यम् ॥ ९ ॥

हेतुमदनित्यमव्यापि सक्रियमनेकमाश्रितं लिङ्गम् ।
सावयवं परतन्त्रं व्यक्तं विपरीतमव्यक्तम् ॥ १० ॥

त्रिगुणमविवेकि विषयः सामान्यमचेतनं प्रसवधर्मि ।
व्यक्तं तथा प्रधानं, तद्विपरीतस्तथा च पुमान् ॥ ११ ॥

प्रीत्यप्रीतिविषादात्मकाः प्रकाशप्रवृत्तिनियमार्थाः ।
अन्योऽन्याभिभवाश्रयजननमिथुनवृत्तयश्च गुणाः ॥ १२ ॥

सत्त्वं लघु प्रकाशकमिष्टमुपष्टम्भकं चलं च रजः ।
गुरुवरणकमेव तमः प्रदीपवच्चार्थतो वृत्तिः ॥ १३ ॥

अविवेक्यादिः सिद्धः त्रैगुण्यात्तद्विपर्ययाभावात् ।
कारणगुणात्मकत्वात् कार्यस्याव्यक्तमपि सिद्धम् ॥ १४ ॥
भेदानां परिमाणात्, समन्वयात्, शक्तितः प्रवृत्तेश्च ।
कारणकार्यविभागात्, अविभागाद्वैश्वरूप्यस्य ॥ १५ ॥
कारणमस्त्यव्यक्तं प्रवर्तते त्रिगुणतः समुदयाच्च ।
परिणामतः सलिलवत् प्रतिप्रतिगुणाश्रयविशेषात् ॥ १६ ॥
संघातपरार्थत्वात् त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययादधिष्ठानात् ।
पुरुषोऽस्ति भोक्तृभावात् कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तेश्च ॥ १७ ॥
जननमरणकरणानां प्रतिनियमादयुगपत्प्रवृत्तेश्च ।
पुरुषबहुत्वं सिद्धं त्रैगुण्यविपर्ययाच्चैव ॥ १८ ॥
तस्माच्च विपर्यासात् सिद्धं साक्षित्वमस्य पुरुषस्य ।
कैवल्यं माध्यस्थ्यं द्रष्टृत्वमकर्तृभावश्च ॥ १९ ॥
तस्मात्तत्संयोगादचेतनं चेतनावदिव लिङ्गम् ।
गुणकर्तृत्वे च तथा कर्तेव भवत्युदासीनः ॥ २० ॥
पुरुषस्य दर्शनार्थं कैवल्यार्थं तथा प्रधानस्य ।
पङ्ग्वन्धवदुभयोरपि संयोगस्तत्कृतः सर्गः ॥ २१ ॥
प्रकृतेर्महान्, ततोऽहङ्कारः तस्माद्गणश्च षोडशकः ।
तस्मादपि षोडशकात् पञ्चभ्यः पञ्च भूतानि ॥ २२ ॥
अध्यवसायो बुद्धिर्धर्मो ज्ञानं विराग ऐश्वर्यम् ।
सात्त्विकमेतद्रूपं तामसमस्माद्विपर्यस्तम् ॥ २३ ॥
अभिमानोऽहङ्कारस्तस्माद्द्विविधः प्रवर्तते सर्गः ।
एकादशकश्च गणस्तन्मात्रः पञ्चकश्चैव ॥ २४ ॥
सात्त्विक एकादशकः प्रवर्तते वैकृतादहङ्कारात् ।
भूतादेस्तन्मात्रः स तामसः, तैजसादुभयम् ॥ २५ ॥
बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि चक्षुःश्रोत्रघ्राणरसनस्पर्शनकानि ।
वाक्पाणिपादपायूपस्थान् कर्मेन्द्रियाण्याहुः ॥ २६ ॥
उभयात्मकमत्र मनः संकल्पकमिन्द्रियं च साधर्म्यात् ।
गुणपरिणामविशेषान्नानात्वं बाह्यभेदाश्च ॥ २७ ॥

शब्दादिषु पञ्चानामालोचनमात्रमिष्यते वृत्तिः।
वचनादानविहरणोत्सर्गानन्दाश्च पञ्चानाम् ॥ २८ ॥
स्वालक्षण्यं वृत्तिस्त्रयस्य सैषा भवत्यसामान्या।
सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणाद्या वायवः पञ्च ॥ २९ ॥
युगपच्चतुष्टयस्य तु वृत्तिः क्रमशश्च तस्य निर्दिष्टा।
दृष्टे तथाऽप्यदृष्टे त्रयस्य तत्पूर्विका वृत्तिः ॥ ३० ॥
स्वां स्वां प्रतिपद्यन्ते परस्पराकूतहेतुकां वृत्तिम्।
पुरुषार्थ एव हेतुर्न केनचित्कार्यते करणम् ॥ ३१ ॥
करणं त्रयोदशविधं तदाहरणधारणप्रकाशकरम्।
कार्यं च तस्य दशधाऽऽहार्यं धार्यं प्रकाश्यं च ॥ ३२ ॥
अन्तःकरणं त्रिविधं दशधा बाह्यं त्रयस्य विषयाख्यम्।
साम्प्रतकालं बाह्यं त्रिकालमाभ्यन्तरं करणम् ॥ ३३ ॥
बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि तेषां पञ्च विशेषाविशेषविषयाणि।
वाग्भवति शब्दविषया शेषाणि तु पञ्चविषयाणि ॥ ३४ ॥
सान्तःकरणा बुद्धिः सर्वं विषयमवगाहते यस्मात्।
तस्मात् त्रिविधं करणं द्वारि द्वाराणि शेषाणि ॥ ३५ ॥
एते प्रदीपकल्पाः परस्परविलक्षणा गुणविशेषाः।
कृत्स्नं पुरुषस्यार्थं प्रकाश्य बुद्धौ प्रयच्छन्ति ॥ ३६ ॥
सर्वं प्रत्युपभोगं यस्मात् पुरुषस्य साधयति बुद्धिः।
सैव च विशिनष्टि पुनः प्रधानपुरुषान्तरं सूक्ष्मम् ॥ ३७ ॥
तन्मात्राण्यविशेषाः तेभ्यो भूतानि पञ्च पञ्चभ्यः।
एते स्मृता विशेषाः शान्ता घोराश्च मूढाश्च ॥ ३८ ॥
सूक्ष्मा मातापितृजाः सह प्रभूतैस्त्रिधा विशेषाः स्युः।
सूक्ष्मास्तेषां नियता मातापितृजा निवर्तन्ते ॥ ३९ ॥
पूर्वोत्पन्नमसक्तं नियतं महदादिसूक्ष्मपर्यन्तम्।
संसरति निरुपभोगं भावैरधिवासितं लिङ्गम् ॥ ४० ॥
चित्रं यथाश्रयमृते स्थाण्वादिभ्यो यथा विना छाया।
तद्वद्विनाऽविशेषैः न तिष्ठति निराश्रयं लिङ्गम् ॥ ४१ ॥

पुरुषार्थहेतुकमिदं निमित्तनैमित्तिकप्रसङ्गेन।
प्रकृतेर्विभुत्वयोगात् नटवद्व्यवतिष्ठते लिङ्गम्॥ ४२॥
सांसिद्धिकाश्च भावाः प्राकृतिका वैकृतिकाश्च धर्माद्याः।
दृष्टाः करणाश्रयिणः कार्याश्रयिणश्च कललाद्याः॥ ४३॥
धर्मेण गमनमूर्ध्वं गमनमधस्ताद् भवत्यधर्मेण।
ज्ञानेन चापवर्गो विपर्ययादिष्यते बन्धः॥ ४४॥
वैराग्यात् प्रकृतिलयः संसारो भवति राजसाद्रागात्।
ऐश्वर्यादविघातो विपर्ययात् तद्विपर्यासः॥ ४५॥
एष प्रत्ययसर्गो विपर्ययाशक्तितुष्टिसिद्ध्याख्यः।
गुणवैषम्यविमर्देन तस्य भेदास्तु पञ्चाशत्॥ ४६॥
पञ्च विपर्ययभेदा भवन्त्यशक्तिश्च करणवैकल्यात्।
अष्टाविंशति भेदाः तुष्टिर्नवधाऽष्टधा सिद्धिः॥ ४७॥
भेदस्तमसोऽष्टविधो मोहस्य च, दशविधो महामोहः।
तामिस्रोऽष्टादशधा, तथा भवत्यन्धतामिस्रः॥ ४८॥
एकादशेन्द्रियवधाः सह बुद्धिवधैरशक्तिरुद्दिष्टा।
सप्तदश वधा बुद्धेर्विपर्ययात् तुष्टिसिद्धीनाम्॥ ४९॥
आध्यात्मिकाश्चतस्रः प्रकृत्युपादानकालभाग्याख्याः।
बाह्या विषयोपरमात् पञ्च, नव तुष्टयोऽभिहिताः॥ ५०॥
ऊहः शब्दोऽध्ययनं दुःखविघातास्त्रयः सुहृत्प्राप्तिः।
दानं च सिद्धयोऽष्टौ सिद्धेः पूर्वोऽङ्कुशास्त्रिविधः॥ ५१॥
न विना भावैर्लिङ्गं न विना लिङ्गेन भावनिर्वृत्तिः।
लिङ्गाख्यो भावाख्यस्तस्माद् द्विविधः प्रवर्तते सर्गः॥ ५२॥
अष्टविकल्पो दैवस्तैर्यग्योनश्च पञ्चधा भवति।
मानुष्यश्चैकविधः समासतोऽयं त्रिधा सर्गः॥५३॥
ऊर्ध्वं सत्त्वविशालस्तमोविशालश्च मूलतः सर्गः।
मध्ये रजोविशालो ब्रह्मादिस्तम्बपर्यन्तः॥ ५४॥
तत्र जरामरणकृतं दुःखं प्राप्नोति चेतनः पुरुषः।
लिङ्गस्याविनिवृत्तेः, तस्माद् दुःखं स्वभावेन॥ ५५॥

इत्येष प्रकृतिकृतो महदादिविशेषभूतपर्यन्तः ।
प्रतिपुरुषविमोक्षार्थं स्वार्थ इव परार्थ आरम्भः ॥ ५६ ॥
वत्सविवृद्धिनिमित्तं क्षीरस्य यथा प्रवृत्तिरज्ञस्य ।
पुरुषविमोक्षनिमित्तं तथा प्रवृत्तिः प्रधानस्य ॥ ५७ ॥
औत्सुक्यनिवृत्त्यर्थं यथा क्रियासु प्रवर्तते लोकः ।
पुरुषस्य विमोक्षार्थं प्रवर्तते तद्वदव्यक्तम् ॥ ५८ ॥
रङ्गस्य दर्शयित्वा निवर्तते नर्तकी यथा नृत्यात् ।
पुरुषस्य तथाऽऽत्मानं प्रकाश्य विनिवर्तते प्रकृतिः ॥ ५९ ॥
नानाविधैरुपायैरुपकारिण्यनुपकारिणः पुंसः ।
गुणवत्यगुणस्य सतस्तस्यार्थमपार्थकं चरति ॥ ६० ॥
प्रकृतेः सुकुमारतरं न किञ्चिदस्तीति मे मतिर्भवति ।
या दृष्टास्मीति पुनर्न दर्शनमुपैति पुरुषस्य ॥ ६१ ॥
तस्मान्न बध्यते नापि मुच्यते नापि संसरति कश्चित् ।
संसरति बध्यते मुच्यते च नानाश्रया प्रकृतिः ॥ ६२ ॥
रूपैः सप्तभिरेव तु बध्नात्यात्मानमात्मना प्रकृतिः ।
सैव च पुरुषार्थं प्रति विमोचयत्येकरूपेण ॥ ६३ ॥
एवं तत्त्वाभ्यासान्नास्मि न मे नाहमित्यपरिशेषम् ।
अविपर्ययाद्विशुद्धं केवलमुत्पद्यते ज्ञानम् ॥ ६४ ॥
तेन निवृत्तप्रसवामर्थवशात् सप्तरूपविनिवृत्ताम् ।
प्रकृतिं पश्यति पुरुषः प्रेक्षकवदवस्थितः स्वस्थः ॥ ६५ ॥
रङ्गस्थ इत्युपेक्षक एको दृष्टाहमित्युपरमत्येका ।
सति संयोगेऽपि तयोः प्रयोजनं नास्ति सर्गस्य ॥ ६६ ॥
सम्यग्ज्ञानाधिगमाद्धर्मादीनामकारणप्राप्तौ ।
तिष्ठति संस्कारवशाच्चक्रभ्रमवद्धृतशरीरः ॥ ६७ ॥
प्राप्ते शरीरभेदे चरितार्थत्वात् प्रधानविनिवृत्तौ ।
ऐकान्तिकमात्यन्तिकमुभयं कैवल्यमाप्नोति ॥ ६८ ॥
पुरुषार्थज्ञानमिदं गुह्यं परमर्षिणा समाख्यातम् ।
स्थित्युत्पत्तिप्रलयाश्चिन्त्यन्ते यत्र भूतानाम् ॥ ६९ ॥